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By:

Rajiv Shah

22 September 2025 at 8:32:23 pm

New Alliances, New Pressures, New Fault Lines

To its west, old relationships in the Gulf are acquiring new strategic and military dimensions. Across the Atlantic, Washington is increasingly using tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy. At the same time, India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and prepares to host its summit when the grouping is being watched in the West as a potential challenge to the American-dominated global financial order. Individually, these developments may appear unrelated. Put together, they reveal a larger...

New Alliances, New Pressures, New Fault Lines

To its west, old relationships in the Gulf are acquiring new strategic and military dimensions. Across the Atlantic, Washington is increasingly using tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy. At the same time, India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and prepares to host its summit when the grouping is being watched in the West as a potential challenge to the American-dominated global financial order. Individually, these developments may appear unrelated. Put together, they reveal a larger geopolitical churn in which alliances, energy, trade, currencies and economic coercion are becoming interconnected. India finds itself almost at its centre. The emerging Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan security equation deserves particular attention. Saudi Arabia brings enormous financial and energy influence; Türkiye possesses considerable military strength, NATO experience and an expanding defence industry; Pakistan brings a large military establishment and nuclear capability with the open support of Washington. Any arrangement containing a collective-defence commitment naturally acquires significance beyond ordinary diplomatic cooperation. Alongside it, another strategic convergence has gradually developed among India, Israel and the UAE. It would be incorrect to describe this as a formal military alliance. Yet geopolitics does not operate through defence treaties alone. India's extensive defence and technology relationship with Israel, its rapidly expanding economic and strategic partnership with the UAE, and the UAE-Israel relationship following the Abraham Accords have created considerable common ground. I2U2—bringing together India, Israel, the UAE and the United States—added another institutional dimension. Thus, without necessarily becoming opposing military camps, two interesting strategic formations are visible across West Asia: Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan and the looser India–UAE–Israel convergence. Balancing Challenge India faces a similar balancing challenge. The Gulf is not a distant geopolitical theatre for New Delhi. Nearly nine million Indians live and work there. India's energy security, investments, trade and remittance flows are closely connected with the region. The proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor also requires relative stability across this geography. Polarisation in West Asia can therefore rapidly become an Indian economic and strategic problem. There is another question Indian planners cannot ignore. If a future India-Pakistan confrontation escalates, how would any collective-defence commitment involving Pakistan be interpreted by Saudi Arabia and Türkiye? It would be alarmist to assume that either country would automatically enter a conflict against India. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has substantial economic and strategic interests in maintaining good relations with New Delhi. Nevertheless, defence planners are paid to examine possibilities before they become crises. While these equations develop in India's neighbourhood, economic pressure is emerging from Washington. The US Senate has voted 86–11 for legislation intended to increase pressure on Russia by targeting major purchasers of Russian energy. The measure could authorise tariffs reaching 100 per cent against goods from countries continuing large-scale purchases of Russian oil and gas, with India among those potentially exposed. China is powerful enough to shrug off similar challenges from the West." However this does not mean that America has already imposed a 100 per cent tariff on India. Further legislative steps remain necessary, and presidential waiver provisions are important. But the overwhelming Senate vote carries a political message that New Delhi cannot dismiss. Tariffs are no longer merely tools of trade protection; they have become instruments of geopolitical coercion. Washington's argument is understandable: revenues from Russian petroleum help sustain Moscow's economy during the Ukraine war, and reducing those revenues increases pressure on Russia. But in that case what about European countries who too were/are customers of Russian oil? India's question is equally legitimate: who should determine where India purchases the energy required by more than 1.4 billion people? If Russian crude remains commercially advantageous and helps contain domestic energy costs, New Delhi cannot reasonably be expected to make every energy decision according to another country's geopolitical priorities. Strategic partnership cannot become strategic obedience. This is where BRICS enters the larger picture. India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and will host its leaders at an unusually sensitive moment. BRICS is no longer merely the original grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Its expansion has considerably increased its demographic, energy and geopolitical weight. More importantly, discussions around BRICS increasingly touch a sensitive nerve in Washington: alternative payment mechanisms, local-currency trade, development finance and the possibility of gradually reducing dependence upon the dollar-dominated international financial system. The BRICS Summit this time is poised to take some decisive steps which may affect western interests especially US. (The writer is an advocate, legal, geopolitical and public policy analyst. Views personal.)

Broken Consensus: Is the UN Still Relevant?

The UN’s current structure is a colonial relic, where a few nations still dominate global rules.

The United Nations was born out of the ashes of the Second World War with a lofty promise: to prevent future wars, uphold international peace and security, and provide a forum for resolving disputes through dialogue, not violence. It was conceived as the cornerstone of a new world order, where multilateralism would guide diplomacy and global cooperation would replace confrontation. For many years, it lived up to that promise in spirit, if not always in practice. Today, however, the UN is increasingly being bypassed, ignored, or rendered ineffective in the face of the very challenges it was created to address.


The world has changed greatly since 1945, yet the UN’s core structure remains frozen in time. Institutions that fail to evolve risk irrelevance, and the UN is no exception.


Many of today’s major challenges, like climate action, security alliances, technology governance, pandemic response, and even peace negotiations, are tackled outside the UN—through bilateral or regional deals or forums like the G20, BRICS, and ASEAN. The General Assembly passes resolutions, but with no enforcement, they are mostly diplomatic theatre. The Security Council, once central to global security, is paralysed by vetoes and inaction. Unable to enforce its own decisions, it has become more of a stage for power politics than a tool for peace.


The Security Council still mirrors the power balance of 1945. The five permanent members—the US, UK, France, Russia, and China—hold disproportionate power through their veto, often blocking action in conflicts tied to their interests. As a result, the Council frequently fails to issue even statements, let alone binding resolutions.


Much of the world lacks a voice in the Council: Africa, Latin America, and much of Asia are sidelined, fuelling resentment and eroding the UN’s legitimacy.


The war in Ukraine starkly shows the UN’s paralysis: Russia’s permanent seat lets it veto any move to hold it accountable. Similarly, the Syrian civil war, with its mass deaths and refugee crisis, dragged on for years without effective UN action.

 

Case for Reform

India’s frustration with the UN system is neither new nor unique. As the world’s most populous nation and a major economy, its absence from permanent Security Council membership is a glaring anomaly. A nuclear power, a spacefaring nation, the world’s largest democracy, and a leading contributor to UN peacekeeping, India still remains outside the core decision-making circle.


The UN’s current structure is a colonial relic, with a few nations still dominating global rules. India’s growing stature and the UN’s stalemate have led it to seek greater strategic success through forums like BRICS and SCO. By contrast, the UN often feels like a stage where India is asked to contribute but denied a role in writing the script.


UN reform has been debated for decades, from expanding the Security Council with new permanent members (India, Brazil, Germany, and an African representative) to curbing the veto. Yet efforts remain stalled, as the P5 have little incentive to dilute their power.


Without consensus among permanent members, reform remains a distant dream. Yet the status quo is increasingly untenable. As more nations lose faith, the global order may tilt further towards regional blocs, fragmenting the notion of a unified international community.


The real question is not whether the UN needs an overhaul or not. The real question is whether the UN can reform itself from within or whether it is time for the world to look for a new alternative.


Today’s world needs a new international body that can better reflect the current geopolitical, economic, and demographic realities. It should be based on a new framework built on principles of democratic representation, rotational leadership, transparency, and accountability.


The real danger lies not in reforming the global system but in doing nothing. As global politics shift in today’s multipolar world and the UN declines, we risk deeper polarisation, where international law is honoured only when convenient and cooperation yields to rhetoric. In this vacuum, powerful states or alliances will pursue their own interests, leaving weaker nations to navigate a fragmented, volatile order.


For countries like India, this is both a challenge and an opportunity. As a rising global power, India must assert its role not just as a reform-seeker but as a reform-leader, building consensus among like-minded and under-represented nations and proposing viable models for a more inclusive and effective international system.

 

(The writer is a foreign affairs expert. Views personal.)

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