China’s Deepening Grip on Bangladesh: What It Means for India

Bangladesh’s deepening ties with China and Pakistan spell trouble for India’s regional strategy.

For decades, Bangladesh balanced its foreign relations, maintaining ties with India and China while ensuring economic growth and stability. India, crucial to Bangladesh’s 1971 liberation, has long shared close economic, political, and cultural ties with its neighbour. However, under interim leader Muhammad Yunus, this balance is shifting away from India.

Bangladesh’s recent diplomacy, trade deals, and military ties indicate a clear tilt toward China, with major implications for India. While past governments maintained neutrality, the current leadership is actively moving out of India’s sphere of influence, deepening ties with China and Pakistan.

This shift is evident in Bangladesh’s push to renegotiate loans, expand military cooperation, and sign a hydrological data-sharing agreement with China. Strengthening Bangladesh-China ties impact not just their bilateral relations but also India’s strategic interests in trade, water security, and defence.

A Brief History of Bangladesh-China Relations

Historically, Bangladesh and China had a tense relationship. During Bangladesh’s 1971 independence struggle, China backed Pakistan diplomatically and militarily, opposing its creation. For four years after independence, China refused to recognise Bangladesh, aligning with Pakistan. Diplomatic ties were normalised in 1975.

Since the 1980s, relations have steadily improved, with China becoming a key economic and military partner. By the early 2000s, it dominated Bangladesh’s economy, becoming its largest trading partner. Trade surpassed $25 billion by 2023, and in 2022, China granted duty-free access to 98% of Bangladeshi exports, deepening economic ties.

Bangladesh’s military ties with China have grown significantly, with over 80% of its hardware, including tanks, fighter jets, and naval vessels, sourced from China. In 2016, Bangladesh bought two Chinese Ming-class submarines, sparking Indian concerns over Chinese influence in the Bay of Bengal.

Bangladesh’s Growing Dependence on China

Last month, Foreign Affairs Adviser Touhid Hossain visited China, where both sides negotiated loan repayment extensions, lower interest rates, healthcare collaboration, and a hydrological data-sharing agreement. While China agreed to some requests in principle, the situation mirrors its debt-trap diplomacy seen in Sri Lanka and Pakistan.

Chinese firms now dominate Bangladesh’s infrastructure sector, financing and constructing major projects like the Padma Bridge Rail Link, Karnaphuli Tunnel, and multiple power plants, reducing India’s economic influence.

Beyond trade, China’s role in Bangladesh’s water security is a growing concern for India. Bangladesh’s recent hydrological data-sharing agreement with China grants access to Brahmaputra River flow data. While seemingly beneficial, it poses a strategic risk. China already controls the river’s upstream flow, and its ongoing dam projects in Tibet could severely impact water availability in both Bangladesh and India, further weakening India’s leverage in transboundary water negotiations.

Military ties with China have also expanded. Beyond weapons procurement, reports suggest Bangladesh is allowing Chinese firms to assist in modernising its naval base in Cox’s Bazar. This too raises fear that China could use Bangladesh as a staging ground for naval operations in the Bay of Bengal, threatening India’s eastern coastline.

Additionally, Bangladesh’s rapprochement with Pakistan under the current regime signals a foreign policy shift. Discussions on expanding military cooperation, particularly intelligence sharing, are growing. Given Pakistan’s hostility toward India, closer Bangladesh-Pakistan military ties—especially under Chinese influence—would be a strategic setback for India.

The Impact on India’s Strategic Interests

Bangladesh’s shift toward China and Pakistan is a growing reality with serious consequences for India. Unlike previous governments that maintained a balanced foreign policy, the new regime is actively deepening ties with India’s hostile neighbours.

For India, the challenge is not just adapting to this shift but countering it through strategic pressure. Rather than expanding economic cooperation, India must use its geopolitical and economic tools to limit Bangladesh’s manoeuvrability and raise the costs of its China alignment. This could include tightening border security, imposing stricter trade policies, and reassessing concessional arrangements that have long favoured Bangladesh.

India should also apply diplomatic pressure to curb Chinese influence in Bangladesh’s defence sector and prevent military use of Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar ports. Water security can serve as a bargaining tool, with India reassessing transboundary river-sharing agreements in response to Bangladesh’s reliance on China’s hydrological data.

At the same time, India must abandon its outdated approach of bailing out neighbours from China’s debt traps without securing concrete benefits. In the past, financial and diplomatic aid has failed to prevent countries from strengthening ties with China. Future assistance to Bangladesh or others must come with clear, enforceable conditions that serve India’s long-term interests.

The era of Bangladesh’s balanced foreign policy is over. India must adopt a firm, strategic, and coercive approach to protect its interests. Failure to counter Bangladesh’s China tilt risks cementing China’s influence in India’s eastern neighbourhood, tipping the regional balance further in Beijing’s favour, and creating major risks in the North East.

(The author is a foreign affairs expert. Views personal.)