Decoding India’s Response to Pak Airstrikes

Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal

Two weeks after Pakistan carried out airstrikes in Afghanistan’s eastern Paktika province, India issued a rare and sharp rebuke. The statement condemned the strikes, criticizing Pakistan’s “old practice” of blaming its neighbours for domestic failures. Though seemingly routine, the response reveals a subtle shift in India’s posture toward Afghanistan’s Taliban regime.

Pakistan’s recent actions in Afghanistan reflect its deepening struggles with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a once-allied but now renegade faction that claims Pakistan’s Pashtun territories as part of Afghanistan. Islamabad has accused Kabul of providing sanctuary to TTP militants, who are blamed for an uptick in cross-border violence. The Taliban, for its part, counters that Pakistan’s strikes have targeted civilians rather than militants. The airstrikes mark yet another low in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, as their decades-old patron-client dynamic continues to unravel.

India’s response is notable for its dual message. By unequivocally condemning the airstrikes and emphasizing civilian casualties, New Delhi tacitly supports the Taliban’s narrative. Simultaneously, its criticism of Pakistan’s tendency to externalize its failures mirrors the Taliban’s accusations. Though couched in diplomatic language, India’s position signals a calculated tilt towards Afghanistan’s current rulers, a pragmatic recalibration of ties that reflects shifting regional dynamics.

India has never recognized the Taliban regime, viewing it as an entity nurtured by Pakistan to undermine Indian interests in the region. For decades, the Taliban provided safe haven to anti-India terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. However, geopolitical realities have compelled New Delhi to adopt a more nuanced approach.

Since reopening its embassy in Kabul in mid-2022, India has engaged in cautious diplomacy with the Taliban. A series of meetings between Indian officials and Taliban leaders including Afghanistan’s foreign and defence ministers indicate that New Delhi is willing to explore limited engagement. India’s humanitarian aid, including food and medical supplies, has also positioned it as a responsible regional actor, concerned with Afghanistan’s stability and welfare.

Yet this engagement stops short of endorsement. New Delhi remains deeply critical of the Taliban’s treatment of women and minorities, as well as its inability to govern effectively. India’s approach appears to be one of selective pragmatism: maintaining minimal channels of communication while safeguarding its investments and countering Pakistan’s influence.

With Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban fraying, Afghanistan offers India an opportunity to undermine Islamabad’s regional strategy. By aligning its position, even tangentially, with the Taliban’s, India adds pressure on Pakistan, whose overstretched military is already grappling with insurgencies in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

India’s stance on Pakistan and Afghanistan cannot be understood in isolation from ongoing developments in Bangladesh, where its Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus is seemingly moving towards rapprochement with Islamabad. This could see Pakistani military personnel returning to Bangladesh for the first time since the 1971 war of independence.

For New Delhi, these developments are troubling. Bangladesh shares borders with several Indian states, and instability in Dhaka could spill over into India’s northeast, a region already vulnerable to insurgencies. Pakistan’s role in this equation is equally concerning. Its military, notorious for supporting militancy in India, may use Bangladesh as a staging ground for destabilizing activities.

In 1971, India played a decisive role in Bangladesh’s liberation from Pakistan, with the Mukti Bahini insurgents receiving Indian military support. But the current political upheaval, which echoes the tumultuous events of that era, threatens to undo decades of progress.

Pakistan’s enduring strategy of ‘bleeding India with a thousand cuts’ persists, even as its own foundations weaken. The country faces a trifecta of crises: an economy on the brink of collapse, political instability, and rising internal dissent. Its military, long considered the bedrock of the state, is now stretched thin, battling insurgencies on multiple fronts while struggling to maintain its grip over a disillusioned populace.

India, meanwhile, has adopted a more assertive posture. The surgical strikes in Uri and the airstrikes in Balakot demonstrated a willingness to retaliate against Pakistani provocations.

Strategically, India’s calibrated approach to Afghanistan and its firm stance on Pakistan’s actions could accelerate the latter’s internal disintegration. Balochistan and Sindh, regions with long-standing separatist aspirations, may be emboldened by Islamabad’s weakening grip.

The triangular relationship between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan is at a critical juncture. For Islamabad, the consequences of its policies are increasingly dire. Its support for militancy, once a tool of statecraft, now threatens its own survival. The prospect of a fragmented Pakistan, reduced to its Punjab heartland, is no longer implausible.

For India, the stakes are equally high. By engaging selectively with the Taliban and asserting its interests in Bangladesh, New Delhi is attempting to secure its borders and assert its regional leadership. However, these gains remain fragile, contingent on deft diplomacy and robust internal security.