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Dhaka’s Dangerous Drift

Muhammad Yunus’s theatrics distract from Bangladesh’s perilous geopolitical and democratic drift.

If Professor Muhammad Yunus hoped to steer Bangladesh into a calm democratic harbour, his tenure as interim leader is instead dragging the country into stormier waters. The Nobel Peace Prize winner and social entrepreneur, once celebrated for bringing microfinance to the world’s poorest, now seems overwhelmed by the chaos of real-world governance. His threat to resign last week may have been meant to jolt political parties into cooperation. Instead, it has exposed the limits of moral authority in a deeply polarised nation teetering on the edge of political and economic breakdown. In the event, Yunus has decided to stay on, if reports are to be believed.


Bangladesh’s interim government, in place since last August following mass student protests that ended Sheikh Hasina’s increasingly autocratic rule, was always going to face formidable challenges. But Yunus has compounded the difficulties by indulging in public melodrama when firmness and discretion are needed. His repeated hints at resignation, his open frustrations with political factions, and his cabinet reshuffles betray a leadership style more academic seminar than statecraft.


The political climate is combustible. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), long antagonistic toward both Hasina’s Awami League and the military, has seized on Yunus’s equivocation to press harder for concessions, notably a fixed election date. BNP supporters continue to flood the streets of Dhaka, demanding justice for what they claim was the fraudulent 2020 mayoral election, a lingering scar from the Awami League’s rule. Yunus, by promising elections by June 2026 but offering no fixed roadmap, has given his critics ample ammunition.


Behind the scenes, more serious confrontations are brewing. General Waker-Uz-Zaman, the army chief, has insisted that elections be held by December 2025. The military’s growing impatience is not simply about scheduling. A rift is widening between Yunus’s civilian administration and the armed forces over several strategic issues, notably the proposed “humanitarian corridor” into Myanmar’s Rakhine state, a move opposed by the military. Yunus’s appointment of a National Security Adviser, bypassing the military chain of command, appears a deliberate attempt to curtail army influence. But instead of strengthening civilian control, it has only provoked institutional resistance.


Yunus’ relationship with the Awami League soured more than a decade ago when he briefly floated the idea of forming a political party. Since then, he has lived in a space between admiration abroad and suspicion at home. His appointment last year as head of the interim government was welcomed by Western capitals and a fatigued civil society but not by Bangladesh’s political class, which sees him as an outsider with little grasp of local power dynamics.


Last week’s resignation theatrics resemble less a democratic reckoning than a courtly drama. Leadership demands not just moral clarity, but strategic acumen and the ability to manage conflicting interests. Yunus has so far displayed neither.


The geopolitical stakes are rising. With India cooling relations following Hasina’s ouster, Bangladesh finds itself increasingly isolated. Economic growth forecasts have been slashed. The World Bank warns that Bangladesh may experience its slowest growth in nearly four decades. Foreign investment is stagnant, and the government’s fiscal leeway is narrowing. China, which courted Hasina with infrastructure promises, is watching the chaos with measured detachment. Meanwhile, the U.S., an early champion of Yunus, is more preoccupied with global flashpoints elsewhere.


Bangladesh sits at the crossroads of South and Southeast Asia, straddling fragile migration routes, Islamic militancy risks, and a region-wide arms race. Its fate affects the stability of not just India’s eastern flank, but also the Bay of Bengal’s maritime security. The interim government’s appeasement (nay, courting of) Islamists risks turning the situation into a pressure cooker.


Bangladesh needs a technocratic government, not a theatrical one. Yunus must understand that the credibility of a transition government depends not on his personal aura, but on his ability to facilitate consensus among political actors and institutions. If he is unable to mediate with the military, communicate clearly with the public, or uphold the authority of civilian institutions, then the real question is whether he still deserves to lead.

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