Persian Paradox

More sanctions, secret talks and a raging nuclear chess game only prove why diplomacy with Iran is harder than ever.

The United States is once again tightening the screws on Iran. On Tuesday, it sanctioned three Iranian nationals and a state-linked entity over their ties to Tehran’s shadowy Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), which Washington sees as the modern-day incarnation of the country’s pre-2004 nuclear weapons programme, the Amad Project. This move follows a fresh round of indirect nuclear negotiations in Oman and another cascade of economic measures aimed at strangling Iran’s oil-based revenue networks.

The timing of these sanctions is telling. The fourth round of nu but progress remains elusive. Iran’s nuclear programme continues to gallop ahead. According to U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the Islamic Republic is the only non-nuclear weapons state enriching uranium up to 60 percent purity - a stone’s throw from weapons-grade levels. Dual-use research into delivery systems remains active and procurement networks abroad help mask illicit acquisitions. Washington’s message bluntly says that these latest actions are meant to delay and degrade SPND’s nuclear research.

But diplomacy still simmers beneath the surface. Tehran even floated a proposal for a joint nuclear enrichment venture involving regional Arab states and American investments, an idea both bold and baffling, considering it would require cooperation between arch-rivals like Iran and Saudi Arabia, not to mention trust from a U.S. administration that has spent months reimposing Donald Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ strategy.

That plan, leaked to the Iranian press, has sparked a domestic uproar. Even Farhikhtegan, a newspaper close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), questioned whether the offer amounted to a service or treason. The idea of involving the United States in Iranian nuclear infrastructure is politically toxic in Tehran, where hardliners remain deeply suspicious of Western engagement after the collapse of the 2015 nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in 2018.

That deal was Barack Obama’s diplomatic high-water mark: a multilateral pact that capped Iranian enrichment levels in exchange for sanctions relief. But when Trump pulled out of the agreement in 2018 and reimposed sanctions, Iran resumed enrichment, albeit gradually at first. Since then, its nuclear capabilities have steadily grown. The Biden administration’s early efforts to revive the JCPOA collapsed amid mutual distrust.

The latest round of sanctions points to another escalation, this time aimed not just at Iran, but at its trading partner: China. On the same day, the U.S. Treasury blacklisted more than 20 companies linked to a sprawling oil network used to funnel billions of dollars to China. These firms, ranging from Singaporean inspection companies to Chinese shipping agents, allegedly disguised Iranian oil shipments, helping Tehran’s armed forces bankroll their drone and ballistic missile programmes and fund proxies like the Houthis in Yemen.

Such backdoor exports remain a vital lifeline for Iran’s regime. Yet, despite the sanctions, they continue largely unabated. If Washington wants to truly squeeze Tehran’s finances, analysts argue it would need to sanction major Chinese banks - something successive administrations have balked at, fearing the geopolitical fallout. However, using counterterrorism authorities to issue these new sanctions may be a subtle step toward that goal. It signals not only America’s determination to block nuclear proliferation, but also a triangulation strategy: pressuring China to rein in Iran.

Yet sanctions alone won’t yield a breakthrough. Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, has publicly rejected calls to dismantle his country’s nuclear infrastructure. The Islamic Republic’s negotiating posture is tougher; its nuclear capacity, greater and its domestic politics, more tightly gripped by security hardliners.

The real paradox is that while both Washington and Tehran speak of peace, their actions lean toward conflict. Sanctions proliferate, enrichment accelerates and the region’s fault lines deepen. If a new accord is to emerge from the ashes of the JCPOA, it will require more than backchannel talks in Muscat. It will need imagination, trust and the political will to step back from the brink. Neither side, for now, seems ready to do so.