The world’s three most consequential nuclear powers are preparing for an extraordinary diplomatic encounter in Shenzhen on November 19. Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping will meet on the sidelines of the 33rd Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders’ Meeting. It will be the first trilateral meeting of the three leaders, bringing together Washington, Moscow and Beijing at a moment when strategic mistrust, regional wars and nuclear anxieties are reshaping international relations.
The question is what their meeting could mean for the future of global security at a time when established diplomatic arrangements are fraying.
The prospect of direct engagement among the three largest nuclear powers carries considerable significance. Yet it also raises an uncomfortable question: can decisions affecting the security of the entire world legitimately be shaped by three capitals alone?
Nuclear Vacuum
Nuclear arms control is likely to be among the central concerns. The expiry of the New START treaty between the United States and Russia on February 5, 2026, has removed the last major bilateral framework imposing limits on their deployed strategic nuclear arsenals. Its disappearance has created a dangerous vacuum in an already volatile international environment.
The treaty’s significance extended beyond numerical restrictions. It provided mechanisms for verification, transparency and communication, helping prevent strategic competition from becoming an uncontrolled arms race. Without a successor arrangement, mutual suspicion could intensify, encouraging both countries to expand or modernise their nuclear capabilities with fewer institutional restraints.
Washington has indicated its interest in discussing reductions in nuclear arsenals, while China has so far resisted joining a framework designed around American and Russian strategic requirements. Beijing argues, with some justification, that its nuclear stockpile remains considerably smaller than those of the two established nuclear superpowers. Estimates place China's arsenal at around 600 warheads, against several thousand in the American and Russian inventories.
The asymmetry makes negotiations difficult. China is reluctant to accept restrictions that could institutionalise an unfavourable balance, while Washington wants Beijing included in any future arms-control architecture. Moscow, meanwhile, has its own strategic calculations. The challenge is to reconcile these competing interests without allowing the absence of agreement to become an invitation to proliferation.
The Shenzhen meeting may also touch upon the conflict involving the United States and Iran, which has added another layer of instability to an already troubled international order. Each of the three powers has different interests and diplomatic leverage in the Middle East. Their ability to influence the course of the conflict, or create conditions for negotiations, will therefore be closely watched.
The Ukraine war presents a more complicated question. Washington has indicated that it does not intend to make the conflict a principal subject of the trilateral discussions, although Moscow has its own reasons for seeking a wider conversation. Beijing, too, has been cautious about allowing the meeting to become a forum for issues that could complicate its diplomatic calculations.
For China, the summit represents an opportunity to enlarge its international stature. Beijing has long sought recognition not merely as a dominant Asian power but as an indispensable participant in the management of global affairs. Hosting the three leaders in Shenzhen offers precisely that diplomatic theatre. Yet leadership of the international order requires more than the ability to convene powerful governments. It demands a willingness to accommodate the interests of countries that do not possess comparable military or economic weight.
Missing Voice
This is where India’s absence becomes particularly consequential. As one of the world’s major nuclear powers and a leading voice of the Global South, India has a legitimate interest in any discussion that could determine the future architecture of nuclear security.
India has consistently maintained a doctrine of credible minimum deterrence and a no-first-use posture. It has also advocated universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament. Its position is not that nuclear weapons can be managed indefinitely through selective agreements among a handful of countries, but that meaningful disarmament must ultimately rest on a wider international framework.
India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and its approach to nuclear diplomacy has consequently differed from that of the established treaty powers. But this should not be mistaken for indifference towards arms control. New Delhi has repeatedly argued that nuclear disarmament must be universal rather than governed by arrangements that preserve existing hierarchies.
Its exclusion from the Shenzhen deliberations therefore exposes a larger contradiction. The Global South is increasingly important to the international economy and geopolitical balance, yet its voice remains limited when the major powers discuss questions of war, peace and strategic stability. Any nuclear framework that ignores countries such as India risks being incomplete from the outset.
India must, of course, pursue its interests with diplomatic patience and strategic independence. Its emphasis on peace, stability, development and the peaceful uses of atomic energy remains important.
But non-alignment cannot mean diplomatic passivity. India should continue to press for an inclusive disarmament framework in which all nuclear-armed states accept meaningful obligations. The objective must be to reduce nuclear dangers, strengthen transparency, prevent accidental escalation and eventually move towards verifiable disarmament.
The Shenzhen meeting may not produce an immediate treaty. Indeed, the differences among its participants are formidable. Its more realistic contribution could be to reopen channels of communication and establish principles for sustained negotiations. A durable international settlement cannot be the private understanding of three powerful leaders. It must recognise the legitimate security concerns of the wider international community.
(The writer is a foreign affairs expert. Views personal.)
