A Tale of Two Responses: 1971 vs 2025

To canonise Indira Gandhi fire-breathing ‘defiance’ to Nixon while chastising Modi’s ‘submission’ before Trump is intellectually dishonest, historically incoherent and politically loaded.

In the immediate aftermath of the ‘ceasefire’ unilaterally announced by Donald Trump between India and Pakistan, a narrative is being put out by certain sections including Congress functionaries (with the notable exception of the erudite Shashi Tharoor) and the familiar clique of anti-Narendra Modi commentators of the so-called ‘secular’ mould.

The narrative, in forms of memes and posts, posit that Indira Gandhi in 1971 had stood tall against the pressure exerted by then U.S. President Richard Nixon and redrew the map of South Asia by dismembering Pakistan into two, while Narendra Modi ‘meekly’ bowed before Donald Trump and pulled back India’s military offensive against Pakistan just when the Indian Armed Forces had our hostile neighbour with the jugular.

Indira, they argue, was an iron-fisted stateswoman while Modis all bark and no bite. But to say this is not merely misleading but a study in historical illiteracy.

To be fair, PM Modi and his deputy, Home Minister Amit Shah, have themselves long blamed Nehru for calling off Indian forces too early in 1947 when Pakistan’s tribal raiders were on the back foot in Kashmir. In fact, many ‘nationalist’ supporters of Modi are rather upset that the Prime Minister lost a golden opportunity to decimate and Balkanize Pakistan. They argue that the Modi government, having built a narrative of muscular nationalism, fell short of its own rhetoric.

It is reasonable, therefore, for critics to wonder whether Modi, after Operation Sindoor had Pakistan militarily and diplomatically cornered, similarly let go of a historic opportunity. But while questions about the prudence of India’s tactical restraint are valid, the idea that Modi’s leadership post-Pahalgam is somehow ‘weaker’ than Indira Gandhi’s performance in 1971 is both bizarre and unjustified.

The two episodes separated by five decades unfolded in radically different strategic environments. To canonise Indira Gandhi for the creation of Bangladesh is to mistake circumstance for statecraft, and bombast for brilliance. In fact, her wartime decisions were not the triumph of foresight, but rather the accidental windfall of geopolitical timing and military professionalism.

Missed Chances

Pakistan, ruled by Yahya Khan and gripped by a civil war in its eastern wing, unleashed a campaign of repression and mass slaughter after the Awami League’s electoral victory. India, flooded with refugees, eventually responded by intervening militarily. In December, Indian forces secured a swift and decisive victory: Dhaka fell, and 93,000 Pakistani soldiers surrendered in the largest such capitulation since World War II.

But what followed that military feat was a diplomatic anti-climax in form of the troubling (and inexplicable) Simla Agreement of 1972. With Pakistan defeated, diplomatically isolated, and divided, India held all the cards: prisoners, territory, and moral high ground. Yet Indira Gandhi handed back 13,000 square kilometres of captured land and released the Pakistani POWs without securing any meaningful progress on Kashmir, recognition of the Line of Control as an international border or firm Pakistani commitments to future peace.

There was no accountability sought for the shocking genocide carried out by Pakistani Army officers in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) or future assurances of their peaceful conduct. Soon after the signing, small wonder that Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto resumed anti-India rhetoric, framing Pakistan as a ‘victim.’ The 1973 Delhi Agreement, involving Bangladesh, was also seen as a missed opportunity to solidify gains India had already made.

Indeed, the treatment of Pakistani POWs, who were housed in comfortable barracks, granted family visits and given cultural programming like Eid celebrations, became a perverse metaphor for the conflict’s aftermath. Indian soldiers, meanwhile, faced the harsh winter in tents.

Why Indira Gandhi did this remains a subject of speculation. Some point to her desire for global acclaim, others cite her political need to appear magnanimous. Still others claim this was to appease the minority vote-bank (the Congress’ traditional base) at home. Either way, for India, a rare strategic opportunity had been wasted. It appears that while we were decisive victors in battle, we were somehow vanquished in diplomacy. What should have been Pakistan’s Versailles turned out to be India’s Munich.

The 1971 victory brought Indira Gandhi immense popularity. But rather than strengthening India’s democratic institutions, she used the moment to weaken them. Four years later came the Emergency wherein political rivals jailed, the press censored and elections suspended.

The 42nd Amendment, passed during this period, changed the very fabric of the Constitution. Words like ‘secular’ and ‘socialist’ were inserted into the Preamble without debate or constituent consensus. Till this day, these ideological Trojan horses are being used to delegitimize cultural nationalism and elevate a singular idea of secularism, one that dismissed faith-based identities as regressive or dangerous.

Even Dr. B.R. Ambedkar had advised Nehru not to include such loaded terms in the Constitution, arguing that India’s guarantee of religious freedom and universal suffrage was secularism enough. But his warning was ignored.

Today, the term is often weaponised to caricature critics of the status quo as ‘fascists’ or ‘Modi bhakts’ and to suggest that any defence of cultural or religious identity is somehow un-Indian. This, too, is part of the dark legacy of 1971 wherein a military victory morphed into political authoritarianism while a tactical triumph was later used to undermine constitutional principles.

India’s response to the April 22 Pahalgam terror attack, where 26 civilians were slaughtered by Pakistan sponsored terrorists who segregated and butchered most just because they were Hindus, has been resolute and tightly calibrated.

Operation Sindoor, launched on May 7, marked a significant shift in India’s counterterrorism posture. In his address to the nation on May 12, Prime Minister Modi called the attack “the most barbaric face of terrorism” and held Pakistan directly accountable while stating there would henceforth be no distinction between government-sponsored terrorism and terrorist organisations.

Indian armaments caused massive damage in the course of Sindoor, striking for the first time, targets deep within Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied territories besides decimating the terror camps of the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed.

India did not target civilian areas. It refused to be baited into escalation that could jeopardise its diplomatic standing or derail its economic trajectory.

Critics have seized on Donald Trump’s announcement of a “mutual ceasefire” and suggested that Modi ‘capitulated’ under American pressure. This simplistic assumption completely misses the point: Indian officials have clarified that operations were “paused, not ended.” After all, who can stop the bombastic Trump jumping the gun? His ‘ceasefire’ announcement has no purchase anyway.

Modi made clear that there would be no return to talks until Pakistan dismantled its terror infrastructure. Likewise, the Indus Water Treaty continues to lie in abeyance. This is already choking Pakistan economically. Unlike the aftermath of 1971, Operation Sindoor has ensured that the cost of harbouring terrorists is permanently raised for Pakistan’s military elite.

This is a far cry from the crude binary now being peddled: Indira, the ‘Iron Lady’ versus Modi the ‘meek nationalist.’ One presided over a decisive war and then squandered its spoils. The other has not sought war but has redefined India’s right to act pre-emptively and refused to legitimise terror-sponsoring regimes with premature talks or shallow gestures.

Such comparisons say more about contemporary politics than historical truth. They are not about national interest but partisan nostalgia - an attempt to lionise Indira (thereby the Congress) and to delegitimise Modi.

History, however, has a longer memory. Indira Gandhi’s 1971 moment undoubtedly produced a new nation, but also seeded authoritarianism at home and left the Kashmir question untouched. Narendra Modi’s 2025 doctrine, still unfolding, is potentially more enduring in effect. For all his faults, Modi’s refusal to reward Pakistan’s duplicity with dialogue is a lesson Indira Gandhi, for all her battlefield bravado, never quite learned.