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By:

Quaid Najmi

4 January 2025 at 3:26:24 pm

‘Now, political defections possible without losing seat’

The recent ‘experiments’ in Ambernath and Akot civic bodies have created a political storm. Renowned legal expert, Barrister Vinod Tiwari, President of Council for Protection of Rights (CPR), gives a perspective to the row while interacting with Quaid Najmi. Excerpts... What is the Anti-Defection Law under the Indian Constitution? The Anti-Defection Law is part of the Tenth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. It was introduced through the 52nd Constitutional Amendment in 1985. The main...

‘Now, political defections possible without losing seat’

The recent ‘experiments’ in Ambernath and Akot civic bodies have created a political storm. Renowned legal expert, Barrister Vinod Tiwari, President of Council for Protection of Rights (CPR), gives a perspective to the row while interacting with Quaid Najmi. Excerpts... What is the Anti-Defection Law under the Indian Constitution? The Anti-Defection Law is part of the Tenth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. It was introduced through the 52nd Constitutional Amendment in 1985. The main purpose is to stop elected representatives – MPs and MLAs - from switching political parties after elections for personal/political gain. It aims to ensure political stability, respect the mandate of voters, and prevent unethical political practices. Under this law, an elected representative can be disqualified if he/she voluntarily gives up the party membership or vote against their party’s official direction (whip). There are limited exceptions, like when two-thirds of a party’s members agree to merge with another party. The Speaker or Chairman decides disqualification cases, but their decisions can be reviewed by courts.   Is there a similar Anti-Defection law for local bodies in Maharashtra? Keeping in mind the spirit of the Tenth Schedule, Maharashtra enacted the Maharashtra Local Authority Members’ Disqualification Act, 1986 (enforced in 1987). It applies to Municipal Councils and other local bodies and was meant to stop the elected councillors from hopping across parties post-elections, and preserve the voters’ mandate at the local level.   Why is there so much unrest in the 2025-2026 civic bodies elections? The root cause lies in post-poll alliances, which have been made legally easier through amendments to Section 63 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils Act, 1965. They allow political parties and/or councillors to form post-election fronts or groups. Over time, political parties have collectively and deliberately weakened the 1986 Disqualification Act, and it is now what I would call a “toothless tiger.” Hence, the strange and opportunistic post-elections alliances witnessed in Ambernath (Thane) and Akot (Akola), and some others after the December 20 municipal council elections.   How exactly was the Anti-Defection law diluted? It was through a quietly crafted amendment to Section 63 of the Municipal Councils Act, 1965, which was implemented after the 2016 local bodies elections, although the Disqualification Act remained on paper. It allows councillors and political parties - within one month of election results - to form a post-poll group or alliance, even if they contested elections separately. Once registered, this newly-formed group is treated as if it were a pre-poll alliance, and the Anti-Defection law applies only after that point. This effectively ‘legalised defections disguised as alliances’.   What were the repercussions? Another major blow came when the State Government amended the law to give itself appellate powers in Anti-Defection cases involving local bodies. Earlier, decisions were taken by Commissioners or Collectors. Now, any aggrieved councillor can appeal to the State Government, which becomes the final authority. This has given huge relief to defectors, especially when the ruling party controls the state government. Now elected representatives brazenly switch sides, aware they may not face serious consequences.   What is the long-term fallout of this trend? These amendments have made post-poll “marriages of convenience” the new political norm. The ruling party always has an unfair advantage, often forming governments without securing a clear electoral majority. This completely undermines democracy and voter trust, besides going contrary to the original purpose of the Anti-Defection Law.

Where Eagles Dare: India’s Deep Strike Into Pakistan’s Heartland

Operation Sindoor played out like a Cold War thriller, as Indian fighter jets shattered Pakistani sanctuaries while whispering a warning near its nuclear vault.

There is something profoundly destabilising about knowing that every inch of your territory lies within your enemy’s reach. It is a lesson that Israel has taught its adversaries for decades—responding not just to rocket fire, but to the factories that produce them and the bunkers that shield their makers. With Operation Sindoor, India has entered that league.


What began as retribution for the April 22 Pahalgam massacre of Indian tourists has ended with the stark revelation that Pakistan’s military depth is no shield against Indian reach.


As Operation Sindoor unfolded, the hum of India’s Rafales over the plains of Punjab and the forbidding ridges of Sargodha echoed like a page torn from a Frederick Forsyth novel.


India comprehensively dismantled the myth that Pakistan’s airspace was sacrosanct while apparently giving a chilling warning that even its nuclear sanctuaries were no longer untouchable, something which had Islamabad and Washington breaking into a cold sweat.


The psychological impact of Sindoor has been such that unverified claims are flying thick and fast on social media of a supposed strike on the fabled Kirana Hills, which is believed to conceal one of Pakistan’s most secure nuclear vaults. Viral videos doing the rounds on social media claimed that the strike had kissed the tunnel entrances of a suspected nuclear storage site.


While the claims have since proven untrue, the gesture suggested India was taking a leaf straight out of Israel’s playbook, particularly during the latter’s Osirak strike on Saddam Hussein’s nuclear reactor in 1981. India’s strikes into the Pakistani heartland also echoed Cold War-era brinkmanship, of Cuban missiles and DEFCON alerts and the whispered hotline calls between Washington and Moscow.


But Sindoor showed a regional South Asian power making a point before the world with French Rafales, SCALP missiles and HAL-integrated BrahMos cruise weapons, asserting that India could, and would, operate on a new doctrine where even the enemy’s nuclear command and control nodes are no longer sanctuaries.


Since the days of Zia-ul-Haq and Rajiv Gandhi, the idea of deep strikes into Pakistan had been checked by the spectre of escalation. That calculus changed in 1999 with Kargil when Pakistani regulars intruded into Indian territory and the two countries fought a limited war under the nuclear overhang. The pattern was repeated with every provocation, from the Parliament attack in 2001 to the horrific Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008, to the Pathankot and Uri incidents in the following decade.


But as forewarned by Prime Minister Modi after the Pahalgam terror attack last month, Operation Sindoor, unlike the Balakot strikes of 2019, would be far bigger and more precise.


While Balakot sent Mirage jets across the Line of Control (LoC) to bomb a terrorist training camp in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindoor struck deep into Pakistani Punjab, hitting Sialkot, Bahawalpur and beyond.


Besides terrorist training centres, Indian jets struck Pakistani military assets in eleven locations, damaging up to 20 percent of the Pakistan Air Force’s (PAF) infrastructure as per estimates. At least one squadron leader, several airmen, and fighter jets were reportedly killed or destroyed at Pakistan’s Bholari air base.


By bypassing or jamming Pakistan’s Chinese-built air defence systems, Indian jets demonstrated that Beijing’s exports were not as impenetrable as advertised. Indian Rafales, armed with SCALP cruise missiles and supported by a homegrown digital warfare ecosystem, flew unchallenged into the heart of Pakistan’s defences.


Pakistan, encumbered by outdated Soviet-era doctrines and Chinese systems stitched together, found itself utterly outclassed during Sindoor.


Much of the credit lies not in foreign acquisitions but domestic innovation. The Akashteer system, built indigenously, intercepted hundreds of Pakistani drones and missiles during the retaliation, confirming its layered, network-centric preparedness. In doing so, it underscored a broader point: defence is not about what you buy, but what you integrate. The Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) -led development of the BrahMos cruise missile, (launched from Su-30 MKIs) once thought too ambitious, had finally come of age. Where Russia had quoted exorbitantly for adapting BrahMos to air-launch platforms, India built it in-house at no profit. That engineering leap turned Indian fighters into long-range precision platforms.


What does it mean to live beside a nuclear-armed enemy? For decades, the answer has been paralysis. Yet the message that India sent out to Pakistan by Operation Sindoor was the opposite one, that proximity no longer protects.


Pakistan has long operated on the assumption that its nuclear umbrella allows it to wage a low-intensity conflict through terrorist proxies, irregulars and rogue elements within its military without facing conventional retaliation. That assumption has now been shredded to bits.


This shift is reminiscent of how Israel has treated Syria and Iran. For years, Israel has conducted strikes within Syrian territory and against Iranian nuclear scientists without triggering full-scale war. Its strategy: hit hard, hit surgically and communicate its red lines clearly. India seems to have borrowed a page from that playbook when it targeted terrorist networks like the Jaish-e-Mohammed in Bahawalpur, a region even American drones had avoided.


It is also reminiscent of American doctrine post-9/11. After the Taliban refused to give up Osama bin Laden, the US not only struck terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan but dismantled the regime that sheltered it. India has not sought regime change, but it has erased the distinction between ‘non-state actors’ and the state that harbours them.


Perhaps the most significant fallout of Operation Sindoor has been strategic, and not tactical. For the first time, India and Pakistan’s friction was not framed through the lens of Kashmir. By striking targets across Pakistan’s geography, and not just in PoJK, India clearly declared that its grievance was with the state’s support of terror, not mere territorial disputes.


This de-hyphenation has been a long-standing goal of Indian diplomacy. Operation Sindoor may have achieved on the battlefield what years of white papers could not.


With the endgame far from over, this doctrine is still being written. But its outlines are becoming clear: zero tolerance for terrorism, a readiness to strike deep inside enemy territory and a belief that precision can prevent escalation. Operation Sindoor has redefined the Indo-Pak dynamic by effecting a psychological shift from reaction to anticipation.


India, by demonstrating that it can target even the most sensitive parts of its neighbour without triggering war, has upended the strategic balance. Whether this deters Pakistan or provokes new asymmetries remains to be seen in the coming days. But one thing abundantly clear post the launch of Sindoor is that the red lines are not where they once were. And for the first time in decades, it is Pakistan that must count the cost of crossing them.

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