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China, Central Asia Cement Strategic Partnership

The China–Central Asia partnership has evolved into a formal alliance, shaping the region’s geopolitical landscape.

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The leaders of China and the five Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, met in Astana from 16 to 18 June for the Second China-Central Asia Summit. Hosted by Kazakhstan and attended by President Xi Jinping, the summit strengthened regional ties, concluding with a treaty of permanent good neighbourliness and plans for cooperation in trade, energy, infrastructure, education, and digital development. The initiatives reflect historical links shaped by current geopolitical dynamics.

 

During the Han and Tang dynasties, the Silk Road linked cities like Xi’an, Samarkand, and Bukhara, enabling trade in silk, spices, ideas, and diplomatic exchange. With its nomadic states and cities, Central Asia was a key hub connecting East Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and the Indian Subcontinent, shaping Eurasian civilisation.


This connectivity broke down under Soviet rule. After the Bolshevik Revolution, Central Asia became part of the USSR, cutting off China’s western borders. Though limited ties existed through the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty, China’s influence remained minimal, especially during Cold War-era border closures and trade controls.

 

The Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse created five independent Central Asian republics, all with borders or historic ties to China. China engaged them cautiously through diplomacy, trade, and security talks. A key step was the 1996 formation of the Shanghai Five—China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—later becoming the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2001 with Uzbekistan’s entry. The SCO provided a multilateral platform, largely led by China and Russia.


China’s focus was twofold: securing Xinjiang, which borders three of the republics, and investing in Central Asia’s resources and infrastructure for energy and logistics.

 

A New Silk Road

In 2013, President Xi launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), positioning Central Asia as a key hub. Backed by concessional loans, Chinese firms built roads, railways, pipelines, and industrial parks. A flagship project—delayed China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway—aims to shorten freight routes to Europe and the Middle East by 559 miles, while Kazakhstan has launched a rival link to Poland.


China is now Central Asia’s top trading partner and infrastructure financier, though concerns persist over debt, Chinese labour, and trade imbalances. Few, however, rival China’s scale and speed.

 

The first China–Central Asia Summit in Xi’an in May 2023 marked a shift. As a Silk Road hub, Xi’an symbolically hosted all five Central Asian leaders, excluding Russia. The summit launched a new framework for bilateral and regional ties, with a joint declaration on respect, sovereignty, and development, setting the stage for regular summits.


The June 2025 Astana Summit cemented this framework, formalising long-term ties with the Treaty of Permanent Good-Neighbourliness. It announced initiatives in poverty reduction, environmental governance, academic exchange, trade, and customs, including a regional training centre and digital customs platform.


President Xi highlighted the “China–Central Asia Spirit” of trust, equality, and mutual benefit. Members agreed to biennial meetings, formalising the partnership. China pledged 1.5 billion yuan (£208.86 million) in 2025 grant aid, plus support for green mining, modern agriculture, and digital connectivity.


Security and the Russia Factor

Security is key to China’s strategy, focused on countering terrorism, separatism, and securing supply chains. The summit enhanced cooperation in cybersecurity, law enforcement, border tech, and counter-extremism training.


China’s influence has grown as Russia’s economic role shrinks due to the Ukraine war and sanctions. Russia remains a security player via the CSTO and a partner through the Eurasian Economic Union, but China now leads in trade and investment. Central Asia is strengthening ties with Turkey and the EU, though these remain limited. U.S. engagement has declined, and India’s role is modest, centred on connectivity and culture.


While Central Asian governments largely welcome Chinese investment, public opinion remains wary. Issues like Kyrgyzstan’s proposed land leases raised concern, though no major protests followed. Civil society worries about labour practices, environmental damage, and economic dependence.


Regional leaders are boosting intra-Central Asian ties through trade, energy deals, and cultural diplomacy to strengthen their position.


China’s non-interference stance contrasts with Western aid conditions, yet its security training, counter-extremism programmes, and digital surveillance (e.g., via Huawei) bolster authoritarian control and shape public policy in several states.


The China–Central Asia partnership has grown from historic ties to a formal alliance defined by treaties, economic corridors, and security cooperation. With regular summits and joint investments, China is now central to Central Asia’s geopolitics, driven by trade, connectivity, and pragmatism.


The future depends on managing local sensitivities and economic imbalances. Whether this leads to co-development or dependency is uncertain, but China’s leading role in Eurasia’s regional framework is clear.


(The writer is a foreign affairs expert. Views personal.)

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