Crossed Wires in Dhaka

As Bangladesh descends into crisis, India must recalibrate its foreign policy to safeguard regional stability while guarding its own interests.

In a year already pockmarked with global unrest, Bangladesh has been swiftly sliding into a political and institutional crisis that could upend the balance of power in South Asia. Since Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, what was meant to be a temporary interim arrangement has degenerated into a perilous standoff between student protestors, a beleaguered leadership and a restive military. At the heart of this maelstrom is Professor Mohammed Yunus - no stranger to leadership in civic life, but who now finds the mechanics of statecraft considerably more turbulent.

Yunus, who was ushered in as caretaker by the Students’ Union in a moment of idealistic fervour, has since become the target of their ire. The very coalition that brought him to power now accuses him of dithering in the face of collapse. Promised reforms which were chiefly aimed at creating conditions for free and fair elections have now stalled. As the days drag on without a credible roadmap to a national vote, pressure from both the military and street agitators intensifies. The professor’s academic laurels offer little armour against the realities of a fracturing state.

The immediate future is fraught. Minorities, particularly Hindus and Christians, find themselves vulnerable amid rising communal tensions. Secular institutions, long the backbone of Bangladesh’s post-1971 identity, are under intense assault not just from religious hardliners, but also from radicalised student groups who blur the lines between revolutionary zeal and outright anarchy. The campus protestors, once vanguards of democracy, are now disrupting the very institutions they once sought to reform. It is not merely the government that is under siege, but Bangladesh’s constitutional order.

The prospect of elections in such a volatile environment seems optimistic, if not delusional. The Awami League, Sheikh Hasina’s once-dominant party, now banned and cornered, is calculating a return. Should the judiciary lift restrictions, Hasina is expected to dramatically reappear on Bangladesh’s political stage, ready to resume her old rivalry with the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and its matriarch, Khaleda Zia. The two women have long personified the country’s bipolar political order. But this time, there is a third axis in play: the student movement, or rather, the new experimental political entities it has spawned.

A triangulated power struggle is taking shape. Who will the student-led formations align with, if anyone? Will they veer left-of-centre, demanding wholesale reform? Or slide into nationalist populism? The answers remain elusive. What is clear, however, is that Bangladesh is undergoing a political experiment with no predictable outcome.

This moment of flux poses considerable risks not just for Dhaka but also for New Delhi. Bangladesh’s internal instability naturally has direct implications for India, particularly in the sensitive northeastern states which share porous borders with the country. A breakdown in law and order could precipitate refugee flows, boost insurgent activity and create a vacuum easily exploited by extremist groups with cross-border agendas. Already, some Indian intelligence reports suggest heightened chatter among fundamentalist organisations seeking to capitalise on the chaos.

India has long styled itself as a reluctant regional hegemon, intervening only when its interests are directly at stake. But this is one such moment. With Bangladesh deeply dependent on Indian trade, infrastructure and energy, Delhi possesses the leverage (though perhaps not yet the will) to help steer its neighbour away from disaster. What is required is not military meddling, but diplomatic finesse. India must support the restoration of democratic order while discreetly encouraging the emergence of pro-India voices across Bangladesh’s political spectrum.

New Delhi’s policy should be guided by a blend of pragmatism and principle. Stability is the immediate priority, but so too is the preservation of a secular and democratic Bangladesh. That is not merely a moral concern but a strategic imperative. A Bangladesh dominated by hardline factions or a politicised military could complicate India’s eastern frontier and reverse decades of gains in cross-border cooperation.

The crisis also offers an opportunity - albeit a narrow one - for India to recalibrate its neighbourhood diplomacy. For too long, it has oscillated between aloofness and overreach. In the case of Bangladesh, it must act with deliberate urgency, deploying its soft power, economic clout and diplomatic channels to foster a political settlement. Supporting independent electoral institutions, nudging the judiciary to safeguard civil liberties and ensuring that all legitimate parties (including the Awami League) can contest elections freely, are all vital steps.

The father of India’s Constitution, B.R. Ambedkar had once observed that the test of a democracy is not in moments of comfort but in how it behaves under duress. India would do well to apply the same standard to its neighbourhood policy. Ensuring that Bangladesh emerges from its current turmoil as a functioning, secular and democratic state is not just an act of regional altruism but a geopolitical necessity at the moment.

The coming weeks will be decisive. Yunus’s fate may be sealed. The military’s ambitions may sharpen. The students’ movement may split or consolidate. But amid this flux, the only certainty is that the outcome will reverberate beyond Bangladesh’s borders. India must ensure that when the dust settles, it is not caught unprepared.

(The author is a researcher and expert in foreign affairs. Views personal.)