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By:

Commodore S.L. Deshmukh

31 October 2024 at 8:30:19 am

The Beam That Blinds the Drone

As cheap drones reshape the battlefield, India’s T-SHUL BEAM points to a future in which electronic warfare may matter as much as firepower The drone has definitively become the weapon of choice for the modern battlefield. Cheap, expendable and increasingly autonomous, unmanned aerial vehicles can now threaten troops, armour, airfields and critical infrastructure without requiring the attacker to risk a pilot. Their proliferation has created a corresponding demand for counter-drone systems...

The Beam That Blinds the Drone

As cheap drones reshape the battlefield, India’s T-SHUL BEAM points to a future in which electronic warfare may matter as much as firepower The drone has definitively become the weapon of choice for the modern battlefield. Cheap, expendable and increasingly autonomous, unmanned aerial vehicles can now threaten troops, armour, airfields and critical infrastructure without requiring the attacker to risk a pilot. Their proliferation has created a corresponding demand for counter-drone systems that can respond quickly and at a cost proportionate to the threat. This is where beam-based anti-drone technology enters the picture. Broadly, such systems fall into two categories. Hard-kill systems use concentrated laser energy to physically damage or destroy a drone. Soft-kill systems, by contrast, use radio-frequency or electromagnetic energy to disrupt the electronic links that allow a drone to communicate, navigate and transmit information. Sophisticated Weaponry Hard-kill laser systems focus an intense beam of light on a vulnerable part of an incoming UAV - its carbon-fibre structure, control surfaces, battery or other critical components. The concentrated energy rapidly heats the target, potentially burning through its structure or disabling optical sensors and bringing the aircraft down. India’s DRDO has demonstrated a 30kW laser system, while Israel’s Rafael has developed the Lite Beam system. Soft-kill systems take a different route. Rather than physically destroying the aircraft, they interfere with the electronic architecture that keeps it airborne. Directional radio-frequency energy can disrupt command-and-control links, video feeds, telemetry and satellite-navigation signals such as GPS or other GNSS services. Depending on the drone and the nature of the disruption, the aircraft may be forced to land, return to its launch point or lose control. It is in this category that the T-SHUL BEAM system developed by Indian defence company IG Defence deserves attention. T-SHUL BEAM is a man-portable, directional counter-drone system designed for tactical deployment. Its multi-band radio-frequency architecture is intended to target several of the links on which unmanned aerial systems depend, including command-and-control, telemetry, video transmission and GNSS navigation. Its directional configuration allows an operator to concentrate electronic countermeasures on a particular aerial target rather than indiscriminately radiating energy across a large area. That matters on a battlefield where the warning time against a small UAV or first-person-view drone may be measured in seconds. The appeal of such a system is therefore not simply that it can counter a drone. It is that it can potentially bring counter-drone capability closer to the soldier and to the tactical edge. Large counter-UAS installations have their place, particularly around fixed and high-value assets. But forward units require systems that can move with them, be deployed rapidly and operate against small, low-cost unmanned platforms without imposing the logistical burden associated with conventional weapons. The T-SHUL BEAM’s significance also lies in its proposed integration with an artificial-intelligence-enabled battle-management architecture. IG Drones, the original equipment manufacturer, has stated that T-SHUL BEAM has been integrated with GRID, its indigenous AI-powered platform. The GRID architecture is intended to bring sensors, intelligence systems, unmanned platforms and command elements into a common operational framework. The attraction of such integration is obvious. Countering drones is increasingly less about a single weapon and more about the speed of the kill chain: detecting a threat, identifying it, deciding what response is appropriate and directing that response before the target disappears. An AI-enabled command architecture can potentially improve situational awareness, facilitate real-time threat detection and coordinate different systems operating simultaneously. This is particularly relevant as drone warfare evolves from isolated attacks towards increasingly complex and potentially swarming operations. A battlefield crowded with drones cannot be managed effectively if every sensor and weapon operates as a separate island. The advantage will increasingly belong to forces capable of turning disparate streams of information into a coherent picture and responding at machine speed. The T-SHUL BEAM’s reported demonstration at Pokhran represents another step in India’s attempt to build a domestic ecosystem spanning drones, counter-drones, artificial intelligence and electronic warfare. Counter-drone warfare is likely to be a recurring requirement rather than a niche capability. Importing every component of such an ecosystem would leave India vulnerable to supply-chain disruptions, technology restrictions and foreign-exchange pressures. Indigenous development, even when undertaken by relatively small private-sector companies, can broaden the country’s technological base and give the armed forces greater freedom to adapt systems to their operational requirements. Economics of the Contest Yet the real measure of any counter-drone system will ultimately be operational rather than promotional. Electronic warfare is inherently a contest between countermeasure and counter-countermeasure. Drone designers can alter frequencies, communications protocols, navigation methods and levels of autonomy. A system that is effective against one generation of drones may require modification against the next. The battlefield, in other words, will remain a technological arms race. The economics of the contest nevertheless favour directed-energy and electronic-warfare solutions. A conventional interceptor expends a missile or projectile against each target. A beam-based system can, subject to its power supply, engagement envelope and other operational constraints, engage targets without expending conventional ammunition. The marginal cost of an interception can consequently be dramatically lower. The beam also travels at effectively the speed of light, removing the flight time associated with kinetic interceptors. In densely populated areas or around sensitive infrastructure, bringing down a drone with a projectile can create its own hazards. Electronic disruption, when properly controlled, offers the possibility of neutralising the threat without sending an interceptor crashing back to earth. These advantages should not obscure the limitations. Soft-kill systems depend on the vulnerabilities of the target’s electronic architecture and may be less effective against increasingly autonomous drones that require fewer external communications. Weather, range, power availability, frequency management and the sophistication of an adversary's electronic countermeasures can all affect performance. No single technology is likely to provide a complete answer. The future of counter-drone warfare will therefore belong not to the beam alone but to layered defence combining. The emergence of systems such as T-SHUL BEAM suggests that India is beginning to build the technological pieces of that architecture at home. (The writer is a retired naval aviation officer and a defence and geopolitical analyst. Views personal.)

A decade and a half of farm loan waivers in Maharashtra

Writer: Abhijit Mulye
Abhijit Mulye
Jun 3
3 min read
AI generated image
AI generated image

Mumbai: In the heartlands of the state, where erratic monsoons and price crashes routinely threaten agrarian livelihoods, farm loan waivers have transformed from emergency financial lifelines into anticipated political rituals. Over the last decade and a half, successive state governments have announced massive debt relief packages to alleviate farmer distress. But how effective have these multi-billion-rupee interventions been? A closer examination of the waivers implemented since 2009 reveals a complex narrative of fiscal strain, implementation bottlenecks, and a heavily debated impact on the state’s agricultural credit culture.


Following the substantial relief provided to the state under the UPA government’s nationwide 2008 Agricultural Debt Waiver scheme, the state progressively shifted towards localised, state-funded bailouts. The first major modern wave came in 2017 with the Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Shetkari Sanman Yojana (CSMSSY). Announced by the Devendra Fadnavis-led government, this ambitious Rs 34,022 crore package aimed to clear the slates for approximately 89 lakh distressed farmers, offering relief up to Rs 1.5 lakh per farmer.


However, the 2017 scheme’s success was highly mixed. Driven by a desire to weed out bogus beneficiaries and ensure precise targeting, the state mandated strict online applications and mandatory Aadhaar linkages. This bureaucratic friction severely bottlenecked the rollout. Ultimately, about 44 lakh farmers successfully navigated the red tape to receive the waiver. Consequently, the actual financial outgo was roughly Rs 18,500 crore – barely over half the announced package size.


New Scheme

Two years later, agrarian distress persisted, compounded by unseasonal rains and shifting political tides. In December 2019, the newly formed Maharashtra Vikas Aghadi (MVA) government under Chief Minister Uddhav Thackeray announced the Mahatma Jyotirao Phule Shetkari Karjmukti Yojana (MJPKY). Learning directly from the administrative nightmares of 2017, the MVA designed a highly streamlined, almost frictionless scheme.


With an initial outlay estimated around Rs 22,000 crore, it offered unconditional waivers of up to Rs 2 lakh for short-term crop loans. Crucially, it required no application forms from the farmers; the government directly accessed bank records and credited farmer accounts. This efficiency paid immense dividends. The scheme successfully reached nearly 31.8 lakh of its 32 lakh targeted beneficiaries, with actual spending settling near Rs 20,250 crore. It was widely hailed as a logistical success, providing swift psychological and financial relief with minimal hurdles.


Third Scheme

On this backdrop comes the Punyashlok Ahilyadevi Holkar Farmers Loan Waiver Scheme, which the state cabinet cleared on Tuesday and details of which are expected to be announced once the Legislative council elections are over. With recurring rural distress and repeated demands raised from various quarters, the Mahayuti government, once again spearheaded by Devendra Fadnavis, has cleared the state’s largest package yet, valued at an unprecedented Rs 36,585 crore, this scheme promises to waive agricultural loans up to Rs two lakh, targeting an estimated 56 lakh farmers. In an attempt to address long-standing criticisms regarding moral hazard, the cabinet also introduced a Rs 50,000 incentive for farmers who regularly repay their crop loans, aiming to reward credit discipline.


Criticism Begins

However, as expected, the farmers’ bodies and the political adversaries have criticized the feat. While Raju Shetty described it as “hollow”, Harshwardhan Sapkal of Congress termed it as a “white wash”, adding that the money won’t reach the real needy.


Despite their undeniable political popularity and immediate localized relief, these massive waivers generally draw sharp, consistent criticism from agricultural economists and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). The core of the expert contention lies in the destruction of the agricultural “credit culture.”


When waivers become predictable, historically honest farmers are incentivized to strategically default on loans, anticipating a future bailout. According to historical RBI data, following the 2017 and 2019 waivers, agricultural Gross Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) in the state saw concerning spikes, reaching 8.44 per cent by 2019. Banks, burned by these sudden spikes in bad loans, often become highly risk-averse. This paradoxically shrinks the pool of fresh formal credit available to farmers for the next sowing season, pushing vulnerable populations back toward exploitative informal moneylenders.


Furthermore, prominent economists, including former RBI Governor Raghuram Rajan, have repeatedly cautioned that repeated waivers crowd out essential private and public investment. When a state government absorbs Rs 30,000 crore in private liabilities, it severely squeezes its own capital expenditure budget. Funds that could have been invested in permanent infrastructure—such as robust irrigation networks, decentralized cold storage chains, or significantly strengthening the Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana (crop insurance framework)—are instead diverted to clearing bad loans.


As Maharashtra embarks on rolling out the sprawling 2026 Ahilyadevi Holkar scheme, the central policy debate remains unresolved. While these multi-crore relief packages undoubtedly offer vital, short-term survival mechanisms for millions of vulnerable farmers caught in a debt trap, experts unanimously agree that long-term agricultural sustainability is impossible without structural reform. Moving beyond cyclical debt waivers to address the systemic root causes of farming unprofitability—through resilient market access and climate adaptation—remains the state’s most pressing, unfulfilled mandate.


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