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By:

Sagari Gupta

24 March 2026 at 2:16:04 pm

SpaceX’s IPO and India’s Sovereignty

The record-breaking $1.75 trillion IPO underscores a new reality that nations which do not control critical digital infrastructure risk ceding part of their sovereignty. Last week, SpaceX listed on Nasdaq under the ticker SPCX, raising $75 billion at a staggering valuation of $1.75 trillion. That single offering surpassed Saudi Aramco’s 2019 record of $25.6 billion by a factor of three. India’s defence budget for FY 2025-26 was Rs. 6.81 lakh crore, approximately $78.57 billion, according to...

SpaceX’s IPO and India’s Sovereignty

The record-breaking $1.75 trillion IPO underscores a new reality that nations which do not control critical digital infrastructure risk ceding part of their sovereignty. Last week, SpaceX listed on Nasdaq under the ticker SPCX, raising $75 billion at a staggering valuation of $1.75 trillion. That single offering surpassed Saudi Aramco’s 2019 record of $25.6 billion by a factor of three. India’s defence budget for FY 2025-26 was Rs. 6.81 lakh crore, approximately $78.57 billion, according to the Union Budget. SpaceX raised the near-equivalent of that annual allocation in one day. The investors who participated were not buying into a rocket company. They were pricing control over satellite infrastructure, global internet access, launch capability, and an integrated AI platform at a level exceeding the GDP of most countries. Roughly 30 percent of the shares, worth approximately $22.5 billion, went to retail investors, three times the proportion typical of a US listing. India has no private entity in this category. What SpaceX actually controls Starlink, SpaceX’s satellite internet division, operated approximately 7,000 active satellites globally as of early 2026. It counts over nine million subscribers worldwide, and following a 2026 merger, SpaceX also owns xAI, the developer of the Grok AI system. A company that controls satellite connectivity, launch capacity, and a frontier AI model occupies a position no regulator has previously had to classify. It is not a telecom operator, not a defence contractor, and not a technology platform. It is all three at once, under common ownership. In June 2025, SpaceX received authorisation from India’s Department of Telecommunications, followed by a licence from IN-SPACe in July 2025. As of June 2026, Starlink’s commercial operations in India remain pending, with the company in active discussions with the Government of India on security clearances, a process slowed by concerns linked to Starlink terminal use in the Iran conflict. That delay is itself revealing. A foreign company’s service continuity in India depends on negotiations that India does not fully control. Satellite communications, launch systems, and AI-integrated data infrastructure are the functional equivalents of roads and electricity grids in a digital economy. States that built those grids in the twentieth century retained control over access, pricing, and service continuity. States that depend on foreign corporations for digital infrastructure in the twenty-first century do not. The dependence question is already live for India India’s digital public infrastructure, covering Aadhaar, UPI, and the Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission, processes billions of transactions monthly. Aadhaar covers nearly the entire adult population, and UPI carries the bulk of India’s retail digital payments. The system’s design is sound: public architecture, state-controlled data governance, open standards. The next connectivity layer is the problem. TRAI data shows rural internet penetration at 44.2 percent as of March 2024, with only 3.8 percent of rural households connected through high-speed fixed infrastructure. Approximately 630 million Indians remain offline, with primary barriers being awareness, affordability, and limited local-language content, according to the Kantar ICUBE 2024 survey. That gap will not close through terrestrial fibre rollout alone. Satellite broadband, through Starlink, Eutelsat OneWeb, or Amazon’s Project Kuiper, will carry a large share of that load over the next decade. None of these are Indian entities. Their pricing decisions, service continuity choices, and data routing practices sit outside Indian jurisdiction. A farmer in Chhattisgarh receiving crop advisory data through a satellite connection does not know that a pricing decision made in California affects whether that signal arrives tomorrow. She will notice only when it stops. Foreign private capital has built connectivity infrastructure in India before. Reliance Jio brought down mobile data costs after its 2016 launch, extending internet access to hundreds of millions of Indians who had not been able to afford it before. Jio’s rollout also created large-scale domestic employment in network maintenance, retail, and customer service, jobs that remain within India’s economy. Private investment in connectivity is not a threat to sovereignty. Structural Gap The difference with SpaceX is structural. Jio operates under Indian law, pays taxes in India, employs Indian engineers, and answers to Indian regulators when disputes arise. Its towers and fibre sit on Indian soil. Starlink’s constellation orbits at 550 kilometres, outside any single national jurisdiction. Under the Telecommunications Act 2023, existing Starlink operators in India continue under the legacy Unified Licence framework, with their licences remaining valid. But no Indian regulatory instrument contains a binding service continuity obligation for satellite operators. If Starlink suspends Indian operations, no domestic legal mechanism compels continuation or requires a managed transition for the users left without service. The $1.75 trillion valuation amplifies this structural gap. India’s external debt stood at $736.3 billion at end-March 2025, according to the Reserve Bank of India. SpaceX’s market valuation now exceeds India’s total external debt by a wide margin. A corporation at that scale does not face the same regulatory friction as a domestic operator. It does not need to negotiate from a position of dependence. India’s satellite communications framework, updated through the Indian Space Policy 2023 and the Telecommunications Act 2023, governs licensing and spectrum allocation in detail. It does not contain binding service continuity or exit-transition obligations for foreign satellite operators. That gap needs closing through explicit licence conditions before Starlink and its competitors reach commercial scale in India. India’s Semiconductor Mission has made genuine progress. Pilot production started in three plants in 2025, and the government confirmed that four plants commenced commercial production in 2026. Kaynes Semicon’s OSAT unit in Sanand reached commercial production in March 2026. India also inaugurated its first 3-nanometer chip design centres in Noida and Bengaluru in 2025, a step toward design capability even as fabrication capacity remains limited. These are real milestones, not announcements. They do not yet constitute a domestic supply chain for the advanced chips needed for satellite infrastructure, AI systems, or next-generation communications hardware. India’s domestic semiconductor market was approximately $45-50 billion in 2024-25, according to industry estimates cited by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. Closing the gap between consumption and domestic production is a decade-long task requiring sustained capital commitment. India’s competition framework does not treat foreign satellite infrastructure concentration as a market power question. The Competition Commission of India has a clear mandate over domestic pricing and merger activity. It has no instrument to act when a foreign entity’s control over orbital infrastructure creates de facto monopoly conditions for remote connectivity within India. That regulatory gap needs explicit legislative attention before dependence deepens further. Market Signals SpaceX’s $1.75 trillion valuation is not a data point about one company. It is a market signal about what global capital considers most valuable in 2026: not oil fields or shipping lanes, but control over the systems through which economies communicate, compute, and transact. India entered the hydrocarbon era as a net importer and spent decades building the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and domestic refining capacity to reduce that dependence. The programme continues to expand today, a reminder that infrastructure sovereignty is an ongoing commitment. The response was slow and expensive. It was also the right call. The digital infrastructure era has well and truly arrived. India is already a net importer of the connectivity and computing systems that will define the next phase of its economic growth. The SpaceX IPO makes the scale of that dependence visible in a single number. And policymakers do not have decades to respond this time. (The writer is an independent public policy researcher. Views personal.)

A Desert Bridge

India’s courtship of Jordan blends history, hard interests and quiet diplomacy.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Jordan, the first full bilateral visit by an Indian prime minister in nearly four decades, was stripped of ceremony and sentimentality and marked a careful recalibration of India’s engagement with a pivotal, if understated, West Asian partner at a moment of regional flux.


India and Jordan have enjoyed cordial relations since 1950, but for much of that period the relationship remained polite rather than purposeful. The two countries occupied different strategic orbits during the Cold War, and New Delhi’s diplomatic energies in West Asia were traditionally focused on the Gulf monarchies, Israel and Iran. Jordan, a resource-poor kingdom with an outsized diplomatic footprint, was rarely at the centre of India’s regional calculations. That neglect is now being corrected.


Modi’s visit, that was timed to coincide with the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the countries, was intended to signal continuity as much as change. India has increasingly cast itself as a ‘bridging power’ - a country able to talk to rival camps without becoming captive to any. Jordan, ruled by King Abdullah II, plays a similar role in a fractured West Asia: maintaining peace with Israel, hosting waves of refugees, and acting as a discreet interlocutor in regional crises, including the war in Gaza. Their convergence is not accidental.


Maturing Relationship

The substance of the visit lay in five memoranda of understanding covering renewable energy, water management, digital transformation, cultural exchange and tourism. Individually, none is revolutionary. Collectively, they point to a maturing partnership focused less on rhetoric and more on problem-solving. Water scarcity and energy transition are existential issues for Jordan; digital public infrastructure and low-cost renewables are areas where India has accumulated practical experience. For New Delhi, Jordan offers not only a stable partner but also a strategic waypoint in a wider regional vision.


That vision increasingly revolves around the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), an ambitious plan to link South Asia with Europe through ports, railways and digital networks across West Asia. Jordan’s geographic position and political moderation make it a natural stakeholder. While IMEC remains aspirational, India’s courtship of Jordan suggests an effort to anchor the project in countries that value predictability over posturing.


Economic ties, though modest, are being nudged upwards. Bilateral trade stands at roughly $2.8bn; both sides now speak of doubling it to $5bn. More significant than the headline figure is the composition of trade. Jordan is a key supplier of phosphates, vital for India’s fertiliser security. Joint ventures such as the India–Jordan Fertiliser Company have helped insulate Indian farmers from volatile global prices. In an era of supply-chain anxiety, such arrangements carry weight disproportionate to their size.


Culture, too, was pressed into diplomatic service. An agreement to ‘twin’ Petra with the Ellora Caves may reflected a deeper logic rooted in civilisational diplomacy. Both sites are not merely tourist attractions but monumental expressions of how ancient societies blended faith, technology and landscape into enduring works of art. Petra, carved into Jordan’s rose-red sandstone, and Ellora, hewn from basalt cliffs in the Deccan, testify to an age when architecture travelled alongside trade, ideas and belief systems. Twinning them is less about symbolism for its own sake than about institutionalising cooperation in conservation, archaeology and heritage management.

India’s Archaeological Survey, now a century old, has developed a formidable reputation in conservation at home and abroad. Jordan, custodian of some of the world’s most fragile heritage sites, has reason to tap that expertise. Modi was keen to invoke ancient trade routes linking Gujarat to the Mediterranean - an allusion meant to place contemporary cooperation in a longue durée of exchange.


Regional security hovered in the background. India has consistently argued for dialogue over force, whether in Ukraine or Gaza, a position that resonates in Amman. Jordan’s own balancing act - condemning radical Islamic violence while maintaining channels to all sides - mirrors India’s instinctive caution. Counter-terrorism cooperation and food security were discussed without bombast, reflecting a shared preference for incrementalism.


There was, inevitably, some stage-setting. Jordan has expressed interest in joining the International Solar Alliance, an Indian-led initiative that blends climate diplomacy with geopolitical branding. India, for its part, hinted at a role in post-conflict reconstruction in Syria, aligning itself with Jordan’s hopes for regional stabilisation without overcommitting.


At a time when America is raising trade barriers and West Asia remains unsettled, India is diversifying its partnerships with care. Jordan, pragmatic and well-connected, fits neatly into that approach. For both countries, the relationship offers reassurance rather than adventure.


(The writer is a foreign affairs expert. Views personal.)

 


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