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By:

Rajendra Pandharpure

15 April 2025 at 7:55:54 pm

The BJP’s Ganesha Gambit

Pune’s Ganeshotsav has become an enormous civic and political stage, and the ruling party has proved adept at occupying it. Pune: The city’s Ganeshotsav is entering its final phase, but the festival has already demonstrated something beyond its extraordinary crowds and familiar spectacle: the extent to which it has become a political stage. This year, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has left a particularly visible imprint on the festivities, using an event that reaches deep into the city’s...

The BJP’s Ganesha Gambit

Pune’s Ganeshotsav has become an enormous civic and political stage, and the ruling party has proved adept at occupying it. Pune: The city’s Ganeshotsav is entering its final phase, but the festival has already demonstrated something beyond its extraordinary crowds and familiar spectacle: the extent to which it has become a political stage. This year, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has left a particularly visible imprint on the festivities, using an event that reaches deep into the city’s neighbourhoods as an opportunity for public outreach. The political appropriation of the festival has not, however, been without a counter-current. Demands were raised for curbs on noise pollution, loudspeakers and the volume of dhol-tasha performances. The argument was not against Ganeshotsav itself, but for moderation - notably, a complete ban on DJ music and limits on the number of dhol and tasha instruments used by performing troupes. Familiar Troubles The festival’s reality has been rather different. Major roads have been occupied by mandaps. Processions celebrating the arrival of Lord Ganesha have unfolded amid punishing noise. DJ music, while subject to restrictions, has continued. Traffic congestion has become a familiar feature of the festival, with the movement of political leaders adding another layer to the city’s already strained roads. The Peth areas have remained crowded deep into the night. The Shrimant Dagdusheth Halwai Ganpati temple has drawn enormous crowds for darshan from the opening day. From the old city to housing societies and neighbourhood mandals, Ganeshotsav touches virtually every part of Pune. For a political party seeking a direct connection with citizens, few occasions offer such a ready-made network of people, institutions and local influencers. The BJP enters this festival with an unusually formidable organisational base. It has two MPs, seven MLAs and more than 100 corporators in Pune. Murlidhar Mohol, one of the city’s MPs, is a Union Minister of State. Chandrakant Patil is a Cabinet minister in the Maharashtra government, while Madhuri Misal is a Minister of State. The party’s presence also extends into the festival’s organisational architecture. Its influence is visible across numerous mandals, large and small. BJP MLA Hemant Rasane is General Secretary of the Shrimant Dagdusheth Halwai Sarvajanik Ganpati Trust. Kunal Tilak, a member of Lokmanya Tilak’s family, is a BJP corporator. The political and cultural histories of Pune therefore intersect in ways that are difficult to ignore. The BJP’s senior leadership has also made the most of the occasion. National President Nitin Nabin visited Pune to seek Lord Ganesha’s blessings, while Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis visited the city before and during the festival. Such visits are about more than religious observance. In a festival watched by millions and embedded in the city’s social life, political visibility comes almost automatically. There is also talk in Pune that the BJP provided substantial financial support to Dhol-Lezim troupes and their organisers, with claims that some major mandals received financial backing as well. These claims would require independent verification, but the perception itself points to the depth of the political contest around Ganeshotsav. BJP workers, according to local observers, have also sought to make their presence more conspicuous than that of festivities organised by housing societies. Useful Expedient The festival arrives at a politically useful moment for the BJP. The party has faced disquiet on several fronts. Young people have been agitated over the paper-leak controversy. Broader public dissatisfaction has been voiced over inflation and unemployment, while government policies relating to ethanol and charges associated with UPI transactions have also generated criticism. While a political party can defend a policy in a press conference and advertise its achievements, during Ganeshotsav, its workers can be physically present in neighbourhoods, among processions, mandals, cultural groups and devotees. Politics thus becomes less about argument and more about visibility. That is the BJP’s advantage in Pune. Ganeshotsav, after all, is not simply a sequence of religious rituals. It is an elaborate civic network involving local organisers, volunteers, cultural groups, businesses, residents and political representatives. Whoever has influence over that network acquires a powerful channel of communication with the city. The BJP appears to understand this particularly well. Its strength in Pune’s electoral politics has been reinforced by a presence that extends beyond elections and into the institutions and social spaces that organise public life. The irony is that the very scale of the festival that makes it politically attractive also magnifies the civic costs. The political value of Ganeshotsav and the civic burden it creates are therefore two sides of the same phenomenon. For Pune, the larger question is not whether politics has entered Ganeshotsav. It has done so for decades. The more consequential question is whether the festival’s extraordinary social capital will remain primarily a vehicle for political outreach or whether the same influence can be used to reconcile celebration with the ordinary civic needs of the city. For the moment, the BJP seems to have understood the first proposition better than most.

A Diplomatic Shock to Beijing

Writer: Dr. V.L. Dharurkar
Dr. V.L. Dharurkar
Jul 1, 2025
4 min read

Rajnath Singh’s refusal to play along with China’s pro-Pakistan script at the SCO summit signals New Delhi’s rejection of Beijing’s diplomatic games while laying down a clear policy red line on terrorism.

It is not often that a defence minister becomes the defining voice at a multilateral summit ostensibly designed for diplomatic consensus. But at the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meeting in Beijing, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh did just that. Refusing to endorse the pro-Pakistan communiqué crafted under China’s watchful eye, Singh delivered a powerful jolt to Beijing, thereby exposing the contradictions of China’s stand on terrorism and reasserting India’s determination to be neither manipulated nor marginalised on the global stage, especially after the April 22 Pahalgam terror attack.


Founded in 2001, the SCO was conceived as a regional forum to foster cooperation among Eurasian nations in the realms of security, trade, energy and culture. Its membership includes not just China, Russia, and India, but also Pakistan, Iran and Central Asian states. But over the years, the SCO has also become a site of geopolitical friction, particularly between India and China, whose increasingly adversarial relationship now shadows every multilateral encounter. The latest summit proved no exception.


Singh’s core grievance was with the language and emphasis of the joint communiqué, which downplayed the menace of state-sponsored terrorism emanating from Pakistan. While the statement included a reference to the hijacking of Pakistan’s Jaffer Express train by Baloch insurgents, casting it as a terrorist act allegedly instigated by India, it conspicuously avoided mentioning, let alone condemning, the massacre of Indian tourists in Pahalgam that was carried out by Pakistan-sponsored terrorists. This asymmetry, India argued, revealed the document’s bias and its failure to reflect a genuine multilateral consensus on terrorism.


Singh’s refusal to sign the final document, and his explicit criticism of its pro-China, pro-Pakistan tilt, was a rebuke to the credibility of the SCO. In effect, he told the forum that if terrorism is not condemned universally, then no resolution is worth endorsing.

New

Delhi has in recent years adopted a more self-assured tone in its multilateral engagements. It has rebuffed calls to take sides in great-power rivalries, declined to join western condemnations of Russia over Ukraine, and politely turned down a G7 invitation from Donald Trump in the aftermath of Pahalgam. After Operation Sindoor, India sent multiple parliamentary delegations to capitals across Europe, America and Asia to build consensus against Pakistan’s long-running policy of weaponizing jihadist groups while explaining the reason for conducting Operation Sindoor. What Singh did in Beijing was to align the SCO response, or lack thereof, with this broader strategic goal.


In doing so, the defence minister directly questioned China’s duplicity. For Beijing, which routinely shields Pakistani individuals and entities from UN terror blacklists, this was an uncomfortable spotlight. It laid bare the contradiction of a country that claims to fight terrorism while selectively turning a blind eye when it suits its allies.


India’s principled stand has rattled the SCO’s fragile unity. The forum risks fading into irrelevance. The very credibility of the SCO depends on whether it can uphold basic international norms, particularly on terrorism, without ideological or strategic bias. If it fails to do so, countries like India will increasingly disengage.


While China routinely lectures others on non-interference and sovereignty, it meddles liberally in South Asia, be it through the Belt and Road Initiative projects in disputed territories or through strategic military and economic support to Pakistan. The SCO, in theory, offers a platform for resolving such frictions. But in practice, it has too often reflected Beijing’s priorities.


Singh’s stand signals a clear evolution in India’s own foreign policy posture. The days of non-alignment as passive neutrality are gone. What replaces it is a policy of strategic autonomy underpinned by clear red lines, especially on issues like terrorism. India does not align blindly with either the West or the authoritarian bloc. But it will not allow itself to be diplomatically ambushed either.


This recalibration has been long in the making. From the Doklam standoff in 2017 to the Galwan Valley clash in 2020, India has learned the hard way that diplomatic niceties count for little in the face of strategic hostility. It has invested in its own deterrent capability, deepened ties with the Quad countries, and is increasingly unafraid to name and shame in forums where it once remained guarded. That shift is now visible not just in the Ministry of External Affairs but in the Ministry of Defence as well.


What Singh delivered in Beijing was a signal that India will no longer play along with multilateral farces scripted to benefit its adversaries. It will engage and cooperate, but on equal terms without capitulating.


The broader lesson for China and for organisations like the SCO is this: a rising India is not a supplicant state. It has its own interests, its own vision, and increasingly, its own platform. Attempts to subsume its voice into a China-Pakistan narrative, will be resisted vocally and fearlessly.


India’s message in Beijing was crystal clear. It may sit at the same table, but it will not be served second-rate diplomacy. The shock delivered by Rajnath Singh may well be the jolt the SCO needs if it is to survive with credibility in an increasingly contested Asia.


(The writer is a foreign affairs expert. Views are personal)

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