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By:

Abhijit Joshi

31 August 2024 at 10:09:24 am

Uddhav Thackeray’s Long March Ahead

While defections may weaken the Shiv Sena (UBT), Maharashtra’s politics is shaped as much by emotion and identity as by arithmetic. As the Shiv Sena marks the 60th anniversary of its foundation, the celebrations are accompanied by introspection as much as festivity. Both factions - the Shiv Sena led by Deputy Chief Minister Eknath Shinde and the Shiv Sena (UBT) led by Uddhav Thackeray - continue to claim ownership of the party’s legacy, ideology and emotional bond with Maharashtra's...

Uddhav Thackeray’s Long March Ahead

While defections may weaken the Shiv Sena (UBT), Maharashtra’s politics is shaped as much by emotion and identity as by arithmetic. As the Shiv Sena marks the 60th anniversary of its foundation, the celebrations are accompanied by introspection as much as festivity. Both factions - the Shiv Sena led by Deputy Chief Minister Eknath Shinde and the Shiv Sena (UBT) led by Uddhav Thackeray - continue to claim ownership of the party’s legacy, ideology and emotional bond with Maharashtra's electorate. Yet one development continues to reverberate across the state: the steady migration of leaders from Uddhav Thackeray’s camp to the Shinde-led Sena. Political Flip-Flop The latest reports suggest that six of the nine Shiv Sena (UBT) Members of Parliament may align themselves with Shinde in what has been described as ‘Operation Tiger.’ The larger question, however, concerns the ordinary Shiv Sainik, the grassroots worker who spends years campaigning, mobilising supporters and defending the party through good times and bad. For such workers, political realignments often produce confusion and disillusionment. One day they are instructed to oppose a rival faction; the next, they find their leaders sharing platforms with former adversaries. The dilemma is profound: whom should they follow, and where does their loyalty now lie? As the Shiv Sena enters its seventh decade, the future of its cadre may matter as much as the future of its leadership. Regional parties in India rarely disappear overnight. They endure electoral setbacks, organisational crises, leadership feuds and even the loss of their symbols. What allows them to survive is the emotional connection between their leaders and their grassroots workers. The undivided Shiv Sena founded by Balasaheb Thackeray in 1966 remains perhaps the clearest example of this phenomenon. Rebellions Galore Over the past three decades, the party has weathered a series of rebellions. In 1991, Chhagan Bhujbal departed with a significant section of the organisation. In 2005, Narayan Rane rebelled, expecting dozens of legislators to follow him, though only a handful eventually did. Raj Thackeray’s exit in 2006 inflicted a deep emotional and organisational wound, even though no MLA initially joined him. The most damaging rupture came in 2022, when Eknath Shinde led a revolt involving 40 legislators, bringing down the Uddhav Thackeray government and eventually securing control of the original Shiv Sena name and its iconic bow-and-arrow symbol. Now, four years later, Uddhav Thackeray faces another test. If the reported departure of six MPs materialises, the party’s parliamentary presence would be substantially weakened. Yet it would merely constitute another chapter in the long and turbulent struggle over Balasaheb Thackeray’s political inheritance. What is striking is that every rebellion in the Shiv Sena’s history has shared a common feature. Chhagan Bhujbal's departure was shaped by the political churn of the Mandal-versus-Kamandal era and his rivalry with Manohar Joshi. Narayan Rane believed that Uddhav Thackeray's rise blocked his own path to the top. Raj Thackeray reached a similar conclusion, convinced that Balasaheb’s preference for his son limited his prospects within the organisation. Even Shinde’s revolt was rooted in the perception that Uddhav’s leadership style had become an obstacle to the ambitions of many senior leaders. Despite these repeated schisms, the Shiv Sena’s core support base has displayed remarkable resilience. The average Shiv Sainik has historically remained loyal not merely to an election symbol but to a broader sense of identity, ideology and belonging. Above all, that loyalty has been anchored in the enduring memory of Balasaheb Thackeray. That emotional capital remains Uddhav Thackeray’s greatest political asset. The evidence was visible in the 2024 Lok Sabha election. Despite losing the party name and symbol, the Shiv Sena (UBT) secured nine parliamentary seats. Although the party subsequently suffered setbacks in the Maharashtra Assembly election, the Lok Sabha outcome demonstrated that a substantial section of Marathi voters continued to regard Uddhav Thackeray as the authentic political heir to Balasaheb’s legacy. The challenge before him today, however, differs fundamentally from the one faced by his father. Balasaheb commanded the organisation through charisma, authority and an almost unmatched emotional hold over the cadre. Uddhav must instead rely on organisation, persistence and sustained public engagement. The next three years will therefore be decisive. If he intends to remain a serious contender ahead of the 2029 Lok Sabha and Assembly elections, he will have to spend considerably more time on the ground. Reconnecting with workers, rebuilding local leadership structures and expanding the party beyond the politics of sympathy will be essential. Electoral revival cannot be achieved through nostalgia alone. There is, however, one development that could reshape the political landscape. The recent rapprochement between Uddhav and Raj Thackeray has revived hopes of a broader Marathi political consolidation. After years of rivalry, the Thackeray cousins appear to have recognised that political survival may require cooperation rather than competition. Should this understanding evolve into a durable alliance, it could consolidate the Marathi vote in urban Maharashtra, particularly in Mumbai, Thane, Nashik and parts of the Konkan. For Uddhav Thackeray, the immediate future remains difficult. Organisational defections continue to haunt the party, and reports suggest that legislators, too, are being courted by rival camps. Yet Maharashtra’s political history offers a useful reminder. The Shiv Sena has repeatedly survived predictions of its demise. Every split has weakened the organisation; none has succeeded in severing its emotional connection with a significant section of its cadre. The battle for the Shiv Sena is therefore no longer merely a contest over legislators, MPs or election symbols. It is a struggle over memory, legitimacy and identity. Eknath Shinde may possess the official party name, the symbol and a larger legislative presence. Uddhav Thackeray, however, still retains a considerable portion of the emotional constituency that Balasaheb painstakingly built over five decades. Whether that emotional reservoir can once again be converted into electoral success remains the defining question. The answer will be determined on the streets, in shakhas and among party workers across Maharashtra over the next three years. For now, Uddhav Thackeray stands politically wounded, but far from defeated. In Maharashtra politics, that distinction often matters more than the numbers.

Afghanistan’s War on Women

A new Taliban penal code effectively legalising domestic abuse exposes not just the brutality of Afghanistan’s rulers but also the world’s uneasy willingness to look away.

“A husband may beat his wife, so long as there are no broken bones or open wounds.” Few sentences better capture the moral universe now taking shape in Afghanistan. What reads like a fragment from a medieval legal text is, in fact, part of a newly circulated penal code reportedly approved by the Taliban’s supreme leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada.

 

The decree reveals the architecture of a system designed not merely to regulate society but to codify hierarchy. The document, which surfaced after being leaked to the Afghan rights group Rawadari and later translated by the Afghanistan Analysts Network, sketches a social order stratified by rank. Religious elites sit at the apex and beneath them lie other social tiers, distinguished by status, caste-like categories and economic standing. Under this arrangement, punishment depends less on the crime than on who commits it.

 

Chilling Clause

Women occupy a rung even lower. In the hierarchy outlined in the code, they are listed alongside slaves. The clause on domestic discipline is particularly chilling. It appears to permit husbands or ‘masters’ to beat women provided that the violence does not leave visible injuries such as fractures or open wounds. In other words, violence is permissible so long as it leaves little evidence. Domestic abuse becomes legally tolerable.


The cruelty of the provision is matched only by the obstacles it places before any woman seeking justice. According to the same legal framework, a woman who wishes to file a complaint must appear in court fully veiled and accompanied by a male guardian. The rule invites an obvious question: what happens when the guardian is the abuser?

 

Under such circumstances, the legal system becomes a hall of mirrors. A wife beaten by her husband must appear in court under his supervision to accuse him. If she flees to her parents without her husband’s permission, another clause reportedly stipulates punishment not only for her but for her relatives as well. Parents who shelter a daughter escaping abuse risk imprisonment.

 

Repressive System

The result is a system that appears designed to ensure submission. Since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021 after the chaotic withdrawal of Western forces and the collapse of the Afghan republic, women’s rights have been dismantled with remarkable speed. The Taliban initially suggested that its rule might be more pragmatic than the horrors it inflicted during its first regime in the 1990s. Reality has proved otherwise.

 

Step by step, Afghan women have been removed from public life. Girls were first barred from secondary schools. Women were then pushed out of most forms of employment. Universities were closed to them. Public parks, gyms and beauty salons followed. Travel without a male escort became increasingly restricted. In some settings, women are discouraged from speaking loudly in public.

 

The state’s intrusion now extends into the architecture of private life. Taliban regulations have reportedly ordered that windows overlooking areas where women might be visible be covered or redesigned. The logic offered is that seeing women perform everyday tasks could provoke ‘immoral acts.’

 

Taken together, these measures amount to the systematic erasure of half the population. Some human-rights advocates describe the process as ‘gender apartheid’ - an attempt to segregate women from public existence as thoroughly as possible.

The penal code’s hierarchy reinforces that exclusion in disturbing ways. One reported provision suggests that the legal consequences for harming animals may exceed those for seriously injuring women. Breaking a wife’s arm could, in theory, result in a shorter sentence than mistreating livestock. In the state’s moral calculus, women rank below beasts.

 

Afghanistan has long been regarded as one of the harshest places in the world to be female. Yet even by the country’s troubled standards, the present trajectory is striking. When the Taliban seized power again in 2021, their spokesmen promised that governance would be different this time - more moderate, more attuned to the expectations of the international community. Those assurances have steadily evaporated.

 

Yet the international response has been muted. Governments across the world insist that engagement with Kabul is necessary for pragmatic reasons. Several countries have hosted Taliban delegations or sent officials to meet them in Kabul. Among those cautiously reopening channels is India, which sees dialogue as strategically useful in a volatile neighbourhood.

 

For the Taliban leadership, such engagement carries symbolic weight. Diplomatic meetings, trade discussions and the gradual easing of isolation suggest that their rule is becoming normalised. Even the possibility of relaxing sanctions or reconsidering terrorist designations is interpreted as validation.

 

For Afghan women, the message is rather different. Roughly 14 million of them now live under a regime that has progressively stripped away their education, employment and mobility. The new penal code, if fully enforced, would go further by redefining violence within the home as something close to a permissible act. The law does not merely fail to protect them; it codifies their vulnerability.

 

The uncomfortable truth is that geopolitics often trumps principle. Governments balancing regional interests, migration pressures and security concerns find it easier to maintain cautious dialogue with Kabul than to isolate it completely. Afghanistan occupies a difficult strategic crossroads linking South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East. Few states relish the prospect of renewed instability there.

But moral compromises accumulate as each diplomatic handshake and trade negotiation conducted in the name of pragmatism, risks signalling that the treatment of Afghan women is a secondary concern.

 

History will likely judge the Taliban harshly for the society they are constructing. Yet it may also judge the wider world for the indifference with which it watched. If Afghanistan’s rulers are busy legalising abuse, the international community risks doing something almost as troubling: normalising it for the sake of convenience.


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