Central Asia’s Middle-Power Rise and India’s Eurasian Strategy
- Sumant Vidwans

- Oct 5
- 3 min read
India stands to benefit from middle powers reshaping the region.

In April, the EU held its first EU–Central Asia Leaders’ Summit in Samarkand with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, pledging €13.2 billion under the Global Gateway initiative. Over €10 billion has since been mobilised for infrastructure, logistics, energy and digital connectivity, with a critical minerals roadmap underway.
In parallel, China held a high-profile China–Central Asia Summit in Astana in June, offering an alternative engagement model. These moves signal a major geopolitical shift: Central Asia is no longer a passive arena for great-power rivalry but an increasingly assertive bloc of middle powers.
Middle power in Central Asia
Middle powers are defined less by size or military strength than by their ability to shape regional or global outcomes through soft power, coalition-building, norm-setting and diplomacy.
In Central Asia, Kazakhstan exemplifies this model as the region’s economic hub and most experienced diplomatic actor. It balances between Russia and the West while deepening ties with Türkiye, China and the Gulf. Its diversified defence procurement, role in energy transition dialogues and leadership in regional infrastructure mark it as a clear middle power.
Uzbekistan, centrally located with a large population and reformist leadership, is emerging as a logistical and diplomatic hub. It has strengthened economic and cultural ties with Türkiye, invested in South Caucasus transit routes, and plays a key role in regional energy and digital projects.
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, often seen as peripheral, gain niche leverage through the C5 platform, selective engagement with China and the Gulf, and strategic roles in energy transit and labour migration.
Why now? Four structural shifts
Central Asia’s rise as a middle-power bloc stems from four shifts.
First, the post-Ukraine realignment has weakened Russia’s economic and political influence, prompting states to diversify toward the EU, Türkiye, the Gulf, South Korea and Japan.
Second, competition over transport corridors has intensified. The Middle Corridor (Trans-Caspian International Transport Route) is gaining traction as an alternative to Russian routes for China–Europe trade. The EU co-finances rail links, ports and digital customs systems, though bottlenecks in Azerbaijan and maritime insurance gaps hinder full operation.
Third, platform diplomacy has surged. The C5+1 framework with the US now covers the Critical Minerals Dialogue, while the EU has launched a roadmap for raw materials and trade facilitation. China counters with concessional loans and digital infrastructure.
Fourth, internal reforms—especially in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—have expanded space for outward-looking, diversified diplomacy.
Arenas of middle-power behaviour
In connectivity and trade, the Middle Corridor is a flagship initiative. With EU support via the €10 billion Global Gateway, countries have launched pilot projects for customs harmonisation, digital waybills and port modernisation, notably in Kazakhstan and Georgia.
In energy and critical minerals, the EU–Central Asia declaration in April set a roadmap for uranium, copper, rare earths and green hydrogen. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are central, with European firms exploring long-term offtake deals and co-investment. India, already a uranium importer from Kazakhstan, is a key stakeholder.
Security hedging is another area. Central Asian states have joined military exercises with the US, Türkiye, China and India. While formal alliances are avoided, interest in diversifying security ties is growing amid Afghan instability and concerns over Russian unpredictability.
Norm-setting and convening power reflect a subtler shift. States increasingly use multilateral forums to position themselves as thought leaders on issues from food security to climate resilience. Hosting summits with both the EU and China in the same year underscores this rising confidence.
Implications for India
India’s interests in Central Asia are strategic. The region offers an energy diversification buffer—uranium, natural gas and critical minerals support India’s clean energy goals—and a key overland link to Europe, complementing maritime routes. Engagement has expanded via the “Connect Central Asia” policy, Chabahar port investments, the INSTC, and dialogues on rare earths and supply chains.
More remains to be done. Rather than new corridors, India should strengthen existing ones by improving border logistics, harmonising customs and aligning digital platforms. Linking Chabahar with the Middle Corridor’s digital standards could create a hybrid route of strategic value.
India should also boost soft-power investments: education partnerships, vocational training, standards harmonisation and joint R&D in energy and technology. These steps can position India as a long-term partner rather than a transactional actor. With China and the EU already investing, delaying risks India being sidelined in Eurasia.
Risks and constraints
Several challenges could undermine Central Asia’s middle-power trajectory. Corridor viability depends on resolving bottlenecks like cross-border tariffs, opaque customs and unreliable insurance—especially for Caspian Sea segments. Political fragility, border disputes (notably Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan) and weak governance also threaten progress.
Great-power pushback remains a concern: Russia wields influence via energy and elite networks, while China’s economic weight can overshadow smaller players. The EU’s reliance on private capital, which may hesitate without guarantees, adds uncertainty. If overly cautious, India risks a reactive rather than proactive role.
(The writer is a foreign affairs expert. Views personal.)





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