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By:

Abhijit Mulye

21 August 2024 at 11:29:11 am

Bihar’s huge gain, Maharashtra’s pause

Shadow cast over the national trajectories of several heavyweights including Fadnavis Mumbai: The sudden appointment of Nitin Nabin as the BJP’s national Working National President on December 14, 2025, has done more than just fill a leadership vacuum; it has recalibrated the internal power dynamics of the ruling party. While the 45-year-old Bihar minister’s elevation is being hailed as a masterstroke in generational transition, it has simultaneously cast a shadow over the national...

Bihar’s huge gain, Maharashtra’s pause

Shadow cast over the national trajectories of several heavyweights including Fadnavis Mumbai: The sudden appointment of Nitin Nabin as the BJP’s national Working National President on December 14, 2025, has done more than just fill a leadership vacuum; it has recalibrated the internal power dynamics of the ruling party. While the 45-year-old Bihar minister’s elevation is being hailed as a masterstroke in generational transition, it has simultaneously cast a shadow over the national trajectories of several heavyweights, most notably from Maharashtra. Nabin, a five-term MLA and a seasoned organisational hand, represents the “new guard” that Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Home Minister Amit Shah have spent years cultivating. By choosing a leader from Bihar—a state where the BJP is looking to fill a leadership void as ally Nitish Kumar nears the twilight of his career—the high command has signaled that the path to the top is reserved for those under 55 with deep grassroots roots. However, this “Bihar first” strategy has created an unexpected bottleneck for Maharashtra’s most prominent national aspirants. Block Fadnavis Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis has long been the subject of “Delhi-bound” rumours. Despite his public assertions that he will remain in Maharashtra until 2029, insiders suggest his national ambitions were a poorly kept secret. Nabin’s appointment complicates this path significantly. At 55, Fadnavis is ten years Nabin’s senior. With Nabin now positioned to transition into the full-time President role by early 2026, the organisational “Top Spot” is effectively occupied for the foreseeable future. For Fadnavis, entering the national arena now means competing in a space where the leadership has already signaled a preference for younger, non-entrenched faces. “The appointment of a 45-year-old sends a message that the party isn’t just looking for experience; it’s looking for a long political runway,” noted a senior BJP strategist. Another senior BJP leader from Bihar highlighted the “Low Key” factor that might have helped Nabin in being elevated to the top slot. Another analyst said that the appointment of Nabin also suggests that the BJP leadership is unlikely to pay heed to the insistence from the RSS while devising the succession strategy within the party and in the government. This factor too goes against Fadnavis, the analyst feels. Waiting Game Another leader feeling the squeeze is BJP National General Secretary Vinod Tawde. Known as a prolific “troubleshooter” in Delhi, speculation was rife that a cabinet reshuffle would see Tawde move from the organisation to a ministerial post. Instead, the elevation of a younger leader to the Working Presidency suggests the “organisational refresh” may keep current secretaries in their administrative roles longer than anticipated. For Tawde, who successfully navigated from state-level sidelines to national relevance, the prospect of a high-profile cabinet berth now appears to be a “distant dream” in the current reshuffle cycle. The “Nabin Era” marks a departure from the traditional seniority-based hierarchy. Those hailing the feat as a masterstroke say that the BJP leadership has achieved multiple goals like neutralising factions and forced recalibration by promoting a leader who was not on the typical media “shortlist”. In Nabin’s appointment the BJP central leadership has bypassed the traditional power centers of Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh and pushed leaders like Fadnavis and Tawde to double down on their current roles rather than looking toward the capital, they say. As the party prepares for its plenary session in January 2026, the message to the rank and file is clear that the national arena is no longer a natural progression for state stalwarts, but a field of high-stakes, unpredictable selection.

China–Pakistan–Kyrgyzstan Triangle Signals New Asian Alignment

The partnership is driven by China’s economic and strategic dominance, while for Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan, it offers a pathway to growth and connectivity.

                                Xi Jinping                                     Shehbaz Sharif                                             Sadyr Japarov
Xi Jinping Shehbaz Sharif Sadyr Japarov

A new triangular partnership is emerging in Asia, linking China, Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan. The collaboration signals a push to deepen economic, security and infrastructure ties across Central and South Asia. Driven by shared strategic interests, the three are exploring cooperation through the Belt and Road Initiative, cross-border trade corridors and counterterrorism coordination.


For China, the partnership strengthens its influence in Central Asia and helps secure its western borders; for Pakistan, it broadens regional connectivity beyond the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor; and for Kyrgyzstan, it brings fresh economic prospects and added political leverage in a changing Asian order. Together, the alignment points to a gradual move towards more integrated regional dynamics shaped by overlapping ambitions.


An Unequal Partnership

The so-called “all-weather friendship” between China and Pakistan is well known. Yet while Pakistan may present it as an equal partnership, it more closely resembles a subordinate relationship—a pattern seen in most close alignments with China. Even so, Chinese investment in Pakistan is substantial. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a 15-year, $62-billion project and the flagship of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, has anchored ties since 2015, with Gwadar Port long promoted as its “crown jewel”.


However, it has increasingly come to resemble a “white elephant”. Years after its construction, business at the port remains limited—mirroring outcomes seen at projects such as Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port and Nepal’s Pokhara Airport, now under investigation for corruption. Attacks by Baloch insurgents on Chinese projects and personnel in Pakistan are also recurring, yet Beijing appears largely undeterred by these challenges.


Beyond Gwadar Port, China has invested for years in Pakistan’s power and transport infrastructure, while Chinese firms are now eyeing major stakes in renewable energy and advanced technology. Whether these investments—often backed by high-interest loans—are sustainable for Pakistan remains uncertain. The U.S. State Department has recently criticised what it calls China’s predatory lending, arguing that such projects largely benefit Chinese firms and workers while adding to Pakistan’s debt burden, a pattern also seen in countries such as the Maldives and Sri Lanka.


China’s Expanding Footprint

While Pakistan is among the most prominent examples of China’s deep economic footprint under the Belt and Road Initiative, it is not the only one. Linking China to Europe through road and rail corridors is central to BRI, with Central Asian states playing a critical role—among them, Kyrgyzstan.


Since 2018, China has emerged as Kyrgyzstan’s leading economic and investment partner, involved in several key transport and infrastructure projects under the BRI. Strengthening connectivity with China through roads, railways, border crossings and logistics hubs also features prominently in Kyrgyzstan’s National Development Programme to 2030.


By the end of 2024, China had invested $286.5 million in Kyrgyzstan. According to the National Statistical Committee, 931 Chinese enterprises were operating in the country, 706 of them primarily backed by Chinese capital. Investments are concentrated in infrastructure—railways, energy and logistics—along with mining and manufacturing. The scale of Chinese presence varies by region, with near-monopoly positions in areas such as Batken. Kyrgyzstan now depends on China for nearly a third of its external debt, raising concerns over financial dependence and potential debt traps.


Kyrgyz-Pakistan Connection

Central Asian states such as Kyrgyzstan are strengthening ties with Pakistan to expand trade and bolster regional security. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov visited Islamabad this month—the first such visit in over two decades—resulting in agreements across trade, education, tourism, energy and agriculture.


Efficient land and rail links are crucial to boosting commerce between Central Asia and Pakistan. For landlocked Central Asian states, access to Pakistani seaports is a key priority, with the potential to significantly expand their global trade.


Notably, the Taliban has emerged as a shared concern. For decades, Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian states stood on the opposite side of Pakistan, which had fostered the Taliban’s rise and supported its takeover of much of Afghanistan in the late 1990s. At the time, Central Asian states strongly backed militias in northern Afghanistan that opposed the Taliban.


After the Taliban was ousted following 9/11, Pakistan went on to provide key support to the insurgency that ultimately overthrew the US-backed Afghan government in 2021. Now, as Pakistan–Taliban relations rapidly deteriorate, Central Asian states are increasingly finding common cause with Islamabad.


The emerging China–Pakistan–Kyrgyzstan triangle reflects a new regional alignment reshaping Asia’s geopolitics. Driven by China’s economic and strategic dominance, Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan see the partnership as a pathway to growth and connectivity. Yet power asymmetries and debt risks raise concerns over sovereignty and long-term stability. Whether this grouping enables genuine regional integration or mainly extends Beijing’s influence will shape the future balance of power in Central and South Asia.


(The writer is a foreign affairs expert. Views personal.)

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