Dragon at the Delta: China’s Eastern Advance

Bangladesh’s growing embrace of Chinese infrastructure and strategic capital confronts India with a geopolitical challenge that extends far beyond the Teesta.

For more than five decades, India and Bangladesh have built one of South Asia’s most stable bilateral relationships. Bound by geography, culture and the shared memory of Bangladesh’s liberation in 1971, New Delhi viewed Dhaka as an indispensable partner in securing India's eastern frontier and integrating its northeastern states with the wider region.

That comfortable strategic assumption is now being seriously tested by Bangladesh’s deeper reliance on Beijing. The proposed Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project, the transfer of the Mongla Port modernisation project to a Chinese state-owned enterprise, and a series of fresh agreements covering water resources, transport and investment collectively signal that China is becoming central to Dhaka’s long-term development strategy.

A New Reality

For India, this is the emergence of a new strategic reality along one of its most sensitive frontiers. Under the Belt and Road Initiative and related financing mechanisms, Beijing has invested billions of dollars across South Asia in ports, highways, railways, power generation and logistics networks in a bid to create enduring political leverage, economic dependence and, in strategically significant locations, the potential for future security advantages.

Thus, Gwadar in Pakistan has become a cornerstone of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Hambantota in Sri Lanka, once promoted purely as a commercial venture, eventually resulted in a ninety-nine-year lease to a Chinese company after Colombo struggled with debt. Chinese investments have expanded across Nepal, the Maldives and Myanmar, while Djibouti hosts Beijing's first overseas military base. None of these developments occurred overnight. They emerged gradually through sustained economic engagement that ultimately acquired strategic dimensions.

Bangladesh increasingly appears to be the next chapter in this story. During Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s recent visit to China, both countries agreed to undertake a feasibility study for the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project. Although still at a preliminary stage, the project immediately attracted attention in New Delhi because of where it is located rather than what it intends to accomplish.

The Teesta originates in the glaciers of Sikkim before flowing through northern West Bengal and into Bangladesh, eventually joining the Jamuna, one of the principal distributaries of the Brahmaputra. It is vital for irrigation, agriculture and livelihoods on both sides of the border. For Bangladesh, effective river management promises flood control, erosion mitigation and enhanced agricultural productivity. These are entirely legitimate developmental objectives.

Vulnerable Stretch

Yet, geography rarely allows infrastructure to remain politically neutral. The proposed project lies opposite Jalpaiguri district in West Bengal and close to the Siliguri Corridor - the narrow, approximately 22-kilometre-wide strip popularly known as the “Chicken’s Neck.” This slender corridor is India’s only land connection with its eight northeastern states. Every major road, railway line, fuel pipeline and military movement linking the Northeast to the rest of India passes through or near this vulnerable stretch.

Should Chinese engineers, contractors, technical personnel and state-owned enterprises establish a sustained operational presence in such close proximity, India inevitably views the implications through a national security lens. It reflects the reality that Chinese state-owned enterprises often operate within Beijing’s wider strategic framework. Companies such as PowerChina may execute commercial contracts, but they also generate detailed geographical knowledge, establish long-term institutional relationships and maintain technical footprints that can serve broader national objectives over time.

For India, the Teesta project cannot be separated from the wider geopolitical context. Ironically, the Teesta dispute itself is hardly new. India and Bangladesh have negotiated water sharing for decades. An interim arrangement was reached in 1983, and significant progress appeared possible during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Dhaka in 2011. The proposed agreement reserved 20 percent of the river's flow for ecological sustainability while allocating 42.5 percent to India and 37.5 percent to Bangladesh.

The agreement ultimately stalled because of opposition from West Bengal, where concerns centred on irrigation requirements and drinking water availability in the state's northern districts. India’s federal structure requires the cooperation of state governments on transboundary river agreements, leaving New Delhi unable to conclude the arrangement despite its diplomatic intent.

Recognising both Bangladesh’s developmental needs and India’s domestic constraints, China entered the conversation. During Sheikh Hasina’s visit to Beijing in 2019, Chinese participation in the Teesta project was formally proposed. Financial packages worth roughly US$853 million were discussed, followed by revised proposals approaching US$1 billion. Although progress slowed because of financing questions and India's reservations, Beijing successfully established itself as an indispensable stakeholder.

India responded with an alternative. In 2024, New Delhi reportedly offered to finance the project itself through a package approaching US$1 billion, hoping to preserve both developmental cooperation and strategic comfort. Political upheaval in Bangladesh following the fall of the Hasina government, however, interrupted that initiative. The new administration has since revived engagement with China, allowing Beijing to regain momentum.

The Teesta is only one element of a much larger picture. China has proposed cooperation across Bangladesh’s water management sector, including river restoration, erosion control, irrigation systems, inland waterways, hydraulic engineering and administrative training. During the recent visit, the two countries signed thirteen Memorandums of Understanding spanning infrastructure, trade, investment, water resources and political cooperation. Alongside these initiatives sits the proposed China-Bangladesh Friendship Hospital and several additional development projects that further deepen institutional ties.

Expanding Partnership

Economics naturally underpins this expanding partnership. China is already among Bangladesh’s largest development partners, having extended approximately US$7.5 billion in loans since diplomatic relations began in 1975. Chinese companies have participated in transformative infrastructure, including the Padma Bridge, while Beijing has become Bangladesh's fourth-largest lender after Japan, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

Infrastructure financing, however, seldom remains purely financial. It creates political influence, shapes future procurement decisions and strengthens long-term strategic relationships.

The decision regarding Mongla Port illustrates this evolution even more clearly. Originally awarded to an Indian company under agreements reached during Sheikh Hasina's tenure, the port modernisation project symbolised India’s growing role in Bangladesh’s maritime infrastructure. Following the political transition in August 2024, the interim government cancelled the arrangement and transferred the project to a Chinese state-owned enterprise.

That decision carries implications extending well beyond port construction. Located roughly 130 kilometres from India’s maritime boundary and about 80 kilometres from the land border, Mongla occupies an important position overlooking the northern Bay of Bengal. The project also includes development of a 110-acre economic zone in nearby Bagerhat, further expanding China's economic footprint.

India has responded with characteristic diplomatic caution. The Ministry of External Affairs has confirmed that New Delhi is closely monitoring developments, while Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri has reiterated that discussions on the Teesta, the Ganga and other transboundary rivers will continue through the Joint Rivers Commission.

While such restraint is prudent, India cannot afford complacency. The central challenge before New Delhi is not preventing Bangladesh from engaging China. That objective is neither realistic nor desirable. The challenge is ensuring that India remains Bangladesh’s partner of first choice by delivering projects faster, expanding investment, deepening connectivity, resolving longstanding bilateral irritants and demonstrating that democratic partnerships can compete with authoritarian financing.

South Asia is entering a new phase of geopolitical competition where influence will be measured less by rhetoric than by roads built, ports modernised, rivers managed and economies connected.

The Teesta and Mongla projects are indicators of a regional order in transition. For India, the warning is unmistakable. Geography may remain permanent, but strategic influence does not. It must be earned continuously, or it will quietly pass to those willing to invest more patiently and think more strategically.

(The writer is a senior journalist and political analyst. Views personal.)