Exit from Ayni

India’s discreet withdrawal from its only overseas airbase in Tajikistan reflects the shifting nature of Central Asian geopolitics and looming challenges to its Chabahar ambitions.

In an unusually muted fashion, India recently confirmed the closure of its first overseas airbase located in Ayni, a village in north-western Tajikistan more than two years after the last Indian personnel packed up and left. The revelation came not through a formal statement but during a routine press briefing on October 31 when the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson, Randhir Jaiswal, quietly acknowledged that “the arrangement was in place for several years and was concluded in 2022.”

The understated confirmation ended months of speculation over India’s departure from the Ayni airbase - a facility that once symbolised New Delhi’s strategic ambitions in Central Asia. Built at a cost of roughly $100m in the early 2000s, the base was India’s first attempt to project power beyond the subcontinent.

Strategic foothold

Ayni sits just 165 kilometres from Tajikistan’s capital, Dushanbe, and within striking distance of Afghanistan, China and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir - an enviable vantage point for any regional power. In 2001, when Tajikistan’s Ghissar airfield lay derelict, India saw an opening. Then–Defence Minister George Fernandes and a rising security hawk, Ajit Doval (now National Security Adviser), had pushed for India to help reconstruct the base.

By 2005, the Border Roads Organisation and the Indian Air Force had transformed the site into a modern airstrip, capable of hosting large transport and combat aircraft. For India, it was a strategic leap: a Central Asian perch offering access to Afghanistan, a hedge against Pakistan, and a foothold in a region traditionally dominated by Moscow.

India never maintained a permanent deployment at Ayni. The base mainly hosted transport aircraft and helicopters, two of which were gifted to Tajikistan. At times, reports suggested the presence of Sukhoi-30 fighters, though these deployments were short-lived. The base’s importance was primarily strategic rather than operational. During the 2001 crisis in Afghanistan, when Taliban forces captured Kabul, the Ayni facility briefly served as a staging point for the evacuation of Indian diplomats and citizens, thus demonstrating its potential value in moments of crisis.

Quiet exit

By 2022, that promise had faded. According to officials and analysts, Tajikistan informed India in 2021 that it would not renew the lease. New Delhi complied and the base was vacated soon after. The official rationale remains unspoken, but geopolitical undercurrents tell their own story.

Central Asia, once a remote frontier, has become a crowded chessboard. Russia regards the region as its strategic backyard, while China has emerged as an assertive player through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Both powers are wary of any non-regional military presence. Analysts say Beijing and Moscow viewed the Indian base as an anomaly and leaned on Dushanbe to end the arrangement.

Tajikistan, heavily dependent on Russian security guarantees and Chinese infrastructure loans, could hardly afford to displease either. For India, the eviction underscores the limits of its influence in a region where economic and political loyalties tilt north and east, not south.

The timing of the revelation is notable. It comes just as India is celebrating what it sees as a breakthrough: Washington’s decision to extend a six-month sanctions waiver for its operations at Iran’s Chabahar port. The project, a linchpin in India’s outreach to Afghanistan and Central Asia, has long been touted as an alternative to Pakistan’s Gwadar port and a counterbalance to China’s expanding footprint in the region.

Yet the closure of Ayni is a sobering reminder of the diplomatic and logistical constraints that accompany such ambitions. The Chabahar corridor, while offering sea access to Central Asia via Iran and Afghanistan, passes through an unstable geopolitical landscape. Tehran’s fraught ties with Washington, the Taliban’s unpredictability in Kabul and Beijing’s growing sway over both Iran and the Central Asian republics will make India’s navigation tricky.

India’s quiet exit from Ayni does not necessarily mark the end of its Central Asian aspirations, but it does suggest a shift in method. Rather than forward deployment, New Delhi may prefer flexible partnerships and infrastructure diplomacy. It remains part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), where it engages with regional leaders under the wary gaze of China and Russia.

As New Delhi sets its sights on the Iranian coast, the echoes from Tajikistan carry with it an inherent lesson that geography is destiny, but diplomacy is the art of survival within it. The road to Chabahar may be paved with fresh opportunities but, as Ayni shows, it is also lined with the ghosts of abandoned outposts.