The ‘Exclusionary Vision’ Dilemma for Sovereign Countries

Sovereign nations protect their distinct cultural foundations while still upholding an inclusive vision of governance. The same principle should apply to India. The ‘Universal Oneness Celebration’ event that was recently held in New York City attracted criticism that was only to be expected from certain obvious quarters who chastised the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) for having an allegedly ‘exclusionary vision’. In a free society, one can always express a personal opinion on the...

min read

The ‘Exclusionary Vision’ Dilemma for Sovereign Countries

Sovereign nations protect their distinct cultural foundations while still upholding an inclusive vision of governance. The same principle should apply to India. The ‘Universal Oneness Celebration’ event that was recently held in New York City attracted criticism that was only to be expected from certain obvious quarters who chastised the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) for having an allegedly ‘exclusionary vision’. In a free society, one can always express a personal opinion on the effectiveness with which the stated ideology or philosophy of any organisation is being implemented on the ground. However, labelling an organisation that considers ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ as its core belief as having an ‘exclusionary vision’ is curious, to say the least. We are living in a world of different sovereign countries, each with its own history, cultural identity that acts as a foundation for nation-building and, of course, its own international borders and immigration policies. It is interesting to see how different countries look at the cultural identity and ethos that shape them, and how they protect the foundation on which they stand while still championing their own ‘inclusive vision’. Illusion of Contradiction Take France as an example. The principles of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity were born out of the French Revolution. They serve as the guiding star for France. Many other countries in the world have also adopted these principles and drawn inspiration from them. Such noble principles, however, are never sufficient to define the foundation of a sovereign country that differentiates it from others. While Liberty, Equality and Fraternity are held in high regard in France, the French language is the foundation on which France stands as a sovereign country. As it is often said, language carries with it not merely its grammar and vocabulary, but a whole culture of its own. Approximately 13 percent of the population in France has a mother tongue different from French. It is noteworthy how France looks at its cultural foundation — the French language — vis-à-vis the spirit behind the principles of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity enshrined in its Constitution. Article 2 of the same French Constitution explicitly states that France has only one official language — French. From time to time, there are demands to grant official status to other minority languages, but they face tremendous political and legal resistance and are shot down. Other languages are denied even ‘co-official’ status because this is perceived as a direct threat to the deeply rooted ideology of the centralised linguistic unity of France. It goes a step further. There is a concerted, systematic effort to preserve the ‘purity’ of the French language and fight the ‘invasion of English’, called Franglais. It is mandatory under the law, including the Toubon Law, to use the French language in government publications and workplaces, and to include a French translation if any English slogan is used even in a commercial advertisement. Similarly, although Italy recognises a few ‘minority languages’, its official national language is only one — Italian. The approach taken by Germany or Japan is broadly the same. One cannot but wonder whether the same critics of the RSS would call an approach taken by France ‘exclusionary’. The fact is that every sovereign country has its own cultural foundation, which is the cause of its very existence. Countries go out of their way to ‘exclusively’ protect and preserve that cultural foundation. That does not mean, however, that France exclusively belongs only to the majority population whose mother tongue is the same as the national language. Nor does it mean that the State will treat its citizens differently based on their mother tongue, or give preferential treatment to the majority community over linguistic minorities. It is in this perspective that one needs to look at the civilisational ethos dating back thousands of years that forms the foundation of the Indian subcontinent, and the historical context of events that led to India being born as a present-day sovereign country in 1947. How India should treat its cultural foundation is no different from how France, Italy, Germany or Japan should do it. Needless to say, neither India nor any of these other countries discriminate against certain citizens when it comes to governance and the rule of law. There is no contradiction or ‘exclusionary vision’ whatsoever in the approach taken by France, and the same should hold true for India as well. Contextual Similarity As far as the United States of America is concerned, neither any particular language, nor any religion, nor any ethnic origin independently defines the cultural foundation of that country. And yet, there is certainly an ‘American culture’ that defines the country and acts as its foundation. People from all over the world, with very different backgrounds, have migrated to that land and ‘American culture’ has assimilated them. Although it may be difficult to define it very clearly, there is certainly ‘Unity in Diversity’ in American culture. The country calls itself ‘a melting pot’. It goes out of its way to protect this attribute through uniform civil laws that apply to all citizens regardless of their religion or ethnicity. Not everything was just and fair in American history. However, American culture and its democratic ethos not only allow open discussion and debate on what was wrong, but also encourage action on the ground to correct historical wrongs. Former President Bill Clinton summarised it well in one of the presidential debates when he said: “There is nothing wrong in America that cannot be corrected by what is right in America.” When it comes to immigration, whether for tourism or work, the US perhaps has been the most open country for several decades. Its policy towards even illegal immigration has been very soft. It has realised, however, that all this is being taken for granted by many countries and even deliberately misused. Any legitimate attempt, in the larger interest of the country, to change and tighten that policy and stop illegal immigration and settlement invites severe criticism. With that criticism, ironically, an otherwise very open and welcoming country gets painted as being very rigid and intolerant. This specific aspect of American culture, and the criticism it faces, has a clear parallel with the civilisational ethos that forms the foundation of India. Indian culture has also assimilated people from many parts of the world for centuries. It too has its own ‘Unity in Diversity’ that is not very easy for many to define and appreciate. It also welcomes open discussion about historical wrongs and makes a sincere attempt to correct them. The accommodating and welcoming nature — the ‘Atithi Devo Bhava’ psyche — implicit in Indian culture has also been deliberately and rampantly misused. Any attempt to enforce the law of the land invites the same criticism that the US faces. Needless to say, India, like the US or any other country, would and should go out of its way to protect its cultural foundation. Doing so can be termed an ‘exclusionary vision’ only as part of a motivated agenda, if not an absolute unwillingness or inability to grasp and respect the cultural foundations of different countries. There is a need to refine and temper the definition of the so-called ‘exclusionary vision’ for it to make sense in a world of sovereign nations that want to legitimately protect their individual identities in different ways. In other words, the very definition of ‘exclusionary vision’ itself needs to be more ‘inclusive’ in more ways than one. Given its history, the US perhaps is the best country to appreciate what it means to espouse ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ as an inclusive ideology. It is also the best country to appreciate the fact that attempts to prevent the deliberate misuse of an inclusive ideology cannot be termed an ‘exclusionary vision’. (The writer has worked in the Information Technology sector. Views personal.)

From Gold to Chips: The Quiet Return of Mercantilism

Apurva Rakesh Pandey

Aug 9

5 min read

Globalisation has not been abandoned but is being rewired around resilience, strategic trust and national power.

**Foreign Trade and Domestic Compared, by William Herbert, 1754**

Economic history rarely buries its most influential ideas. It merely waits for circumstances to make them relevant again. Mercantilism is one such idea. For much of the post-Cold War era, it seemed safely confined to textbooks - a relic of a time of colonial monopolies and favourable trade balances. The triumph of globalization appeared to have settled the debate. Economic interdependence promised not only prosperity but also peace.

Three decades later, that confidence has begun to dissolve. While the world has not abandoned globalization, it has become less certain about the assumptions on which it rested. Across the major economies, governments are reclaiming a role they once seemed willing to surrender. Washington has embraced tariffs, industrial subsidies and technology export controls. Beijing has tightened restrictions on critical minerals while accelerating technological self-reliance. The European Union increasingly frames trade through the language of economic security.

Philosophical Shift

The implications represent a change in the philosophy of globalization itself. If the first era of globalization was organised around efficiency, the emerging one is being organised around security. As Dani Rodrik has argued, industrial policy has returned to the centre of economic governance. Comparative advantage is steadily yielding to a new vocabulary of technological sovereignty, resilient supply chains and economic security. The defining question is no longer where production is cheapest, but where it is safest.

The resemblance to mercantilism is impossible to ignore. Not because the world is returning to the seventeenth century, but because governments are once again judging commerce by the strategic capabilities it creates rather than the wealth it generates. Classical mercantilists controlled trade routes and protected monopolies. Today’s strategic states compete for semiconductors, artificial intelligence, critical minerals and technological standards. Gold has given way to chips and spices to rare earths.

The pandemic exposed the fragility of supply chains built almost exclusively for efficiency. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrated how energy, food and finance could become instruments of coercion, while the freezing of Russian foreign exchange reserves revealed that even global financial networks were no longer politically neutral. At the same time, strategic rivalry between the United States and China expanded beyond tariffs into semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum computing and critical minerals. The geography of competition had shifted from factories to the technologies that would shape future economic and military power.

Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman describe this landscape as one of “weaponized interdependence”, where states exploit their central positions within global networks to pursue geopolitical objectives. Interdependence, once celebrated as a guarantee of stability, has become a source of leverage. The lesson is that efficiency without resilience is no longer an economic virtue but a strategic vulnerability.

Shaping Markets

Once that vulnerability became visible, policy could hardly remain unchanged. Governments are no longer content merely to regulate markets; they are shaping them. From the CHIPS and Science Act in the United States to China’s drive for technological self-reliance and the European Union’s Economic Security Strategy, industrial policy has returned to the centre of economic governance. Japan, South Korea and Singapore have adopted similar approaches, strengthening economic-security frameworks while investing in advanced manufacturing and digital infrastructure. This is an acknowledgement that markets alone cannot guarantee national resilience. In many ways, it is mercantilism without colonies.

Export controls, industrial subsidies, technology alliances and strategic stockpiles have become essential instruments of economic statecraft. Record central-bank gold purchases, reserve diversification and growing interest in local-currency settlement mechanisms reflect a broader search for financial resilience in an uncertain world. As Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris argue in War by Other Means, economic instruments have become as consequential to statecraft as military power itself.

Yet to interpret these developments as the end of globalization would be to misunderstand the moment. The world is not ‘de-globalising;’ it is ‘re-globalising’ on strategic terms. International trade continues to expand and multinational firms remain deeply embedded in global value chains. What has changed is the organising principle. The first wave of globalization rewarded efficiency and scale; the next is likely to reward resilience, trusted partnerships and strategic diversification. Friend-shoring, near-shoring, China+1 and the shift from just-in-time to just-in-case production are not signs of globalization’s retreat but evidence that globalization is being fundamentally rewritten.

Supply chains are not disappearing; they are being rewired around trust, resilience and strategic alignment. Economic openness is giving way neither to protectionism nor autarky, but to a more selective form of integration.

Every transformation of the global economy reshapes the hierarchy of opportunity. The present one may prove unusually favourable to India. As multinational firms diversify production networks and governments increasingly favour trusted partners, India is well placed to emerge not merely as an alternative manufacturing destination but as a pivotal node in resilient global supply chains.

Advantage India

Its advantages extend beyond labour costs to a large domestic market, democratic institutions, strategic autonomy, a rapidly expanding digital economy and a central position in the Indo-Pacific. In an age where geopolitical trust has become an economic asset, these strengths constitute a strategic advantage.

New Delhi’s response reflects an awareness of this shift. Rather than relying on market liberalisation alone, it has increasingly focused on building industrial capability. The Production Linked Incentive (PLI) programme across fourteen strategic sectors, together with the India Semiconductor Mission, PM Gati Shakti and the National Logistics Policy, aims to strengthen manufacturing competitiveness, logistics and technological capacity. At the same time, leadership in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, biotechnology, space and clean energy is becoming central not only to economic growth but also to strategic influence. Modern mercantilism is no longer about protecting industries but about building capabilities.

Industrial capability, however, cannot flourish behind closed borders. That explains New Delhi’s renewed emphasis on trade diplomacy. The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with the United Arab Emirates, the Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement with Australia, and the recently concluded free trade agreements with the United Kingdom, the European Union and New Zealand, alongside negotiations with the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council, reflect an approach best described as strategic openness. India is seeking deeper integration with global markets while preserving policy space in sectors vital to long-term resilience. The objective is to become a trusted manufacturing, technology and supply-chain partner in an increasingly fragmented global economy.

That said, global manufacturers continue to point to land acquisition, regulatory complexity, logistics costs and judicial delays as obstacles to large-scale investment. Competing with established manufacturing ecosystems will require sustained reforms in infrastructure, education, research, innovation and ease of doing business. India’s emergence as a pivotal player in the next phase of globalization will ultimately depend on the consistency of these reforms.

History nevertheless suggests that periods of global economic reordering often favour countries that adapt before others do. The redistribution of manufacturing after the Second World War transformed Japan, later South Korea and Taiwan, and eventually China. Today’s reconfiguration of supply chains may prove equally consequential. Countries that combine openness with resilience, innovation with industrial capability, and competitiveness with institutional credibility will shape the next chapter of globalization. India has the opportunity to be among them only if strategic ambition is matched by sustained execution.

Adam Smith taught that wealth is created through markets. Kautilya understood that markets ultimately serve the interests of the state. The twenty-first century suggests that both captured part of the truth. Prosperity still depends on openness, competition and innovation, but enduring power increasingly belongs to nations capable of converting economic capability into strategic advantage.

(The author is an alumnus of the University of Allahabad and a writer and analyst on international relations and strategic affairs. Views personal.)

The ‘Exclusionary Vision’ Dilemma for Sovereign Countries

From Gold to Chips: The Quiet Return of Mercantilism

Recent Posts

Comments