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By:

Commodore S.L. Deshmukh

31 October 2024 at 8:30:19 am

The Beam That Blinds the Drone

As cheap drones reshape the battlefield, India’s T-SHUL BEAM points to a future in which electronic warfare may matter as much as firepower The drone has definitively become the weapon of choice for the modern battlefield. Cheap, expendable and increasingly autonomous, unmanned aerial vehicles can now threaten troops, armour, airfields and critical infrastructure without requiring the attacker to risk a pilot. Their proliferation has created a corresponding demand for counter-drone systems...

The Beam That Blinds the Drone

As cheap drones reshape the battlefield, India’s T-SHUL BEAM points to a future in which electronic warfare may matter as much as firepower The drone has definitively become the weapon of choice for the modern battlefield. Cheap, expendable and increasingly autonomous, unmanned aerial vehicles can now threaten troops, armour, airfields and critical infrastructure without requiring the attacker to risk a pilot. Their proliferation has created a corresponding demand for counter-drone systems that can respond quickly and at a cost proportionate to the threat. This is where beam-based anti-drone technology enters the picture. Broadly, such systems fall into two categories. Hard-kill systems use concentrated laser energy to physically damage or destroy a drone. Soft-kill systems, by contrast, use radio-frequency or electromagnetic energy to disrupt the electronic links that allow a drone to communicate, navigate and transmit information. Sophisticated Weaponry Hard-kill laser systems focus an intense beam of light on a vulnerable part of an incoming UAV - its carbon-fibre structure, control surfaces, battery or other critical components. The concentrated energy rapidly heats the target, potentially burning through its structure or disabling optical sensors and bringing the aircraft down. India’s DRDO has demonstrated a 30kW laser system, while Israel’s Rafael has developed the Lite Beam system. Soft-kill systems take a different route. Rather than physically destroying the aircraft, they interfere with the electronic architecture that keeps it airborne. Directional radio-frequency energy can disrupt command-and-control links, video feeds, telemetry and satellite-navigation signals such as GPS or other GNSS services. Depending on the drone and the nature of the disruption, the aircraft may be forced to land, return to its launch point or lose control. It is in this category that the T-SHUL BEAM system developed by Indian defence company IG Defence deserves attention. T-SHUL BEAM is a man-portable, directional counter-drone system designed for tactical deployment. Its multi-band radio-frequency architecture is intended to target several of the links on which unmanned aerial systems depend, including command-and-control, telemetry, video transmission and GNSS navigation. Its directional configuration allows an operator to concentrate electronic countermeasures on a particular aerial target rather than indiscriminately radiating energy across a large area. That matters on a battlefield where the warning time against a small UAV or first-person-view drone may be measured in seconds. The appeal of such a system is therefore not simply that it can counter a drone. It is that it can potentially bring counter-drone capability closer to the soldier and to the tactical edge. Large counter-UAS installations have their place, particularly around fixed and high-value assets. But forward units require systems that can move with them, be deployed rapidly and operate against small, low-cost unmanned platforms without imposing the logistical burden associated with conventional weapons. The T-SHUL BEAM’s significance also lies in its proposed integration with an artificial-intelligence-enabled battle-management architecture. IG Drones, the original equipment manufacturer, has stated that T-SHUL BEAM has been integrated with GRID, its indigenous AI-powered platform. The GRID architecture is intended to bring sensors, intelligence systems, unmanned platforms and command elements into a common operational framework. The attraction of such integration is obvious. Countering drones is increasingly less about a single weapon and more about the speed of the kill chain: detecting a threat, identifying it, deciding what response is appropriate and directing that response before the target disappears. An AI-enabled command architecture can potentially improve situational awareness, facilitate real-time threat detection and coordinate different systems operating simultaneously. This is particularly relevant as drone warfare evolves from isolated attacks towards increasingly complex and potentially swarming operations. A battlefield crowded with drones cannot be managed effectively if every sensor and weapon operates as a separate island. The advantage will increasingly belong to forces capable of turning disparate streams of information into a coherent picture and responding at machine speed. The T-SHUL BEAM’s reported demonstration at Pokhran represents another step in India’s attempt to build a domestic ecosystem spanning drones, counter-drones, artificial intelligence and electronic warfare. Counter-drone warfare is likely to be a recurring requirement rather than a niche capability. Importing every component of such an ecosystem would leave India vulnerable to supply-chain disruptions, technology restrictions and foreign-exchange pressures. Indigenous development, even when undertaken by relatively small private-sector companies, can broaden the country’s technological base and give the armed forces greater freedom to adapt systems to their operational requirements. Economics of the Contest Yet the real measure of any counter-drone system will ultimately be operational rather than promotional. Electronic warfare is inherently a contest between countermeasure and counter-countermeasure. Drone designers can alter frequencies, communications protocols, navigation methods and levels of autonomy. A system that is effective against one generation of drones may require modification against the next. The battlefield, in other words, will remain a technological arms race. The economics of the contest nevertheless favour directed-energy and electronic-warfare solutions. A conventional interceptor expends a missile or projectile against each target. A beam-based system can, subject to its power supply, engagement envelope and other operational constraints, engage targets without expending conventional ammunition. The marginal cost of an interception can consequently be dramatically lower. The beam also travels at effectively the speed of light, removing the flight time associated with kinetic interceptors. In densely populated areas or around sensitive infrastructure, bringing down a drone with a projectile can create its own hazards. Electronic disruption, when properly controlled, offers the possibility of neutralising the threat without sending an interceptor crashing back to earth. These advantages should not obscure the limitations. Soft-kill systems depend on the vulnerabilities of the target’s electronic architecture and may be less effective against increasingly autonomous drones that require fewer external communications. Weather, range, power availability, frequency management and the sophistication of an adversary's electronic countermeasures can all affect performance. No single technology is likely to provide a complete answer. The future of counter-drone warfare will therefore belong not to the beam alone but to layered defence combining. The emergence of systems such as T-SHUL BEAM suggests that India is beginning to build the technological pieces of that architecture at home. (The writer is a retired naval aviation officer and a defence and geopolitical analyst. Views personal.)

From Mud to Money

Jul 13
3 min read

The global carbon market is quietly undergoing a profound transformation. For years, companies eager to offset emissions favoured inexpensive carbon credits generated by projects that merely avoided future emissions. Increasingly, however, investors, regulators and corporate buyers are demanding something more tangible: carbon that is actually removed from the atmosphere and securely stored. That shift is elevating nature-based solutions, particularly agroforestry, from a niche environmental practice to a potentially valuable financial asset.


Yet one of the world’s greatest carbon sinks remains largely invisible to global finance. It is not found in vast corporate plantations but in the tiny farms that dominate much of Asia and Africa. These smallholders cultivate roughly two-thirds of the agricultural land in developing economies, but few are able to participate in the expanding market for carbon removals. The irony is striking. Those who could contribute most to climate mitigation are least able to access the capital that rewards it.


Structural Causes

The reasons are structural rather than ecological. Carbon markets are designed for scale, legal certainty and measurable outcomes. Smallholders, by contrast, operate fragmented plots, often no larger than two hectares, with limited access to finance, technology or regulatory expertise. The costs of measuring, verifying and certifying carbon sequestration frequently exceed the value of the credits produced by individual farms. As a result, institutional investors prefer large commercial projects, leaving millions of rural producers excluded from a market that is increasingly worth billions.


This need not remain the case. What is required is not another pilot project but an institutional architecture that allows small farms to function as one investable asset.


The first building block is aggregation. Individual farmers should not be expected to navigate global carbon registries on their own. Instead, they should be organised through Farmer Producer Organisations or cooperatives that combine thousands of small, scattered holdings into a single commercial entity. Such organisations would handle contracts, compliance and administration while dramatically reducing transaction costs. Carbon buyers, in turn, would gain access to large volumes of verified credits through a single institutional counterparty rather than negotiating with countless individual producers.


Aggregation alone is insufficient. Carbon markets have long been burdened by expensive measurement, reporting and verification procedures. Traditionally, projects relied on field inspections, manual tree counts and repeated site visits. Such methods are prohibitively costly for small farms.


Reaching out directly

Technology offers a more efficient alternative. Satellite imagery, remote-sensing drones and artificial intelligence can now estimate biomass growth with remarkable accuracy. Automated digital monitoring systems can reduce verification costs substantially while improving transparency and consistency. They ensure that a larger share of carbon revenues reaches farmers rather than intermediaries.


Finance presents an equally formidable challenge. Trees do not generate carbon credits overnight. They require years of growth before significant sequestration can be certified. Few smallholders can afford to wait five or ten years for an uncertain financial return while sacrificing immediate agricultural income.


The solution lies in treating future carbon revenues as a financial asset today. Development banks, rural lenders and climate-finance institutions should develop forward-payment mechanisms that allow farmers to borrow against expected carbon income.


Like many agricultural commodities, carbon credits often pass through layers of brokers, consultants and intermediaries before reaching international buyers. Each layer captures a share of the value, leaving farmers with only a modest fraction of the final price.


Digital payment systems and blockchain-enabled smart contracts could help correct this imbalance. Transparent payment mechanisms linking buyers directly to cooperatives or individual producers would reduce opportunities for value leakage.


Governments and international institutions also have an essential role. Carbon registries should establish standardised regional biomass baselines to eliminate the need for expensive project-specific studies. Digitised land records must be integrated with satellite monitoring systems to simplify verification and strengthen confidence in land tenure. Regulators should also recognise that agroforestry delivers benefits extending well beyond carbon storage. Biodiversity conservation, soil restoration and rural livelihoods deserve to command a premium over monoculture plantations that merely maximise carbon volumes.


Perhaps most importantly, market rules should require that the majority of carbon-credit revenues flow directly to producers. Climate finance cannot claim success if the principal beneficiaries are consultants and brokers rather than farmers.


The future of carbon markets will ultimately be decided not only by financial innovation but by institutional design. High-integrity carbon removals are becoming one of the world's most valuable environmental commodities. If properly organised, millions of smallholder farms can become suppliers of that commodity while simultaneously strengthening food security, restoring degraded landscapes and raising rural incomes.


(The writer is a member of Maharashtra Agriculture Price Commission. Views personal.)

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