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By:

Sagari Gupta

24 March 2026 at 2:16:04 pm

SpaceX’s IPO and India’s Sovereignty

The record-breaking $1.75 trillion IPO underscores a new reality that nations which do not control critical digital infrastructure risk ceding part of their sovereignty. Last week, SpaceX listed on Nasdaq under the ticker SPCX, raising $75 billion at a staggering valuation of $1.75 trillion. That single offering surpassed Saudi Aramco’s 2019 record of $25.6 billion by a factor of three. India’s defence budget for FY 2025-26 was Rs. 6.81 lakh crore, approximately $78.57 billion, according to...

SpaceX’s IPO and India’s Sovereignty

The record-breaking $1.75 trillion IPO underscores a new reality that nations which do not control critical digital infrastructure risk ceding part of their sovereignty. Last week, SpaceX listed on Nasdaq under the ticker SPCX, raising $75 billion at a staggering valuation of $1.75 trillion. That single offering surpassed Saudi Aramco’s 2019 record of $25.6 billion by a factor of three. India’s defence budget for FY 2025-26 was Rs. 6.81 lakh crore, approximately $78.57 billion, according to the Union Budget. SpaceX raised the near-equivalent of that annual allocation in one day. The investors who participated were not buying into a rocket company. They were pricing control over satellite infrastructure, global internet access, launch capability, and an integrated AI platform at a level exceeding the GDP of most countries. Roughly 30 percent of the shares, worth approximately $22.5 billion, went to retail investors, three times the proportion typical of a US listing. India has no private entity in this category. What SpaceX actually controls Starlink, SpaceX’s satellite internet division, operated approximately 7,000 active satellites globally as of early 2026. It counts over nine million subscribers worldwide, and following a 2026 merger, SpaceX also owns xAI, the developer of the Grok AI system. A company that controls satellite connectivity, launch capacity, and a frontier AI model occupies a position no regulator has previously had to classify. It is not a telecom operator, not a defence contractor, and not a technology platform. It is all three at once, under common ownership. In June 2025, SpaceX received authorisation from India’s Department of Telecommunications, followed by a licence from IN-SPACe in July 2025. As of June 2026, Starlink’s commercial operations in India remain pending, with the company in active discussions with the Government of India on security clearances, a process slowed by concerns linked to Starlink terminal use in the Iran conflict. That delay is itself revealing. A foreign company’s service continuity in India depends on negotiations that India does not fully control. Satellite communications, launch systems, and AI-integrated data infrastructure are the functional equivalents of roads and electricity grids in a digital economy. States that built those grids in the twentieth century retained control over access, pricing, and service continuity. States that depend on foreign corporations for digital infrastructure in the twenty-first century do not. The dependence question is already live for India India’s digital public infrastructure, covering Aadhaar, UPI, and the Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission, processes billions of transactions monthly. Aadhaar covers nearly the entire adult population, and UPI carries the bulk of India’s retail digital payments. The system’s design is sound: public architecture, state-controlled data governance, open standards. The next connectivity layer is the problem. TRAI data shows rural internet penetration at 44.2 percent as of March 2024, with only 3.8 percent of rural households connected through high-speed fixed infrastructure. Approximately 630 million Indians remain offline, with primary barriers being awareness, affordability, and limited local-language content, according to the Kantar ICUBE 2024 survey. That gap will not close through terrestrial fibre rollout alone. Satellite broadband, through Starlink, Eutelsat OneWeb, or Amazon’s Project Kuiper, will carry a large share of that load over the next decade. None of these are Indian entities. Their pricing decisions, service continuity choices, and data routing practices sit outside Indian jurisdiction. A farmer in Chhattisgarh receiving crop advisory data through a satellite connection does not know that a pricing decision made in California affects whether that signal arrives tomorrow. She will notice only when it stops. Foreign private capital has built connectivity infrastructure in India before. Reliance Jio brought down mobile data costs after its 2016 launch, extending internet access to hundreds of millions of Indians who had not been able to afford it before. Jio’s rollout also created large-scale domestic employment in network maintenance, retail, and customer service, jobs that remain within India’s economy. Private investment in connectivity is not a threat to sovereignty. Structural Gap The difference with SpaceX is structural. Jio operates under Indian law, pays taxes in India, employs Indian engineers, and answers to Indian regulators when disputes arise. Its towers and fibre sit on Indian soil. Starlink’s constellation orbits at 550 kilometres, outside any single national jurisdiction. Under the Telecommunications Act 2023, existing Starlink operators in India continue under the legacy Unified Licence framework, with their licences remaining valid. But no Indian regulatory instrument contains a binding service continuity obligation for satellite operators. If Starlink suspends Indian operations, no domestic legal mechanism compels continuation or requires a managed transition for the users left without service. The $1.75 trillion valuation amplifies this structural gap. India’s external debt stood at $736.3 billion at end-March 2025, according to the Reserve Bank of India. SpaceX’s market valuation now exceeds India’s total external debt by a wide margin. A corporation at that scale does not face the same regulatory friction as a domestic operator. It does not need to negotiate from a position of dependence. India’s satellite communications framework, updated through the Indian Space Policy 2023 and the Telecommunications Act 2023, governs licensing and spectrum allocation in detail. It does not contain binding service continuity or exit-transition obligations for foreign satellite operators. That gap needs closing through explicit licence conditions before Starlink and its competitors reach commercial scale in India. India’s Semiconductor Mission has made genuine progress. Pilot production started in three plants in 2025, and the government confirmed that four plants commenced commercial production in 2026. Kaynes Semicon’s OSAT unit in Sanand reached commercial production in March 2026. India also inaugurated its first 3-nanometer chip design centres in Noida and Bengaluru in 2025, a step toward design capability even as fabrication capacity remains limited. These are real milestones, not announcements. They do not yet constitute a domestic supply chain for the advanced chips needed for satellite infrastructure, AI systems, or next-generation communications hardware. India’s domestic semiconductor market was approximately $45-50 billion in 2024-25, according to industry estimates cited by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. Closing the gap between consumption and domestic production is a decade-long task requiring sustained capital commitment. India’s competition framework does not treat foreign satellite infrastructure concentration as a market power question. The Competition Commission of India has a clear mandate over domestic pricing and merger activity. It has no instrument to act when a foreign entity’s control over orbital infrastructure creates de facto monopoly conditions for remote connectivity within India. That regulatory gap needs explicit legislative attention before dependence deepens further. Market Signals SpaceX’s $1.75 trillion valuation is not a data point about one company. It is a market signal about what global capital considers most valuable in 2026: not oil fields or shipping lanes, but control over the systems through which economies communicate, compute, and transact. India entered the hydrocarbon era as a net importer and spent decades building the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and domestic refining capacity to reduce that dependence. The programme continues to expand today, a reminder that infrastructure sovereignty is an ongoing commitment. The response was slow and expensive. It was also the right call. The digital infrastructure era has well and truly arrived. India is already a net importer of the connectivity and computing systems that will define the next phase of its economic growth. The SpaceX IPO makes the scale of that dependence visible in a single number. And policymakers do not have decades to respond this time. (The writer is an independent public policy researcher. Views personal.)

Godfather Geopolitics: America’s ‘Offer’ They Cannot Refuse

From India’s oil choices to Venezuela’s sovereignty, America’s return to coercive diplomacy shows that power, not principle, still governs the global order.

In international affairs, an old Hindi proverb captures a stubborn truth with disarming bluntness: jiski lathi, uski bhains - he who wields the stick owns the buffalo. Strip away the rhetoric of norms, values and institutions and power still decides outcomes. The modern world likes to pretend it has outgrown jungle law.  However, recent American conduct under President Donald Trump suggests otherwise.


The United States has, in quick succession, cast itself as global peacemaker and global enforcer. One week it claims credit for ceasefires and stability across continents; the next it issues blunt “offers” to allies and threats to adversaries in Asia, Europe and Latin America.


The method is familiar to legions of readers of Mario Puzo’s The Godfather. Don Vito Corleone does not begin with violence. He begins with an offer which is generous on the surface, laden with implied consequences beneath. Refusal is tolerated only briefly. Those who persist are made examples of, their families, businesses and allies erased to reinforce the lesson. The brilliance of the Don’s rule lies not in brute force alone but in the theatre of inevitability: resistance appears futile long before it is crushed.


Coercive Diplomacy

Something similar is visible today in the conduct of the world’s most powerful democracy. The United Nations and the International Court of Justice, meant to arbitrate disputes and restrain excess, increasingly resemble the feeble law-enforcement agencies in Puzo’s novel. They merely admonish and pass resolutions, but their writ rarely runs where power truly resides.


India now finds itself on the receiving end of Washington’s ‘friendly pressure. President Trump has spoken warmly of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, calling him “a very good man” even as he publicly hints at punitive tariffs should New Delhi fail to accommodate American preferences on energy. India’s purchases of discounted Russian oil have long irritated Washington. In August 2025, American tariffs on Indian goods were doubled to 50 percent with Russian energy ties cited as a key grievance.


Trump has claimed that Modi privately assured him India would halt such purchases, a claim New Delhi has firmly denied. India, the world’s fastest-growing large economy, is being asked to rearrange its energy security to suit Washington’s geopolitical objectives, chiefly the isolation of Russia.


Oil has always been central to great-power politics. Control of supply confers leverage, and leverage is the currency of coercion. India today is Russia’s largest oil customer, buying crude at discounted rates that cushion domestic inflation and support growth. Washington argues that these revenues help finance Moscow’s war in Ukraine. The blunt message is that either align with American sanctions or face economic consequences.


Iraq once rebuffed similar pressure. It was invaded in 2003, its leader Saddam Hussein captured and executed under the pretext of weapons of mass destruction that never existed. That Baghdad had enjoyed cordial ties with Moscow was no coincidence. By contrast, Saudi Arabia, home to most of the 9/11 hijackers, and Pakistan, which sheltered Osama bin Laden, were spared comparable retribution. Oil and strategic convenience, and not justice, it seems, determines US priorities.


The pattern is repeating elsewhere. Venezuela, sitting atop the world’s largest proven oil reserves, has long irked Washington with its ties to Russia and China. American forces recently seized President Nicolás Maduro in a dramatic overnight operation, with Mr Trump announcing that he would face trial and a 99-year sentence in the United States for alleged narcotics and arms offences. Sovereignty, it seemed, was optional. Soon after, American authorities halted Chinese and Russian oil shipments from Venezuelan ports, provoking angry protests from Moscow.


Conduct Unbecoming

Since the 1960s the United States has intervened militarily across Vietnam, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Panama, Haiti and Angola, among others. Each episode came wrapped in the language of democracy, stability or counter-terrorism. Few delivered any of these in lasting form. Many left shattered societies in their wake. That numerous American allies remain conspicuously undemocratic has never proved an obstacle when strategic interests were at stake.


South Asia offers a particularly sharp illustration. In Bangladesh, a US-backed political realignment has coincided with a disturbing surge in communal violence, including attacks on Hindus and widespread lawlessness. In Kashmir, India has long complained of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. Indian officials allege that such groups benefit indirectly from American intelligence tolerance, if not assistance. When India launched Operation Sindoor in retaliation to the Pahalgam massacre with the aim to dismantle Pakistan-sponsored terror infrastructure across the border, pressure from Washington and Riyadh helped force an early halt. Shortly thereafter, Pakistan army chief Asim Munir was feted in Washington even as senior Pakistani officials were photographed attending funerals of known militants.


India’s discomfort does not end there. New Delhi is aware of foreign funding networks actively encouraging radical groups to foment trouble within the country, along with the US-led bankrolling of ‘sympathetic’ political movements and the amplification (by the elite Western press) of international criticism of the Modi government on religious freedom and human rights. The tariffs imposed by Trump are merely the sharpest end of a broader toolkit in this case.


And Trump’s enthusiasm for tariffs has only intensified in the past few months. On his social-media platform Truth Social, he boasted that levies imposed by his administration have already generated “hundreds of billions of dollars” for America, soon to exceed $600 billion. They have, he insists, made the country “stronger and more respected than ever before.”


But the reality is less flattering. Tariffs function as taxes on consumers, raising prices and distorting supply chains. They fuel trade wars that sap global growth. The benefits to domestic industry are uneven at best. Small wonder that Trump’s authority to impose such sweeping measures now faces scrutiny in the Supreme Court. His warning that any judicial rollback would endanger national security betrays a striking disdain for checks and balances. A ruling expected in 2026 could define the limits of presidential economic power.


Here again the Godfather analogy intrudes. Don Corleone does not recognise any authority above his own. Laws exist to be bent or broken if they obstruct his interests. The end justifies the means. When courts, institutions or allies resist, they are pressured until compliance becomes the rational choice.


Iran provides the latest example. Having failed to extract concessions from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Washington backed Israeli strikes under the codename ‘Midnight Hammer’ and openly signalled support for regime change by encouraging protests. Tehran’s sovereignty counted for little. Similar rhetoric has been directed at Cuba and Colombia. Even Greenland has found itself the subject of unsolicited American interest.


For India, the message is unsettling. The ‘offer’ on the table, which is to shift energy purchases away from Russia towards America and its allies, at higher cost, comes wrapped in friendship but enforced by threat. Accept, and all is well. Refuse, and tariffs, diplomatic pressure and strategic isolation will follow. Trump has made India an offer it cannot refuse.


The tragedy is that such behaviour corrodes the very order America once championed. Rules-based systems survive only if the strong accept restraint. When power is exercised nakedly in this fashion, institutions hollow out and cynicism flourishes. Smaller states learn that morality is ornamental and alignment transactional. Even large states like India are reminded of the limits of its autonomy.


In geopolitics, the white shirt and tie of civilised diplomacy conceal a clenched fist beneath the table. The stick remains decisive. The buffalo, as ever, follows whoever holds it.

 


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