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By:

Commodore S.L. Deshmukh

31 October 2024 at 8:30:19 am

The Beam That Blinds the Drone

As cheap drones reshape the battlefield, India’s T-SHUL BEAM points to a future in which electronic warfare may matter as much as firepower The drone has definitively become the weapon of choice for the modern battlefield. Cheap, expendable and increasingly autonomous, unmanned aerial vehicles can now threaten troops, armour, airfields and critical infrastructure without requiring the attacker to risk a pilot. Their proliferation has created a corresponding demand for counter-drone systems...

The Beam That Blinds the Drone

As cheap drones reshape the battlefield, India’s T-SHUL BEAM points to a future in which electronic warfare may matter as much as firepower The drone has definitively become the weapon of choice for the modern battlefield. Cheap, expendable and increasingly autonomous, unmanned aerial vehicles can now threaten troops, armour, airfields and critical infrastructure without requiring the attacker to risk a pilot. Their proliferation has created a corresponding demand for counter-drone systems that can respond quickly and at a cost proportionate to the threat. This is where beam-based anti-drone technology enters the picture. Broadly, such systems fall into two categories. Hard-kill systems use concentrated laser energy to physically damage or destroy a drone. Soft-kill systems, by contrast, use radio-frequency or electromagnetic energy to disrupt the electronic links that allow a drone to communicate, navigate and transmit information. Sophisticated Weaponry Hard-kill laser systems focus an intense beam of light on a vulnerable part of an incoming UAV - its carbon-fibre structure, control surfaces, battery or other critical components. The concentrated energy rapidly heats the target, potentially burning through its structure or disabling optical sensors and bringing the aircraft down. India’s DRDO has demonstrated a 30kW laser system, while Israel’s Rafael has developed the Lite Beam system. Soft-kill systems take a different route. Rather than physically destroying the aircraft, they interfere with the electronic architecture that keeps it airborne. Directional radio-frequency energy can disrupt command-and-control links, video feeds, telemetry and satellite-navigation signals such as GPS or other GNSS services. Depending on the drone and the nature of the disruption, the aircraft may be forced to land, return to its launch point or lose control. It is in this category that the T-SHUL BEAM system developed by Indian defence company IG Defence deserves attention. T-SHUL BEAM is a man-portable, directional counter-drone system designed for tactical deployment. Its multi-band radio-frequency architecture is intended to target several of the links on which unmanned aerial systems depend, including command-and-control, telemetry, video transmission and GNSS navigation. Its directional configuration allows an operator to concentrate electronic countermeasures on a particular aerial target rather than indiscriminately radiating energy across a large area. That matters on a battlefield where the warning time against a small UAV or first-person-view drone may be measured in seconds. The appeal of such a system is therefore not simply that it can counter a drone. It is that it can potentially bring counter-drone capability closer to the soldier and to the tactical edge. Large counter-UAS installations have their place, particularly around fixed and high-value assets. But forward units require systems that can move with them, be deployed rapidly and operate against small, low-cost unmanned platforms without imposing the logistical burden associated with conventional weapons. The T-SHUL BEAM’s significance also lies in its proposed integration with an artificial-intelligence-enabled battle-management architecture. IG Drones, the original equipment manufacturer, has stated that T-SHUL BEAM has been integrated with GRID, its indigenous AI-powered platform. The GRID architecture is intended to bring sensors, intelligence systems, unmanned platforms and command elements into a common operational framework. The attraction of such integration is obvious. Countering drones is increasingly less about a single weapon and more about the speed of the kill chain: detecting a threat, identifying it, deciding what response is appropriate and directing that response before the target disappears. An AI-enabled command architecture can potentially improve situational awareness, facilitate real-time threat detection and coordinate different systems operating simultaneously. This is particularly relevant as drone warfare evolves from isolated attacks towards increasingly complex and potentially swarming operations. A battlefield crowded with drones cannot be managed effectively if every sensor and weapon operates as a separate island. The advantage will increasingly belong to forces capable of turning disparate streams of information into a coherent picture and responding at machine speed. The T-SHUL BEAM’s reported demonstration at Pokhran represents another step in India’s attempt to build a domestic ecosystem spanning drones, counter-drones, artificial intelligence and electronic warfare. Counter-drone warfare is likely to be a recurring requirement rather than a niche capability. Importing every component of such an ecosystem would leave India vulnerable to supply-chain disruptions, technology restrictions and foreign-exchange pressures. Indigenous development, even when undertaken by relatively small private-sector companies, can broaden the country’s technological base and give the armed forces greater freedom to adapt systems to their operational requirements. Economics of the Contest Yet the real measure of any counter-drone system will ultimately be operational rather than promotional. Electronic warfare is inherently a contest between countermeasure and counter-countermeasure. Drone designers can alter frequencies, communications protocols, navigation methods and levels of autonomy. A system that is effective against one generation of drones may require modification against the next. The battlefield, in other words, will remain a technological arms race. The economics of the contest nevertheless favour directed-energy and electronic-warfare solutions. A conventional interceptor expends a missile or projectile against each target. A beam-based system can, subject to its power supply, engagement envelope and other operational constraints, engage targets without expending conventional ammunition. The marginal cost of an interception can consequently be dramatically lower. The beam also travels at effectively the speed of light, removing the flight time associated with kinetic interceptors. In densely populated areas or around sensitive infrastructure, bringing down a drone with a projectile can create its own hazards. Electronic disruption, when properly controlled, offers the possibility of neutralising the threat without sending an interceptor crashing back to earth. These advantages should not obscure the limitations. Soft-kill systems depend on the vulnerabilities of the target’s electronic architecture and may be less effective against increasingly autonomous drones that require fewer external communications. Weather, range, power availability, frequency management and the sophistication of an adversary's electronic countermeasures can all affect performance. No single technology is likely to provide a complete answer. The future of counter-drone warfare will therefore belong not to the beam alone but to layered defence combining. The emergence of systems such as T-SHUL BEAM suggests that India is beginning to build the technological pieces of that architecture at home. (The writer is a retired naval aviation officer and a defence and geopolitical analyst. Views personal.)

Growing Risks Of Cyber Warfare

Sep 22, 2024
3 min read

Updated: Oct 21, 2024

In a shocking series of events, multiple coordinated explosions have rocked Lebanon and parts of Syria, killing dozens of people and injuring thousands. The blasts occurred after explosive devices, hidden inside pagers and other radio communication devices, were detonated. The targeted individuals were primarily members of Hezbollah, with the explosions taking place in densely populated areas, resulting in widespread injuries to civilians, including children.

The devices, mainly pagers, walkie-talkies, and radios, had been in the possession of Hezbollah operatives, who had acquired them months prior, under the assumption they were secure. However, Hezbollah has accused Israel’s intelligence agency, Shin Bet, of tampering with the devices during transit.

According to security experts, Israel’s elite secret cyber warfare unit was behind the attack. This unit, known for its global cyber operations, is also linked to the creation of the STUXnet malware, which was responsible for the failure of Iran’s nuclear power plant. The pagers were rigged with explosive materials in place of a battery, and a relay switch was installed, allowing the explosions to be triggered remotely in a synchronized manner. The result was devastating injuries to the eyes, face, hands, and legs of those carrying the devices.

The incident occurred in Hezbollah-stronghold areas, including the Dahieh suburb of Beirut, southern Lebanon, and parts of the Beqaa Valley, with some explosions also reported across the border in Syria. The blasts overwhelmed hospitals, as hundreds of victims sought medical help for injuries ranging from severe burns to shattered limbs. The intensity of the explosions, far beyond that of ordinary battery malfunctions, indicates a highly sophisticated sabotage operation.

These explosions have not only deepened the crisis in Lebanon but have also raised critical questions about supply chain security, intelligence tactics, and the legality of using booby-trapped electronics in conflict zones.


What Are Pagers, and Why Are They Still Preferred?

Despite being old-school tele communication technology, pagers or beepers are still used in many countries, particularly in critical sectors and organizations. Pagers primarily facilitate one-way communication, pager uses higher frequencies than car radios i.e. 400 MHz band frequency. It also used a very basic type of VHF spectrum. These devices operate in restricted areas to transfer messages, alerts, and information. These devices are considered more secure and harder to trace or track compared to mobile phones, as they only receive messages, similar to a car radio that receives signals without revealing the listener’s identity or location. Additionally, pagers lack features like Bluetooth or GPS, making them more difficult to hack or compromise.

Among their many advantages, pagers are known for their long battery life and durability, making them ideal for continuous use in specific industries. There are an estimated two million active pager users worldwide. Hezbollah began using pagers after Israel successfully assassinated a high-ranking Hezbollah target by hacking his cellphone and precisely targeting him with a missile. Since then, many Hezbollah members have switched to more primitive communication devices, like pagers, to avoid being tracked via the internet.


Are Mobile Phones and Smartphones Similarly Vulnerable?

American and European security agencies suggest that, theoretically, it is possible to alter mobile phones and other smart devices to turn them into explosive devices. However, practically, it is more difficult due to the advanced security systems in modern smartphones. A hacked smartphone may exhibit various signs, such as abnormal temperature changes, slower system performance, unexpected reboots, odd sounds during calls, hung applications, or irrelevant messages and pop-ups, all of which could indicate tampering. These security systems make it more challenging to modify smartphones in the same manner as simpler devices like pagers.


New Security Challenges

The Hezbollah pager explosion serves as a wake-up call for sectors involving critical infrastructure and aviation. In an era where smartphones are network-connected and can be charged wirelessly, the possibility of tampering with batteries or embedding explosives, like HMX, PETN and other type of plastic explosives pose significant risks. During flights, even a minor explosion could result in catastrophic consequences. On the ground, the threat extends to damaging nearby aircraft, equipment, and infrastructure. Airport security may soon impose stricter regulations, potentially banning pagers, walkie-talkies, and radios, much like power banks, which are now restricted on flights. In the future, mobile phones may only be allowed in switched-off modes, placed in lithium-safe bags during flights. Suspicious devices could be handled separately in Faraday-sheet bags to block any network or signal connections.

This incident highlights the growing risks of cyber warfare and the dangers posed by everyday communication devices being exploited for sabotage. It is an alarming call for a nation’s security as the treat of such critical infrastructure being handled by terrorist organisations can compromise the use of day-to-day electronics for malicious activities. As technology advances, so must the protocols for ensuring public safety, particularly in high-risk environments where even the smallest vulnerability could lead to devastating consequences.

(The writer is an eminent cyber and explosives forensic expert. Views personal.)

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