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By:

Commodore S.L. Deshmukh

31 October 2024 at 8:30:19 am

The Digital Compass at Sea

Electronic chart systems have transformed maritime navigation, but their promise of safer voyages depends on reliable data and rigorous regulatory compliance. The sea has always punished navigational complacency. For centuries, mariners relied on paper charts, manual plotting and accumulated experience to steer vessels through treacherous waters. These methods remain part of maritime tradition, but modern shipping demands a more integrated approach to navigation. The Electronic Chart Display...

The Digital Compass at Sea

Electronic chart systems have transformed maritime navigation, but their promise of safer voyages depends on reliable data and rigorous regulatory compliance. The sea has always punished navigational complacency. For centuries, mariners relied on paper charts, manual plotting and accumulated experience to steer vessels through treacherous waters. These methods remain part of maritime tradition, but modern shipping demands a more integrated approach to navigation. The Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) represents a decisive step in that direction, combining official digital charts with real-time information from a vessel’s navigational sensors. Its growing importance reflects a simple truth: in an industry where a minor navigational error can have catastrophic consequences, better information can make the difference between a safe passage and disaster. ECDIS is not merely a digital version of a paper chart. It is a type-approved navigational information system that displays official Electronic Navigational Charts (ENCs) and integrates data from equipment such as the Global Positioning System (GPS), gyrocompass, radar, Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA), Automatic Identification System (AIS) and echo sounder. By bringing these inputs together, it gives navigators a consolidated picture of the vessel’s position, its surroundings and potential hazards. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) recognises compliant ECDIS, when used with appropriate official chart data, as meeting the relevant chart-carriage requirements under Chapter V of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). The distinction matters: an ordinary electronic display is not necessarily an ECDIS, and the use of unofficial chart data does not confer the same regulatory standing. Beyond Charts The system’s principal advantage lies in its ability to combine information and alert navigators to developing risks. It supports route planning and monitoring, checks proposed routes against configured safety parameters, displays the vessel’s position in real time and generates alarms when specified dangers or deviations are detected. Depending on the equipment and data available, radar, AIS, weather, tidal and other information can also be overlaid on the chart. This integration can reduce the burden of maintaining paper charts and manually plotting a vessel’s position. It can also help crews identify navigational hazards earlier, monitor their progress more efficiently and make better-informed decisions. In commercial shipping, where time, fuel consumption and operational reliability all matter, these benefits extend beyond safety to voyage efficiency. Yet ECDIS should not be mistaken for an autonomous navigator. Its alarms and safety checks depend on correctly configured settings, reliable sensor inputs and accurate chart information. Officers must understand what the system is displaying, recognise its limitations and retain the judgement to challenge misleading or incomplete information. The regulatory framework reflects the importance of getting this right. Under SOLAS Chapter V, ECDIS carriage became mandatory for specified categories of ships through a phased implementation schedule. The requirements cover, among others, new passenger ships of 500 gross tonnage and above and new cargo ships of 3,000 gross tonnage and above, subject to the applicable provisions and ship categories. The charts themselves are equally important. Official ENCs are vector charts produced to International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) standards. ECDIS processes this information into a System Electronic Navigational Chart (SENC), the internal database used by the equipment. Raster Navigational Charts (RNCs), by contrast, are digital images of paper charts. Software maintenance is therefore central to compliance. IHO standards have evolved, and equipment must remain compatible with the applicable requirements. New ECDIS installations have been expected to meet the relevant standards in force at installation, while existing systems require appropriate maintenance and upgrades. IMO guidance, including MSC.1/Circ.1503, has highlighted the importance of keeping ECDIS software properly maintained. Ship operators cannot assume that a system remains compliant simply because it was approved when first installed. Flag administrations and port-state control authorities may identify deficiencies where applicable requirements are not met. Maritime Imperative For India, these requirements carry particular significance. Its commercial shipping fleet operates within an international regulatory environment in which navigational safety, technical compliance and crew competence are inseparable. India has acceded to SOLAS and has used directives issued by the Directorate General of Shipping (DG Shipping) to implement applicable ECDIS carriage requirements. The government has also pursued the incorporation of relevant provisions into the domestic regulatory framework. DG Shipping has invoked Section 406(3) of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, in connection with ECDIS carriage requirements and the conditions attached to statutory certification. Implementation schedules for Indian ships undertaking international voyages have been prescribed, with compliance subject to regulatory oversight. Training is the other indispensable element. Navigational officers serving on ECDIS-equipped vessels must receive the applicable training in accordance with the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), including the Manila amendments of 2010. Officers must be competent in route planning, alarm interpretation, chart management, system limitations and the response to equipment failure. India has an established marine services sector capable of supporting this transition. Companies offer ECDIS upgrades and maintenance alongside services for AIS, anemometers, autopilots, bridge navigational watch alarm systems, compasses, echo sounders and Global Maritime Distress and Safety System equipment. Marine radar servicing, including X-band and S-band systems, and the maintenance of associated electronic equipment are also available across Indian ports and anchorages. Shipowners must ensure that upgrades are undertaken by competent personnel, that equipment remains properly maintained and that the documentation needed for class surveys and port-state inspections is in order. Periodic checks should be treated as an operational necessity rather than an expense to be deferred. ECDIS is most effective when official charts, updated software, dependable sensors, trained officers and disciplined bridge procedures work together. A failure in any one of these elements can compromise the whole arrangement. As shipping becomes more technologically sophisticated, ECDIS is set to remain a central platform for navigation aboard commercial vessels. Its value lies not simply in replacing paper charts, but in helping crews interpret their surroundings, anticipate hazards and manage voyages with greater precision. For India, effective implementation is therefore both a regulatory obligation and a strategic investment in safer shipping. The challenge is to move beyond carriage requirements and ensure continuing operational competence. (The writer is a retired naval aviation officer and defence and a geopolitical analyst. Views personal.)

Hirohito Unmasked: Revisiting Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy

Jan 9, 2025
3 min read

Updated: Jan 10, 2025

Hirohito

One summer’s day in 2011, as I browsed through the cluttered shelves of Blossoms’ Bookstore in Bangalore, I stumbled upon a doorstopper of a book. The tome was David Bergamini’s Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy, a 1,400-page exposé that sought to do for the Pacific theatre what William Shirer’s The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich did for Nazi Germany. As an obsessive World War II completist, I was astonished that I had never heard of this book.


As I later discovered, the academic establishment’s effort to ‘suppress’ Bergamini’s book by denying it the critical recognition it deserved, made for a conspiracy in itself.


In 1971, Bergamini, a popular science writer, had published his bombshell of a book which forcefully threw the mask off Showa Emperor Hirohito by alleging he was no ceremonial relic or dupe of Japanese military but an active warmonger. Bergamini, born in Japan (but schooled in Hankow, China), had trawled through more than 30,000 pages of Japanese documents and US intel. reports, done 140,000 pages of collateral reading, 272 reference books, 50,000 pages of testimony from the Tokyo war crimes trial and 5,613 pages of diaries kept by high Japanese officials in his quest to understand what had made the intelligent, artistic Japanese people turn to war.


His formidable research revealed Emperor Hirohito and his courtiers had been plotting a war against the West since the 1920s. According to Bergamini, Hirohito had inherited from his great-grandfather, the Meiji Emperor a mission, which was to rid Asia of white men. Among his many formidable revelations, he stressed on the ‘Sugiyama Memoranda,’ published by a Tokyo firm, Hara Shobo, in 1967.


The memo, jotted by Japanese Chief of Staff Sugiyama Hajime contained verbatim accounts of conversations with Hirohito, which revealed that the Emperor participated in the Pearl Harbour planning a full six months before his official military advisors had wind of it.


The memo, Bergamini claimed, directly refuted statements of Gen. MacArthur claiming that Hirohito had professed ignorance of military and economic matters in 1941 to him. His book comprehensively demolished MacArthur’s postwar whitewashing of Hirohito.


Bergamini's ‘heresy’ - portraying Hirohito as a war criminal and 1930s Japan as a hotbed of manufactured conflicts, conspiracies, assassinations, shadowy cliques - saw the American academic establishment crash down on him like a ton of bricks.


Leading the charge against him in the New York Times was Yale historian James B. Crowley, who lambasted the writer’s cavalier handling of sources. Crowley alleged Bergamini’s brief against the Emperor of Japan was “completely unsubstantiated by any reliable source, primary or secondary” and that Bergamini’s book was believable "only by violating every canon of acceptable documentation


British historian Geoffrey Barraclough had a more measured view. In a review in the New Yorker, Barraclough, while criticizing Bergamini's “idiosyncratic” approach, nonetheless admitted that he had succeeded, where experts had failed, in opening the general public’s eyes to the role of Japan in the 1930s.


Barraclough, however, objected that Bergamini had stressed the conspiracy theory and “magnified it to monster dimensions” while “refusing to believe that Japan, unlike Germany, lacked a mastermind pulling the strings and executing a preconceived design, and has in effect, invented one.” According to Barraclough, Bergamini had made Hirohito the “archvillain, the Japanese Hitler.”


The one enthusiastic endorsement came from Sir William Webb, the Australian judge on the Tokyo Military Tribunal, who hailed Bergamini’s book as “a tremendous achievement” which supplemented and complemented the findings of the Tribunal of which he was president.


Sadly, the intense critical hostility devastated Bergamini, and is believed to have driven him to an early grave in 1983.


Irony of ironies, 29 years later, academic Herbert B. Bix came out with ‘Hirohito and the making of Modern Japan’ (2000), which pretty much repeated Bergamini’s central thesis - of Hirohito's involvement in the war-making process - and was awarded a Pulitzer!


Today, Bergamini’s book falls under the ‘hard-to-get’ category. Over the years, I was fortunate enough to acquire a second used copy in Mumbai’s Flora Fountain area. In terms of readability, it is on par with Shirer’s Third Reich classic and Alexander Werth’s ‘Russia at War:1941-45’ (1964). It is an absolute smasher, reading like a relentless thriller in spots, and a must for anyone seriously studying the Pacific War.

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