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By:

Rajiv Shah

22 September 2025 at 8:32:23 pm

New Alliances, New Pressures, New Fault Lines

To its west, old relationships in the Gulf are acquiring new strategic and military dimensions. Across the Atlantic, Washington is increasingly using tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy. At the same time, India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and prepares to host its summit when the grouping is being watched in the West as a potential challenge to the American-dominated global financial order. Individually, these developments may appear unrelated. Put together, they reveal a larger...

New Alliances, New Pressures, New Fault Lines

To its west, old relationships in the Gulf are acquiring new strategic and military dimensions. Across the Atlantic, Washington is increasingly using tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy. At the same time, India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and prepares to host its summit when the grouping is being watched in the West as a potential challenge to the American-dominated global financial order. Individually, these developments may appear unrelated. Put together, they reveal a larger geopolitical churn in which alliances, energy, trade, currencies and economic coercion are becoming interconnected. India finds itself almost at its centre. The emerging Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan security equation deserves particular attention. Saudi Arabia brings enormous financial and energy influence; Türkiye possesses considerable military strength, NATO experience and an expanding defence industry; Pakistan brings a large military establishment and nuclear capability with the open support of Washington. Any arrangement containing a collective-defence commitment naturally acquires significance beyond ordinary diplomatic cooperation. Alongside it, another strategic convergence has gradually developed among India, Israel and the UAE. It would be incorrect to describe this as a formal military alliance. Yet geopolitics does not operate through defence treaties alone. India's extensive defence and technology relationship with Israel, its rapidly expanding economic and strategic partnership with the UAE, and the UAE-Israel relationship following the Abraham Accords have created considerable common ground. I2U2—bringing together India, Israel, the UAE and the United States—added another institutional dimension. Thus, without necessarily becoming opposing military camps, two interesting strategic formations are visible across West Asia: Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan and the looser India–UAE–Israel convergence. Balancing Challenge India faces a similar balancing challenge. The Gulf is not a distant geopolitical theatre for New Delhi. Nearly nine million Indians live and work there. India's energy security, investments, trade and remittance flows are closely connected with the region. The proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor also requires relative stability across this geography. Polarisation in West Asia can therefore rapidly become an Indian economic and strategic problem. There is another question Indian planners cannot ignore. If a future India-Pakistan confrontation escalates, how would any collective-defence commitment involving Pakistan be interpreted by Saudi Arabia and Türkiye? It would be alarmist to assume that either country would automatically enter a conflict against India. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has substantial economic and strategic interests in maintaining good relations with New Delhi. Nevertheless, defence planners are paid to examine possibilities before they become crises. While these equations develop in India's neighbourhood, economic pressure is emerging from Washington. The US Senate has voted 86–11 for legislation intended to increase pressure on Russia by targeting major purchasers of Russian energy. The measure could authorise tariffs reaching 100 per cent against goods from countries continuing large-scale purchases of Russian oil and gas, with India among those potentially exposed. China is powerful enough to shrug off similar challenges from the West." However this does not mean that America has already imposed a 100 per cent tariff on India. Further legislative steps remain necessary, and presidential waiver provisions are important. But the overwhelming Senate vote carries a political message that New Delhi cannot dismiss. Tariffs are no longer merely tools of trade protection; they have become instruments of geopolitical coercion. Washington's argument is understandable: revenues from Russian petroleum help sustain Moscow's economy during the Ukraine war, and reducing those revenues increases pressure on Russia. But in that case what about European countries who too were/are customers of Russian oil? India's question is equally legitimate: who should determine where India purchases the energy required by more than 1.4 billion people? If Russian crude remains commercially advantageous and helps contain domestic energy costs, New Delhi cannot reasonably be expected to make every energy decision according to another country's geopolitical priorities. Strategic partnership cannot become strategic obedience. This is where BRICS enters the larger picture. India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and will host its leaders at an unusually sensitive moment. BRICS is no longer merely the original grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Its expansion has considerably increased its demographic, energy and geopolitical weight. More importantly, discussions around BRICS increasingly touch a sensitive nerve in Washington: alternative payment mechanisms, local-currency trade, development finance and the possibility of gradually reducing dependence upon the dollar-dominated international financial system. The BRICS Summit this time is poised to take some decisive steps which may affect western interests especially US. (The writer is an advocate, legal, geopolitical and public policy analyst. Views personal.)

How Singh defended 1991 Union budget

Updated: Jan 2, 2025

Manmohan Singh

New Delhi: Manmohan Singh, the architect of India's economic reforms, had to literally face a trial-by-fire to ensure widespread acceptance of his path-breaking 1991 Union budget that saw the nation rise from its darkest financial crises.


Singh, the newly-appointed finance minister in the PV Narasimha Rao-led government, did it with great elan -- from facing journalists at a post-budget press conference to irate Congress leaders unable to digest the wide-ranging reforms at the parliamentary party meeting.


Singh's historic reforms not only rescued India from near bankruptcy but also redefined its trajectory as a rising global power.


Singh made an unscheduled appearance at a press conference on July 25, 1991, a day after the presentation of the Union budget, "to ensure that the message of his budget did not get distorted by less-than-enthusiastic officials", Congress leader Jairam Ramesh wrote in his book "To the Brink and Back: India's 1991 Story" that recounts the fast-paced changes that took place after Rao became prime minister in June 1991.


"The finance minister explained his budget - calling it 'a budget with a human face'. He painstakingly defended the proposals to increase fertiliser, petrol and LPG prices," Ramesh recounted in the book published in 2015.


Ramesh was an aide to Rao during his initial months in office.


Sensing the disquiet in the Congress ranks, Rao called a meeting of the Congress Parliamentary Party (CPP) on August 1, 1991, and decided to allow party MPs to "vent their spleen freely".


"The prime minister stayed away and allowed Manmohan Singh to face the flak on his own," Ramesh wrote, adding that two more meetings took place on August 2 and 3, in which Rao was present throughout.


"In the CPP meetings, the finance minister cut a lonely figure and the prime minister did nothing to alleviate his distress," Ramesh recounted.


Only two MPs - Mani Shankar Aiyar and Nathuram Mirdha - backed budget wholeheartedly.


Aiyar had supported the budget, contending that it conformed to Rajiv Gandhi's beliefs on what needed to be done to stave off the financial crisis.

Bowing to pressure from the party, Singh had agreed to lower the 40 per cent increase in fertiliser prices to 30 per cent but had left the hike in LPG and petrol prices untouched.


The Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs met twice on August 4 and 5, 1991, to decide on the statement Singh would make in the Lok Sabha on August 6.


"The statement dropped the idea of a rollback, which had been demanded over the past few days but now spoke of protecting the interests of small and marginal farmers," Ramesh said in his book.


"Both sides had won. The party had forced a rethink but the fundamentals of what the government wanted -- the decontrol of prices of fertilisers other than urea and an increase in urea prices -- had been preserved," he recounted.

"This was political economy at its constructive best -- a textbook example of how the government and the party can collaborate to create a win-win situation for both," he added in the book.

-PTI

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