India’s Missing Link: The Iran–Armenia Corridor

To secure its Eurasian place, India must treat Chabahar as vital, deepen Iran–Armenia ties, and balance East with West.

India has long acknowledged the strategic value of linking South Asia to Europe through Iran and the Caucasus, yet progress on the proposed India–Iran–Armenia corridor remains negligible. Despite multiple rounds of talks, there is little to show in infrastructure, trade volumes, or institutional mechanisms.

This inertia contrasts sharply with shifting geopolitics. Russia leans on Iran, Turkey asserts itself in the Caucasus, and China deepens its Belt and Road footprint. For India, space to influence outcomes is narrowing. The Iran–Armenia route—one of the few overland options bypassing Pakistan and China—still languishes on the margins of New Delhi’s priorities.

India’s civilisational links with Iran stretch back centuries, through trade, poetry, and religion. Persian was once the language of the Mughal court, while Iranian merchants criss-crossed the subcontinent and the Silk Road.

Armenia, often overlooked in Indian discourse, historically served as a commercial bridge to Europe. Armenian traders settled in Surat, Kolkata, and Chennai, establishing prosperous communities and churches that endure.

Yet in recent decades, India’s engagement has been reactive at best, pushing both Iran and the Caucasus to the periphery of its foreign policy.

The Present Moment

India’s involvement in Iran’s Chabahar port is often viewed as a counter to China-backed Gwadar in Pakistan. Chabahar is also central to the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), linking India to Russia and Europe via Iran and the Caucasus.

Armenia is emerging as a key player in the “Middle Corridor”, connecting India and Iran to Europe via Armenia and Georgia, bypassing both Turkey and Russia. For India, this is about more than trade—it is about securing strategic options as chokepoints like the Suez Canal or South China Sea grow volatile.

Meanwhile, regional shifts are stark. Russia, under sanctions, is drawing closer to Iran. China continues to dominate Eurasian infrastructure through the BRI. Turkey, emboldened, backs Azerbaijan and strengthens ties with Pakistan. India is present but not driving the agenda.

India cannot afford passivity. Energy security still hinges on diverse, stable suppliers, and Iran, despite sanctions, remains a major holder of oil and gas.

Chabahar and the INSTC could reduce dependence on the Suez Canal and provide faster, cheaper access to Europe, boosting India’s trade competitiveness.

Geopolitically, Armenia—though small—offers a counterbalance as Turkey, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan tighten their axis. For India, deeper ties here would enhance influence in a crowded regional arena.

The corridor also fits into a wider West Asia strategy. While the Gulf dominates attention due to oil and labour flows, the Iran–Caucasus route could open land access to the Caspian, Black Sea, and Central Asia. This is not just a trade path but a geopolitical artery shaping India’s continental role for decades.

Risks of Inaction

India’s hesitancy at Chabahar has given China room to expand in Iran through major investments and oil deals. The INSTC, conceived over two decades ago, remains underused, constrained by bureaucracy and poor coordination.

Inaction carries costs. Without political and financial commitment, India risks exclusion from a corridor that could define Eurasian trade. The root problem is New Delhi’s “maritime bias”—a disproportionate focus on the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific at the expense of continental Eurasia.

If India is serious about being a continental as well as a maritime power, it must recalibrate its approach.

First, treat Chabahar and the INSTC not as optional side projects but as strategic imperatives. This means funding, high-level diplomatic attention, and timelines for implementation.

Second, institutionalise a trilateral framework with Iran and Armenia. Regular dialogue, shared investment mechanisms, and a formal working group on connectivity could prevent ad-hocism and create momentum.

Finally, balance East and West. Engagement with the US and EU need not preclude deepening ties with Eurasia. In fact, leveraging Iran’s location and Armenia’s European proximity could enhance India’s bargaining position with both BRICS and Western blocs.

India’s ambitions to be a global power cannot rest solely on Indo-Pacific partnerships or symbolic summits. They require concrete, sustained investment in regions that lie between oceans and continents. The Iran-Armenia corridor offers a rare chance to bridge India’s maritime strengths with continental reach.

This is no longer just about Chabahar or a set of cargo trains across the Caucasus. It is about whether India reclaims its historical place as a connector of worlds—from the Indian Ocean to the Eurasian heartland. If it misses this window, the corridor may still be built. But India may find itself waiting at a gate where the rules have already been written by others.

(The writer is a foreign affairs expert. Views personal.)