India’s Security Starts at the Shore

From fishermen and coastal businesses to merchant ships, India must turn its maritime economy and communities into a stronger layer of national resilience.

India’s security landscape has evolved beyond traditional threats like enemy warships, submarines, missiles, and land forces to encompass hybrid challenges. Now, research vessels, survey ships, fishing fleets, maritime militia, drones, merchant ships, environmental incidents, proxy networks, and local intelligence activities all impact national security. This is particularly relevant for India due to increasing threats in the Indian Ocean Region.

Since the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, India has strengthened coastal security and recognised the importance of coastal and fishing communities as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the security system. The next step should be to institutionalise this idea through a National Coastal and Border Citizen Security Awareness Programme. The aim is to create an informed public-warning layer that knows what to observe, what to avoid and whom to inform.

National Resilience

At the same time, India must treat merchant shipping as an instrument of national resilience. In any crisis or war, the Indian Navy will require fuel, stores, ammunition, sealift, repair support, harbour services, evacuation capacity and offshore logistics. India therefore needs a Strategic Merchant Marine Reserve of Indian-flagged vessels that can be mobilised in national emergencies.

A small boat, such as a dhow, fishing trawler or tourist craft, may appear harmless, but it can be misused for reconnaissance, the landing of men or material, smuggling, logistics support, illegal communications or sabotage. Similarly, a coastal hotel, resort, warehouse, marina or water-sports operator may unknowingly be useful to hostile actors seeking information or access.

A national citizen-awareness programme should therefore cover fishermen, coastal residents, port workers, hotel and resort employees, tourist boat operators, marine service providers, customs brokers, truck drivers, coastal panchayats, schools, colleges and local businesses. The training must be simple, repeated and delivered in Indian languages.

Fishermen should be specifically encouraged to report foreign research vessels, unusual survey activity and unexplained fishing or trawler movements close to sensitive maritime zones. It should not expect citizens to perform intelligence work or confront suspicious persons.

The Government’s Vibrant Villages Programme, which enhances certain border villages, serves as a valuable model. Its security-awareness approach should be expanded to other regions, including coastal states. When executed properly, this programme can also foster national integration by uniting efforts to protect the country, the Republic of India.

Hotels, resorts, marinas, tourist operators, fishing harbours, coastal warehouses and port contractors should be brought under a light but meaningful Coastal Business Security Code. This need not be burdensome. It should require basic staff training, guest verification, emergency contact lists, suspicious-activity reporting procedures and periodic participation in local drills. A trained ecosystem can identify warning signs before they become incidents.

Foreign fishing fleets also have strategic significance. Such vessels can provide presence, surveillance, logistics, intimidation and deniability. A ship need not fly a naval ensign to serve naval objectives. India must therefore build a society-wide habit of lawful observation and reporting, even when everything is fine, particularly around sensitive waters, island territories, submarine-cable routes, offshore energy assets, ports and naval approaches.

Strategic Reserve

India must also look inward. In a major crisis, the Navy cannot operate on combat platforms alone. In protracted operations, the Navy would require a merchant-marine backbone: tankers for fuel, cargo ships for stores and ammunition, offshore vessels for support, tugs for harbour operations, heavy lift repair vessels, hospital or evacuation capacity, coastal transport and sealift. Modern naval power is sustained not only by warships, but also by the commercial maritime system that supports them. The United States, the United Kingdom and other maritime powers have long understood that merchant shipping forms part of national power.

In line with India’s Maritime Amrit Kaal Vision 2047 and for strengthening of India’s maritime security, India should create a National Maritime Auxiliary and Strategic Sealift Framework, broadly comparable in purpose, though not necessarily in structure, to the military sealift arrangements used by major maritime powers.

This also requires building Indian-flagged ships with dual-use features as well as creating a mechanism to include existing merchant vessels in national emergencies, such as, Product tankers, coastal tankers, container feeders, ro-ro vessels, multipurpose cargo ships, offshore support vessels, dredgers, tugs, heavy-lift vessels, harbour craft and passenger-cum-evacuation vessels since all have crisis value. This does not mean converting merchant ships into warships. It means designing them with features that improve usefulness in emergencies.

The Government should incentivise such vessels through tax benefits, priority cargo, viability-gap funding, cargo reservation, lower port dues, green finance, shipbuilding support and defence-readiness grants. They should be maintained to high standards and periodically inspected for auxiliary readiness. US has for years treated parts of its commercial maritime sector as a reserve of strategic capability and China is following their footsteps, thus India cannot afford to ignore this dimension.

The Government should create a voluntary Merchant Marine Support Register for Indian flagged vessels. Shipowners could enrol vessels in return for defined incentives. In peacetime, such ships would continue normal trading. In a national emergency, they could be mobilised for fuel carriage, stores transport, evacuation, offshore support, towing, repair assistance, harbour services, pollution response or logistics support to the Navy and Coast Guard. This would also require conducting tabletop drills and exercises regularly to test preparedness.

India’s 2047 maritime vision should explicitly recognise merchant shipping as a national-security enabler, not just a trade instrument. A trained citizen layer along the coast and border, combined with a capable strategic merchant marine reserve, would enhance security of India’s extensive 11,098 km of coastline.

(Capt. Naveen Singhal is Marine Consultant and Member of the Singapore Shipping Association. He has been extensively involved in the inspection of US Navy’s non-commissioned, Military Sealift Command vessels in Diego Garcia and other naval bases in South East Asia. Capt. MM Saggi is former Nautical Advisor, Government of India. Views personal.)