Iran and Iraq: From Battlefield to Backroom

In describing the potential dangers of the rivalry between the US and China, American political scientist Graham Allison, in his book ‘The Thucydides Trap,’ uses the title term to describe the inevitable conflict between a rising power and an established one. The term alludes to the destructive conflict in the ancient world that raged for 27 years between Athens and Sparta (431 B.C. - 404 B.C.) which was chronicled by the Athenian historian Thucydides in his classic ‘History of the Peloponnesian War’ – a book considered the first ‘objective’ work of history.

Like Athens and Sparta of yore, Iran and Iraq – two Middle Eastern powers who were bitter foes - seem to have undergone a remarkable transformation in their relationship as exemplified by the recent visit of Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian to Iraq.

Pezeshkian’s discussions with Prime Minister Muhammad Shia’ Al-Sudani revolved around bolstering economic cooperation and deepening political ties — a stark contrast to the adversarial relations that has defined the two nations for much of the past. Talks focused on expanding trade, with ambitions to increase bilateral trade to $20 billion in the coming years. Energy cooperation was also on the agenda, reflecting Iraq’s ongoing need for Iranian electricity supplies amid its own chronic shortages. This partnership is emblematic of Iraq’s broader strategy to diversify its international alliances and reduce dependence on the United States.

The Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) remains one of the longest and bloodiest conflicts (and least documented) of the 20th century, casting a shadow over both nations that lingered well into the 21st century. The war, sparked by territorial disputes and ideological differences left scars so deep that any thought of reconciliation seemed impossible.

Yet, in light of their altered relations today, it appears that Iran and Iraq are navigating a path that defies Allison’s ‘Thucydidean Trap.’

Strategically, both nations are keen to stabilize their borders and counter shared threats, particularly from extremist groups. The rise of the Islamic State in 2014 galvanized a tacit military partnership, as Iranian-backed militias played a crucial role in the fight against the jihadists in Iraq.

Iran’s influence in Iraq has grown significantly since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein. Yet, the path to rapprochement since 1980 has been rocky and chaotic, chequered by violent sectarian conflict and buffeted by the headwinds of the Iraqi civil war that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein.

Describing the pervasive hatred between Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Williamson Murray and Kevin M. Woods, in their authoritative history of the conflict, observe how Iraq made the battlefield even more gruesome by introducing poison gas – not used extensively in a major war since Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935.

Both emerged from the war weakened and wary, their economies shattered and their militaries exhausted. The conflict was a pyrrhic victory for Iraq and a grievous loss for Iran, leaving both nations “more vulnerable than they had been before the first shot was fired,” say Williamson and Woods in their book.

Both Hussein and Khomeini, the war’s chief architects, were gone by the mid-2000s, but the animosity and distrust remained.

The toppling of Hussein’s regime in 2003 dismantled the fragile power structure of a deeply sectarian country, setting off a brutal cycle of insurgency and sectarian violence. Amidst this geopolitical chaos, Iran seized the opportunity to expand its influence in Iraq, sponsoring militant groups.

One of the most notable figures to emerge was Muqtada al-Sadr, a fiery cleric who galvanized Shiite resentment and nationalist sentiment against the U.S. occupation. Sadr’s Mahdi Army, a militia formed in 2003, became a formidable force, clashing with American troops and other rival factions.

As the U.S. struggled to establish order, Iran played a calculated game of fostering Shiite militias and political factions to create a network of influence in a rapidly fragmenting Iraq. Tehran’s backing of groups like the Badr Organization and the Mahdi Army was part of a broader strategy to counter American presence and ensure that post-Saddam Iraq would be an ally rather than a rival. Iran’s Quds Force, led by the now-deceased General Qassem Soleimani, became instrumental in this effort, coordinating with Iraqi militias and providing funding, weapons, and training.

The rise of ISIS in 2014 marked another turning point in the relations between the two countries. As the extremist group seized large swathes of Iraqi territory, including Mosul, Iran quickly mobilized to support the Iraqi government and Shiite militias in the fight against ISIS. This intervention was not merely a defensive manoeuvre; it solidified Iran’s role as a critical security partner, further entrenching its influence in Iraq’s military and political spheres.

Pezeshkian called his visit “a new starting point for cooperation” with Iraq. The shift from outright hostility to strategic partnership, albeit with its complexities and contradictions, illustrates a nuanced escape from the destructive cycles of the past.