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By:

Quaid Najmi

4 January 2025 at 3:26:24 pm

Congress’ solo path for ‘ideological survival’

Mumbai: The Congress party’s decision to contest the forthcoming BrihanMumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) elections independently is being viewed as an attempt to reclaim its ideological space among the public and restore credibility within its cadre, senior leaders indicated. The announcement - made by AICC General Secretary Ramesh Chennithala alongside state president Harshwardhan Sapkal and Mumbai Congress chief Varsha Gaikwad - did not trigger a backlash from the Maharashtra Vikas Aghadi...

Congress’ solo path for ‘ideological survival’

Mumbai: The Congress party’s decision to contest the forthcoming BrihanMumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) elections independently is being viewed as an attempt to reclaim its ideological space among the public and restore credibility within its cadre, senior leaders indicated. The announcement - made by AICC General Secretary Ramesh Chennithala alongside state president Harshwardhan Sapkal and Mumbai Congress chief Varsha Gaikwad - did not trigger a backlash from the Maharashtra Vikas Aghadi (MVA) partners, the Nationalist Congress Party (SP) and Shiv Sena (UBT). According to Congress insiders, the move is the outcome of more than a year of intense internal consultations following the party’ dismal performance in the 2024 Assembly elections, belying huge expectations. A broad consensus reportedly emerged that the party should chart a “lone-wolf” course to safeguard the core ideals of Congress, turning140-years-old, next month. State and Mumbai-level Congress leaders, speaking off the record, said that although the party gained momentum in the 2019 Assembly and 2024 Lok Sabha elections, it was frequently constrained by alliance compulsions. Several MVA partners, they claimed, remained unyielding on larger ideological and political issues. “The Congress had to compromise repeatedly and soften its position, but endured it as part of ‘alliance dharma’. Others did not reciprocate in the same spirit. They made unilateral announcements and declared candidates or policies without consensus,” a senior state leader remarked. Avoid liabilities He added that some alliance-backed candidates later proved to be liabilities. Many either lost narrowly or, even after winning with the support of Congress workers, defected to Mahayuti constituents - the Bharatiya Janata Party, Shiv Sena, or the Nationalist Congress Party. “More than five dozen such desertions have taken place so far, which is unethical, backstabbing the voters and a waste of all our efforts,” he rued. A Mumbai office-bearer elaborated that in certain constituencies, Congress workers effectively propelled weak allied candidates through the campaign. “Our assessment is that post-split, some partners have alienated their grassroots base, especially in the mofussil regions. They increasingly rely on Congress workers. This is causing disillusionment among our cadre, who see deserving leaders being sidelined and organisational growth stagnating,” he said. Chennithala’s declaration on Saturday was unambiguous: “We will contest all 227 seats independently in the BMC polls. This is the demand of our leaders and workers - to go alone in the civic elections.” Gaikwad added that the Congress is a “cultured and respectable party” that cannot ally with just anyone—a subtle reference to the Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (MNS), which had earlier targeted North Indians and other communities and is now bidding for an electoral arrangement with the SS(UBT). Both state and city leaders reiterated that barring the BMC elections - where the Congress will take the ‘ekla chalo’ route - the MVA alliance remains intact. This is despite the sharp criticism recently levelled at the Congress by senior SS(UBT) leader Ambadas Danve following the Bihar results. “We are confident that secular-minded voters will support the Congress' fight against the BJP-RSS in local body elections. We welcome backing from like-minded parties and hope to finalize understandings with some soon,” a state functionary hinted. Meanwhile, Chennithala’s firm stance has triggered speculation in political circles about whether the Congress’ informal ‘black-sheep' policy vis-a-vis certain parties will extend beyond the BMC polls.

Marcos vs. Duterte: How the UniTeam Fell Apart

What began as a coalition of convenience has turned into a contest of survival.

Ferdinand Marcos Jr Sara Duterte
Ferdinand Marcos Jr Sara Duterte

Earlier this month, a routine administrative reshuffle sent shockwaves through Philippine politics. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) removed Col. Raymund Dante Lachica, head of the Vice Presidential Security Group (VPSG), without notifying Vice President Sara Duterte.


This was not merely a bureaucratic move but a bold political message. The removal signalled deeper institutional friction and was widely seen as evidence of the worsening ties between President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr and his vice president. Their “UniTeam” alliance had once projected unity, stability, and dynastic collaboration during the 2022 elections.


From alliance to antagonism

The UniTeam’s 2022 formation arose not from ideology but political expediency. Ferdinand Marcos Jr, representing the northern elite and business technocrats, allied with Sara Duterte, daughter of hardline populist ex-President Rodrigo Duterte, who dominated Mindanao and commanded a loyal base. Their combined machinery swept the elections, securing majorities and reshaping the nation’s power structure.


By mid-2023, cracks had begun to appear. Policy rifts emerged over education, public health, and governance. Sara Duterte pushed for a nationalistic, conservative curriculum, while Marcos backed liberal reforms and technocratic consensus. Cabinet reshuffles slowly edged out Duterte allies, deepening mistrust. In June 2024, she resigned as Education Secretary, citing irreconcilable policies and poor consultation.


What followed went beyond disagreement—it was the rise of rival political narratives. Marcos styled himself as a global-minded moderniser, courting investors and bolstering diplomacy. Duterte doubled down on populism, accusing the government of neglecting grassroots concerns and hoarding power in Manila. By late 2024, the UniTeam had devolved from an alliance into a battleground of competing agendas and loyalties.


The impeachment battle

The conflict intensified after four impeachment complaints were filed against Vice President Sara Duterte in December 2024. Allegations included misuse of intelligence funds and efforts to undermine the President through inflammatory statements and coercive tactics. In February 2025, the House approved the complaints, paving the way for a Senate trial.


The impeachment proceedings quickly dominated national discourse. Major TV networks, online influencers, and regional papers took sides. Pro- and anti-Duterte protests erupted in Davao and several provincial capitals. The issue also split the political class, leaving governors and mayors caught in a storm of pressure and potential retribution.


In July 2025, the Supreme Court issued a landmark ruling declaring the impeachment unconstitutional, citing the one-year bar on successive cases within the same legislative term. Duterte supporters hailed it as a victory for judicial independence, while Marcos allies warned of judicial overreach.


Military and security fault lines

The military’s role in the feud remained one of its most sensitive and volatile aspects. The abrupt removal of Col. Lachica in October, without protocol or prior coordination with the Vice President’s office, fuelled fears of creeping militarisation in civilian politics.


Earlier that year, anonymous reports surfaced of an aborted “soft coup” allegedly led by retired officers sympathetic to Duterte. Though the AFP denied the claims, the incident prompted a rare public address by the Chief of Staff, reaffirming the military’s loyalty to the Constitution and civilian rule. Shaped by the lessons of the 1986 and 2001 EDSA uprisings, the institution sought to project neutrality and professionalism.


Despite this, the military remains a powerful arbiter in political crises. Its stance may be neutral, but internal sentiments often reflect the nation’s broader political divides.


The political landscape ahead

With the once-dominant UniTeam now defunct, political alliances are rapidly realigning. President Marcos Jr is working to tighten control over key institutions and expand his base among centrists, technocrats, and Manila’s economic elite. His administration has doubled down on infrastructure, education reform, and foreign policy to position the Philippines as a key Indo-Pacific player.


Meanwhile, Vice President Duterte is rallying her base in Mindanao and the Visayas, drawing on her family’s entrenched networks and populist legacy. Her public appearances are more frequent, her rhetoric sharper. A new political party launch seems likely. Her local-first message resonates with voters who feel sidelined by the capital-centric policies of the current administration.


The rivalry is already reshaping legislative debates, with Senate and House blocs subtly realigning. Bills on decentralisation, education, and law enforcement have turned into political flashpoints. Provincial leaders are hedging their bets, balancing between both camps. Their decisions will strongly influence the path to the 2028 presidential race.


The Philippines has long faced cycles of elite rivalry, personality-driven politics, and institutional fragility. The Marcos-Duterte rift continues this pattern but may also mark a turning point. As 2028 approaches, key questions remain: Will the political system adapt, evolve, or fracture under the strain of dynastic rule? Can realignment foster policy coherence and democratic maturity, or will it entrench old weaknesses? The answers could shape the next decade of Philippine governance and stability.


(The writer is a foreign affairs expert. Views personal.)

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