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Correspondent

23 August 2024 at 9:59:04 pm

Liberal Hypocrisy

A revealing test of liberalism is whether it can condemn an idea when it comes from someone it considers politically useful. A recent interview given by controversial former student activist Sharjeel Imam to a supposedly progressive portal has put sections of India’s self-proclaimed liberal establishment in a right quandary. In his interview, Imam outrageously questioned the democratic framework as a means of securing Muslim political rights, portrayed secularism as a majoritarian stratagem...

Liberal Hypocrisy

A revealing test of liberalism is whether it can condemn an idea when it comes from someone it considers politically useful. A recent interview given by controversial former student activist Sharjeel Imam to a supposedly progressive portal has put sections of India’s self-proclaimed liberal establishment in a right quandary. In his interview, Imam outrageously questioned the democratic framework as a means of securing Muslim political rights, portrayed secularism as a majoritarian stratagem and challenged the idea of a unified Indian nation while going so far as to label the Constitution a trap and denouncing parliamentary democracy itself The point is not what Imam believes; radical fundamentalism has always worn its extremism on its sleeve. The real issue is why his pronouncements have not provoked the kind of hysterical moral outrage routinely directed at Hindu nationalism. Imam, who became a prominent face of the anti-Citizenship Amendment Act protests of 2019–20, faces serious charges under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) in connection with the Delhi riots conspiracy case and remains in judicial custody without conviction. The point is why are the voices, that routinely lecture the country on secularism, pluralism and constitutional morality, so conspicuously silent after Imam’s brazen statements. Figures like Imam have never existed in an ideological vacuum. Sections of the activist, academic and media elite gave the anti-CAA movement considerable moral and political support, and some commentators treated its more radical voices primarily through the prism of resistance to the Modi government, while wilfully sanitizing bigotry as 'dissent' and dressing up open sedition as mere political grievance When Hindu nationalist figures speak, their statements are meticulously dissected, parsed, and condemned for their threat to minority rights and secularism. Yet, when comparable or worse challenges to national cohesion, territorial integrity, and democratic principles emanate from minority or Islamist quarters, the same commentators suddenly discover the virtues of nuance, context and restraint. They retreat into a cowardly fence-sitting, desperate to avoid alienating a vocal constituency in their anti-regime coalition. Anything less than equal scrutiny turns universal principles into mere instruments of partisan convenience. This reveals a deeper, more embarrassing pathology among sections of the liberal establishment to conflate opposition to the government with absolute moral virtue. It exposes an unseemly willingness to forge Faustian bargains with extremist elements, operating on the crude and dangerous logic that the enemy of my enemy must be my ideological ally. An individual does not become a defender of democracy merely by opposing Narendra Modi, just as criticism of Islamist politics does not automatically make someone a Hindu nationalist. Ideological arguments must be judged by consistent standards rather than convenient labels. Liberalism that cannot confront illiberalism among its own ideological fellow-travellers is not principled liberalism. It then devolves into mere partisan hypocrisy and a hollow exercise in selective outrage that ultimately destroys the very democratic values it claims to defend.

New Alliances, New Pressures, New Fault Lines

Aug 25
3 min read

To its west, old relationships in the Gulf are acquiring new strategic and military dimensions. Across the Atlantic, Washington is increasingly using tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy. At the same time, India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and prepares to host its summit when the grouping is being watched in the West as a potential challenge to the American-dominated global financial order.


Individually, these developments may appear unrelated. Put together, they reveal a larger geopolitical churn in which alliances, energy, trade, currencies and economic coercion are becoming interconnected. India finds itself almost at its centre.


The emerging Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan security equation deserves particular attention.


Saudi Arabia brings enormous financial and energy influence; Türkiye possesses considerable military strength, NATO experience and an expanding defence industry; Pakistan brings a large military establishment and nuclear capability with the open support of Washington.


Any arrangement containing a collective-defence commitment naturally acquires significance beyond ordinary diplomatic cooperation.


Alongside it, another strategic convergence has gradually developed among India, Israel and the UAE. It would be incorrect to describe this as a formal military alliance. Yet geopolitics does not operate through defence treaties alone. India's extensive defence and technology relationship with Israel, its rapidly expanding economic and strategic partnership with the UAE, and the UAE-Israel relationship following the Abraham Accords have created considerable common ground. I2U2—bringing together India, Israel, the UAE and the United States—added another institutional dimension.


Thus, without necessarily becoming opposing military camps, two interesting strategic formations are visible across West Asia: Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan and the looser India–UAE–Israel convergence.


Balancing Challenge

India faces a similar balancing challenge. The Gulf is not a distant geopolitical theatre for New Delhi. Nearly nine million Indians live and work there. India's energy security, investments, trade and remittance flows are closely connected with the region. The proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor also requires relative stability across this geography. Polarisation in West Asia can therefore rapidly become an Indian economic and strategic problem.


There is another question Indian planners cannot ignore. If a future India-Pakistan confrontation escalates, how would any collective-defence commitment involving Pakistan be interpreted by Saudi Arabia and Türkiye? It would be alarmist to assume that either country would automatically enter a conflict against India. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has substantial economic and strategic interests in maintaining good relations with New Delhi.


Nevertheless, defence planners are paid to examine possibilities before they become crises.


While these equations develop in India's neighbourhood, economic pressure is emerging from Washington.


The US Senate has voted 86–11 for legislation intended to increase pressure on Russia by targeting major purchasers of Russian energy. The measure could authorise tariffs reaching 100 per cent against goods from countries continuing large-scale purchases of Russian oil and gas, with India among those potentially exposed. China is powerful enough to shrug off similar challenges from the West."


However this does not mean that America has already imposed a 100 per cent tariff on India. Further legislative steps remain necessary, and presidential waiver provisions are important. But the overwhelming Senate vote carries a political message that New Delhi cannot dismiss. Tariffs are no longer merely tools of trade protection; they have become instruments of geopolitical coercion.


Washington's argument is understandable: revenues from Russian petroleum help sustain Moscow's economy during the Ukraine war, and reducing those revenues increases pressure on Russia. But in that case what about European countries who too were/are customers of Russian oil?


India's question is equally legitimate: who should determine where India purchases the energy required by more than 1.4 billion people?


If Russian crude remains commercially advantageous and helps contain domestic energy costs, New Delhi cannot reasonably be expected to make every energy decision according to another country's geopolitical priorities. Strategic partnership cannot become strategic obedience.


This is where BRICS enters the larger picture.


India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and will host its leaders at an unusually sensitive moment. BRICS is no longer merely the original grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Its expansion has considerably increased its demographic, energy and geopolitical weight.


More importantly, discussions around BRICS increasingly touch a sensitive nerve in Washington: alternative payment mechanisms, local-currency trade, development finance and the possibility of gradually reducing dependence upon the dollar-dominated international financial system. The BRICS Summit this time is poised to take some decisive steps which may affect western interests especially US.


(The writer is an advocate, legal, geopolitical and public policy analyst. Views personal.)

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