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By:

Sagari Gupta

24 March 2026 at 2:16:04 pm

SpaceX’s IPO and India’s Sovereignty

The record-breaking $1.75 trillion IPO underscores a new reality that nations which do not control critical digital infrastructure risk ceding part of their sovereignty. Last week, SpaceX listed on Nasdaq under the ticker SPCX, raising $75 billion at a staggering valuation of $1.75 trillion. That single offering surpassed Saudi Aramco’s 2019 record of $25.6 billion by a factor of three. India’s defence budget for FY 2025-26 was Rs. 6.81 lakh crore, approximately $78.57 billion, according to...

SpaceX’s IPO and India’s Sovereignty

The record-breaking $1.75 trillion IPO underscores a new reality that nations which do not control critical digital infrastructure risk ceding part of their sovereignty. Last week, SpaceX listed on Nasdaq under the ticker SPCX, raising $75 billion at a staggering valuation of $1.75 trillion. That single offering surpassed Saudi Aramco’s 2019 record of $25.6 billion by a factor of three. India’s defence budget for FY 2025-26 was Rs. 6.81 lakh crore, approximately $78.57 billion, according to the Union Budget. SpaceX raised the near-equivalent of that annual allocation in one day. The investors who participated were not buying into a rocket company. They were pricing control over satellite infrastructure, global internet access, launch capability, and an integrated AI platform at a level exceeding the GDP of most countries. Roughly 30 percent of the shares, worth approximately $22.5 billion, went to retail investors, three times the proportion typical of a US listing. India has no private entity in this category. What SpaceX actually controls Starlink, SpaceX’s satellite internet division, operated approximately 7,000 active satellites globally as of early 2026. It counts over nine million subscribers worldwide, and following a 2026 merger, SpaceX also owns xAI, the developer of the Grok AI system. A company that controls satellite connectivity, launch capacity, and a frontier AI model occupies a position no regulator has previously had to classify. It is not a telecom operator, not a defence contractor, and not a technology platform. It is all three at once, under common ownership. In June 2025, SpaceX received authorisation from India’s Department of Telecommunications, followed by a licence from IN-SPACe in July 2025. As of June 2026, Starlink’s commercial operations in India remain pending, with the company in active discussions with the Government of India on security clearances, a process slowed by concerns linked to Starlink terminal use in the Iran conflict. That delay is itself revealing. A foreign company’s service continuity in India depends on negotiations that India does not fully control. Satellite communications, launch systems, and AI-integrated data infrastructure are the functional equivalents of roads and electricity grids in a digital economy. States that built those grids in the twentieth century retained control over access, pricing, and service continuity. States that depend on foreign corporations for digital infrastructure in the twenty-first century do not. The dependence question is already live for India India’s digital public infrastructure, covering Aadhaar, UPI, and the Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission, processes billions of transactions monthly. Aadhaar covers nearly the entire adult population, and UPI carries the bulk of India’s retail digital payments. The system’s design is sound: public architecture, state-controlled data governance, open standards. The next connectivity layer is the problem. TRAI data shows rural internet penetration at 44.2 percent as of March 2024, with only 3.8 percent of rural households connected through high-speed fixed infrastructure. Approximately 630 million Indians remain offline, with primary barriers being awareness, affordability, and limited local-language content, according to the Kantar ICUBE 2024 survey. That gap will not close through terrestrial fibre rollout alone. Satellite broadband, through Starlink, Eutelsat OneWeb, or Amazon’s Project Kuiper, will carry a large share of that load over the next decade. None of these are Indian entities. Their pricing decisions, service continuity choices, and data routing practices sit outside Indian jurisdiction. A farmer in Chhattisgarh receiving crop advisory data through a satellite connection does not know that a pricing decision made in California affects whether that signal arrives tomorrow. She will notice only when it stops. Foreign private capital has built connectivity infrastructure in India before. Reliance Jio brought down mobile data costs after its 2016 launch, extending internet access to hundreds of millions of Indians who had not been able to afford it before. Jio’s rollout also created large-scale domestic employment in network maintenance, retail, and customer service, jobs that remain within India’s economy. Private investment in connectivity is not a threat to sovereignty. Structural Gap The difference with SpaceX is structural. Jio operates under Indian law, pays taxes in India, employs Indian engineers, and answers to Indian regulators when disputes arise. Its towers and fibre sit on Indian soil. Starlink’s constellation orbits at 550 kilometres, outside any single national jurisdiction. Under the Telecommunications Act 2023, existing Starlink operators in India continue under the legacy Unified Licence framework, with their licences remaining valid. But no Indian regulatory instrument contains a binding service continuity obligation for satellite operators. If Starlink suspends Indian operations, no domestic legal mechanism compels continuation or requires a managed transition for the users left without service. The $1.75 trillion valuation amplifies this structural gap. India’s external debt stood at $736.3 billion at end-March 2025, according to the Reserve Bank of India. SpaceX’s market valuation now exceeds India’s total external debt by a wide margin. A corporation at that scale does not face the same regulatory friction as a domestic operator. It does not need to negotiate from a position of dependence. India’s satellite communications framework, updated through the Indian Space Policy 2023 and the Telecommunications Act 2023, governs licensing and spectrum allocation in detail. It does not contain binding service continuity or exit-transition obligations for foreign satellite operators. That gap needs closing through explicit licence conditions before Starlink and its competitors reach commercial scale in India. India’s Semiconductor Mission has made genuine progress. Pilot production started in three plants in 2025, and the government confirmed that four plants commenced commercial production in 2026. Kaynes Semicon’s OSAT unit in Sanand reached commercial production in March 2026. India also inaugurated its first 3-nanometer chip design centres in Noida and Bengaluru in 2025, a step toward design capability even as fabrication capacity remains limited. These are real milestones, not announcements. They do not yet constitute a domestic supply chain for the advanced chips needed for satellite infrastructure, AI systems, or next-generation communications hardware. India’s domestic semiconductor market was approximately $45-50 billion in 2024-25, according to industry estimates cited by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. Closing the gap between consumption and domestic production is a decade-long task requiring sustained capital commitment. India’s competition framework does not treat foreign satellite infrastructure concentration as a market power question. The Competition Commission of India has a clear mandate over domestic pricing and merger activity. It has no instrument to act when a foreign entity’s control over orbital infrastructure creates de facto monopoly conditions for remote connectivity within India. That regulatory gap needs explicit legislative attention before dependence deepens further. Market Signals SpaceX’s $1.75 trillion valuation is not a data point about one company. It is a market signal about what global capital considers most valuable in 2026: not oil fields or shipping lanes, but control over the systems through which economies communicate, compute, and transact. India entered the hydrocarbon era as a net importer and spent decades building the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and domestic refining capacity to reduce that dependence. The programme continues to expand today, a reminder that infrastructure sovereignty is an ongoing commitment. The response was slow and expensive. It was also the right call. The digital infrastructure era has well and truly arrived. India is already a net importer of the connectivity and computing systems that will define the next phase of its economic growth. The SpaceX IPO makes the scale of that dependence visible in a single number. And policymakers do not have decades to respond this time. (The writer is an independent public policy researcher. Views personal.)

Nikki Bhati and India’s Dowry Curse

Four decades after India amended its dowry law, the case underscores why parents must be held as accountable as in-laws in a culture that sacrifices daughters.

When news broke that Nikki Bhati, a young woman from Uttar Pradesh, had been burned alive in her own home, the headlines were predictably lurid. What jarred more was the spectacle that followed. At her funeral, the man accused of orchestrating her murder - her own father-in-law - lit the pyre even as Nikki’s own parents stood by. Their apparent indifference was startling. They had long known of the abuse she endured. Yet, rather than shelter Nikki, they sent her back to her husband and his family, sealing her fate.


Nikki faced repeated physical abuse from her husband and mother-in-law, and her parents were aware of these incidents, as well as her husband’s alleged infidelity. Despite a panchayat being called and an agreement for her husband to stop the abuse, Nikki’s parents sent her back to her marital home. They did not want to take her back. To add to this torture, Nikki and her older sister, Kanchan, married to the elder brother of her husband, were reportedly forced to hand out 50 percent of their earnings from the beauty parlour they ran within the home, followed by forcing them to stop the business as it was bad for the family’s reputation.


Way back in 1988, this journalist had written on dowry deaths as a big chapter in a book. The cases cited in it are evidence that there has been no impact on dowry deaths over the past forty years despite the Dowry Prohibition Amendment Act 1984.


Back then, the toll was already gruesome. Between May and June 1985, at least six young women in Mumbai alone were reported dead as a result of harassment by their husbands or in-laws. The victims came from different communities and income groups, but their fates were identical. All were newly married; all died before turning 25. In only one of those cases did the police book a mother-in-law for murder. The rest were charged under lesser provisions of the Indian Penal Code. None led to convictions.


Even those arrests were made only after grieving families hounded police officials for action. As the late Sheela Barse, a pioneering journalist and activist, observed at the time that the law was too narrow. Section 498A targeted only the husband and his relatives. But, she argued, parents of the bride were often complicit, if not directly then indirectly, in their daughter’s suffering and eventual death.


Complicity takes many forms. Affluent families feed the very practice they denounce, showering their daughters’ weddings with lavish dowries. Poorer parents accede to demands from grooms’ families, pawning land or jewellery to marry off their daughters. Once married, daughters who return home bruised and battered are often told to endure it in silence. Parents dread the stigma of a separated daughter more than her suffering.


The case of ShailaLhatkar in Pune illustrates the point. Her husband, a qualified engineer, had already been divorced once. Shaila complained repeatedly to her father about the violence she suffered. Each time he sent her back, insisting it was her duty as a Hindu wife to remain with her husband. She died soon after, burned by her in-laws.


Sometimes the abdication of responsibility is even more grotesque. In Delhi, Shani Kaur was subjected to horrific abuse: beatings with iron rods, branding with hot irons, and repeated expulsions from her in-laws’ home. Her mother knew all this, by her own admission, but did nothing. Only after Shani died of burns did she turn to feminist groups demanding justice.


This selective outrage infuriated Barse. She called for broadening the law so that parents who knowingly abandoned their daughters to abusive marriages would also be held accountable. That demand remains unheeded. The law remains tilted towards punishing in-laws, while leaving untouched the deep-rooted social expectations that drive parents to disown their daughters’ suffering.


Nikki Bhati’s case underscores the point. Both she and her sister confided to their parents about their husbands’ violence. But the parents were more preoccupied with defending themselves against a dowry complaint filed by their own estranged daughter-in-law.


Activists in the 1980s made the same observations. “Every case of unnatural death of a woman may not be the result of the pernicious practice of dowry,” noted Chandrakanta Dixit, then a young feminist campaigner. “But is it not instructive that stoves and gas cylinders burst mainly on young, married housewives while male cooks and older housewives escape miraculously every time?”


India has changed in many ways since the 1980s. Its cities gleam with new wealth. Its women lead companies and win Olympic medals. Yet the old, hidden cruelties remain. According to the National Crime Records Bureau, more than 6,500 dowry deaths are reported each year - almost 18 every day. The true figure is likely higher, given underreporting and the reluctance of police to classify cases as dowry-related.


While laws banning dowry and punishing cruelty within marriage exist, they are riddled with loopholes, plagued by shoddy investigations and weak prosecutions. Social reform has faltered too. For all the rhetoric of ‘Beti Bachao, Beti Padhao’ (Save the Daughter, Educate the Daughter), the stigma of bringing a married daughter back home remains entrenched.


What is required is not just tougher statutes but a cultural shift. Parents must be held accountable when they knowingly send their daughters back into abusive marriages.


The flames that consumed Nikki Bhati are the same that consumed countless brides before her. India’s dowry system may be formally outlawed. In practice, it is alive, well, and murderous.


(The author is a noted film scholar and a double-winner for the National Award for Best Writing on Cinema who has also written extensively on gender issues. Views personal)

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