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By:

Commodore S.L. Deshmukh

31 October 2024 at 8:30:19 am

The Digital Compass at Sea

Electronic chart systems have transformed maritime navigation, but their promise of safer voyages depends on reliable data and rigorous regulatory compliance. The sea has always punished navigational complacency. For centuries, mariners relied on paper charts, manual plotting and accumulated experience to steer vessels through treacherous waters. These methods remain part of maritime tradition, but modern shipping demands a more integrated approach to navigation. The Electronic Chart Display...

The Digital Compass at Sea

Electronic chart systems have transformed maritime navigation, but their promise of safer voyages depends on reliable data and rigorous regulatory compliance. The sea has always punished navigational complacency. For centuries, mariners relied on paper charts, manual plotting and accumulated experience to steer vessels through treacherous waters. These methods remain part of maritime tradition, but modern shipping demands a more integrated approach to navigation. The Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) represents a decisive step in that direction, combining official digital charts with real-time information from a vessel’s navigational sensors. Its growing importance reflects a simple truth: in an industry where a minor navigational error can have catastrophic consequences, better information can make the difference between a safe passage and disaster. ECDIS is not merely a digital version of a paper chart. It is a type-approved navigational information system that displays official Electronic Navigational Charts (ENCs) and integrates data from equipment such as the Global Positioning System (GPS), gyrocompass, radar, Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA), Automatic Identification System (AIS) and echo sounder. By bringing these inputs together, it gives navigators a consolidated picture of the vessel’s position, its surroundings and potential hazards. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) recognises compliant ECDIS, when used with appropriate official chart data, as meeting the relevant chart-carriage requirements under Chapter V of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). The distinction matters: an ordinary electronic display is not necessarily an ECDIS, and the use of unofficial chart data does not confer the same regulatory standing. Beyond Charts The system’s principal advantage lies in its ability to combine information and alert navigators to developing risks. It supports route planning and monitoring, checks proposed routes against configured safety parameters, displays the vessel’s position in real time and generates alarms when specified dangers or deviations are detected. Depending on the equipment and data available, radar, AIS, weather, tidal and other information can also be overlaid on the chart. This integration can reduce the burden of maintaining paper charts and manually plotting a vessel’s position. It can also help crews identify navigational hazards earlier, monitor their progress more efficiently and make better-informed decisions. In commercial shipping, where time, fuel consumption and operational reliability all matter, these benefits extend beyond safety to voyage efficiency. Yet ECDIS should not be mistaken for an autonomous navigator. Its alarms and safety checks depend on correctly configured settings, reliable sensor inputs and accurate chart information. Officers must understand what the system is displaying, recognise its limitations and retain the judgement to challenge misleading or incomplete information. The regulatory framework reflects the importance of getting this right. Under SOLAS Chapter V, ECDIS carriage became mandatory for specified categories of ships through a phased implementation schedule. The requirements cover, among others, new passenger ships of 500 gross tonnage and above and new cargo ships of 3,000 gross tonnage and above, subject to the applicable provisions and ship categories. The charts themselves are equally important. Official ENCs are vector charts produced to International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) standards. ECDIS processes this information into a System Electronic Navigational Chart (SENC), the internal database used by the equipment. Raster Navigational Charts (RNCs), by contrast, are digital images of paper charts. Software maintenance is therefore central to compliance. IHO standards have evolved, and equipment must remain compatible with the applicable requirements. New ECDIS installations have been expected to meet the relevant standards in force at installation, while existing systems require appropriate maintenance and upgrades. IMO guidance, including MSC.1/Circ.1503, has highlighted the importance of keeping ECDIS software properly maintained. Ship operators cannot assume that a system remains compliant simply because it was approved when first installed. Flag administrations and port-state control authorities may identify deficiencies where applicable requirements are not met. Maritime Imperative For India, these requirements carry particular significance. Its commercial shipping fleet operates within an international regulatory environment in which navigational safety, technical compliance and crew competence are inseparable. India has acceded to SOLAS and has used directives issued by the Directorate General of Shipping (DG Shipping) to implement applicable ECDIS carriage requirements. The government has also pursued the incorporation of relevant provisions into the domestic regulatory framework. DG Shipping has invoked Section 406(3) of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, in connection with ECDIS carriage requirements and the conditions attached to statutory certification. Implementation schedules for Indian ships undertaking international voyages have been prescribed, with compliance subject to regulatory oversight. Training is the other indispensable element. Navigational officers serving on ECDIS-equipped vessels must receive the applicable training in accordance with the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), including the Manila amendments of 2010. Officers must be competent in route planning, alarm interpretation, chart management, system limitations and the response to equipment failure. India has an established marine services sector capable of supporting this transition. Companies offer ECDIS upgrades and maintenance alongside services for AIS, anemometers, autopilots, bridge navigational watch alarm systems, compasses, echo sounders and Global Maritime Distress and Safety System equipment. Marine radar servicing, including X-band and S-band systems, and the maintenance of associated electronic equipment are also available across Indian ports and anchorages. Shipowners must ensure that upgrades are undertaken by competent personnel, that equipment remains properly maintained and that the documentation needed for class surveys and port-state inspections is in order. Periodic checks should be treated as an operational necessity rather than an expense to be deferred. ECDIS is most effective when official charts, updated software, dependable sensors, trained officers and disciplined bridge procedures work together. A failure in any one of these elements can compromise the whole arrangement. As shipping becomes more technologically sophisticated, ECDIS is set to remain a central platform for navigation aboard commercial vessels. Its value lies not simply in replacing paper charts, but in helping crews interpret their surroundings, anticipate hazards and manage voyages with greater precision. For India, effective implementation is therefore both a regulatory obligation and a strategic investment in safer shipping. The challenge is to move beyond carriage requirements and ensure continuing operational competence. (The writer is a retired naval aviation officer and defence and a geopolitical analyst. Views personal.)

Persian Entanglements: How Israel and Iran went from covert allies to existential enemies

Jun 23, 2025
5 min read

In the final part of this series, we trace the forgotten Cold War alliance between Iran, Israel, and the U.S. and their lasting political fallout.


Israel and its Discontents - Part 3


A forgotten Cold War triangle between the Mossad, the SAVAK and the CIA offers uncanny echoes in today’s missile strikes and nuclear espionage.

While unthinkable today, there was a time when Iran’s generals toasted Israeli tacticians over Cognac and caviar in Tehran’s plush north-side villas. In the 1970s, the one-eyed Israeli Warhawk Moshe Dayan was venerated in Iranian military circles, and the air in the capital was thick with geopolitical calculation. Long before the chants of “Death to Israel,” Tehran was quietly colluding with Tel Aviv in a covert alliance that would reshape the region.


Before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, during the heyday of the Shah, a peculiar triangle of Israel’s Mossad, the American CIA, and SAVAK - Iran’s dreaded internal security service – had formed a clandestine alliance designed to weaponize Iran into a Cold War bulwark against Arab nationalism, Soviet influence and the rise of leftist revolution across the Middle East.


The deal was as audacious as it was secretive and ambitious. Israel, the region’s only nuclear-capable state, would share missile technology with Iran while the United States would look the other way, so long as the Soviets were kept in check.


This triangulation became known as the ‘Peripheral Alliance Strategy,’ or ‘Project Klil.’ It yoked together non-Arab states - Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia with Israel in a broad counter-Arab intelligence and military network. As Mossad’s founding chief Reuven Shiloah reportedly told President Dwight Eisenhower in 1958, “This high dam will stop the red tide.”


At the heart of this bizarre brotherhood was a plan that bordered on the fantastical: Iranian missiles powered by Israeli know-how and petrodollars. As Israeli investigative journalist Ronen Bergman recounts in his thrilling ‘The Secret War With Iran’ (2007), Mossad operative Reuven Merhav negotiated with SAVAK’s Hassan Toufanian under the codename Operation Tzor.


Israeli Defence Minister EzerWeizman offered the Shah ‘Jericho’ missiles, originally designed to carry nuclear payloads and the blueprint for Israel’s Lavi fighter jets. Iran would host the test sites while Israel would gain strategic depth and funding. It was, by then, the largest Israeli military-industrial deal ever undertaken with billions of petrodollars in play.


Yet another initiative known as Project Flower, began in 1977. It aimed to develop a surface-to-surface missile with a range of 500km - enough to hit targets from Riyadh to the Iraqi capital of Baghdad – Iran’s sworn adversary in the region. Israel Military Industries would design the hardware while Iran would build the production lines. In the short term, the project promised a deterrent. In the long run, it planted the seeds of a technological lineage that would haunt both nations.


As Iranian-Swedish academic Trita Parsi notes in his ‘Treacherous Alliance’ (2008), this Israeli-Iranian courtship was not ideological but coldly strategic. Iran, ringed by hostile Arab regimes and nervous about Soviet proximity, saw in Israel a useful partner. Israel, threatened by Arab military coalitions, saw in Iran a vital flank. What emerged was a labyrinth of military cooperation, espionage and trade, rooted in pragmatism and wrapped in secrecy with more than a fair amount of skullduggery.


The Shah’s rationale was also increasingly pessimistic about American support. With Jimmy Carter in the White House preaching human rights and rethinking support for autocrats, the Iranian monarch looked elsewhere. Israel, unconstrained by congressional hearings or moral hesitations, became a dependable partner, an ‘honourable schoolboy.’


Between 1953 and 1979, Iran had sold most of its oil to Israel and, in turn, became a major buyer of Israeli goods which ranged from tyres to dentures, as per declassified Israeli state archives.


And then came 1979. Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution toppled the Shah. SAVAK agents were executed while Mossad networks were dismantled overnight. The missiles, blueprints and cooperative legacies vanished into sealed archives. The Islamic Republic, now vocally committed to the destruction of Israel, erased all trace of its courtship. But memory is not so easily scrubbed.


In November 1979, when Iranian students stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran, they found rooms filled with shredded CIA documents. Iran’s new rulers then pulled off a miracle. A group of 250 devout women, known as the ‘Puzzle Committee,’ set about reconstructing the shredded papers by hand. By the end of their labours, they had assembled a treasure trove of espionage secrets detailing clandestine dealings between the Mossad, the CIA and the SAVAK.


As Bergman details in his book, this effort led to the publication of ‘Asnad-e Laneh-ye Jasusi-e Amrika’ (Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den) which ran into 80 volumes. Among the revelations were surveillance logs of Khomeini’s exile, the CIA’s recruitment techniques, and blueprints for crushing leftist movements.


If that scene seemed cinematic, it would find its mirror image decades later when Iran and Israel would be locked (as they are now) in a death grapple.


In 2018, Israeli Mossad agents, in yet another of their breathtakingly audacious operations, raided a Tehran warehouse, hauling out 50,000 pages and 163 discs from Iran’s nuclear archive. The vault was breached in under seven hours using custom torches and vault-crackers. The mission, chronicled in the 2023 book ‘Target Tehran’ by Yonah Bob and IlanEvyata, exposed the AMAD project - the covert Iranian programme for nuclear weapons development which was suspected by Israel to have continued long after Tehran had promised peaceful intent. (A photo showing the presence of this book in Netanyahu’s underground war room is now doing the rounds)


Among the files retrieved were diagrams and missile plans hauntingly similar to those from Project Flower.


In a supreme irony of history, what Israel had helped Iran build in the 1970s, it was now working to dismantle by cyber sabotage, diplomatic coercion and finally, direct military strikes in form of Operation Rising Lion.


This strange symmetry came full circle on June 22 after the U.S. B-2 bombers flattened key Iranian nuclear sites in Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan using GBU-57 bunker-buster bombs. The intelligence for these missions had, in part, originated from Mossad’s 2018 haul.


The entanglements between the clandestine services of these three countries run still deeper. Israeli intermediaries were central to brokering the initial arms deals between the U.S. and Iran during the infamous Iran-Contra affair of 1985-86, which involved a secret sale of arms to Iran, despite a US embargo, in exchange for the release of American hostages and the diversion of proceeds to fund the Contra rebels in Nicaragua.


In 1985, Manucher Ghorbanifar, an Iranian arms dealer and former SAVAK agent had approached Israeli officials with a proposal that in exchange for Western arms, Iran would help secure the release of American hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon.


David Kimche, then director-general of Israel’s Foreign Ministry and a former Mossad deputy, was among the key Israeli intermediaries. He coordinated between the U.S. National Security Council (under Oliver North) and Israeli arms manufacturers.


Yaakov Nimrodi, a well-connected Israeli arms broker who had been the IDF’s military attaché in Tehran under the Shah, also played a role. He had deep personal contacts within Iran’s post-revolutionary military apparatus. The first shipment of TOW anti-tank missiles in August 1985 was transferred to Iran via Israel. In return, one American hostage was released.


The U.S. would thus funnel arms via Israel, who would ‘launder’ the operation to avoid public scrutiny. Later, the scandal ballooned as funds from the Iran arms sales were illegally diverted to Nicaraguan Contras.


For a country whose founding narrative rests on existential threat, Israel’s long entwinement with Iran is an awkward inheritance. That it once considered selling Iran its prized Lavi fighter jet programme, the crown jewel of Israeli aviation, strains credulity today. At the same time, it also underscores the extraordinary contingency of Middle Eastern alliances.


In 330 BCE, Alexander the Great had torched Persepolis, the ceremonial capital of the Persian Achaemenid Empire. Some say it was an accident. Others insist it was deliberate. Either way, an empire built on splendour and secrecy collapsed into ash. Today, the Islamic Republic, born in fire, sustained by secrecy, finds its prized nuclear facilities once again reduced to rubble. Only this time, the flames are not accidental.

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