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By:

Rajiv Shah

22 September 2025 at 8:32:23 pm

New Alliances, New Pressures, New Fault Lines

To its west, old relationships in the Gulf are acquiring new strategic and military dimensions. Across the Atlantic, Washington is increasingly using tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy. At the same time, India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and prepares to host its summit when the grouping is being watched in the West as a potential challenge to the American-dominated global financial order. Individually, these developments may appear unrelated. Put together, they reveal a larger...

New Alliances, New Pressures, New Fault Lines

To its west, old relationships in the Gulf are acquiring new strategic and military dimensions. Across the Atlantic, Washington is increasingly using tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy. At the same time, India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and prepares to host its summit when the grouping is being watched in the West as a potential challenge to the American-dominated global financial order. Individually, these developments may appear unrelated. Put together, they reveal a larger geopolitical churn in which alliances, energy, trade, currencies and economic coercion are becoming interconnected. India finds itself almost at its centre. The emerging Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan security equation deserves particular attention. Saudi Arabia brings enormous financial and energy influence; Türkiye possesses considerable military strength, NATO experience and an expanding defence industry; Pakistan brings a large military establishment and nuclear capability with the open support of Washington. Any arrangement containing a collective-defence commitment naturally acquires significance beyond ordinary diplomatic cooperation. Alongside it, another strategic convergence has gradually developed among India, Israel and the UAE. It would be incorrect to describe this as a formal military alliance. Yet geopolitics does not operate through defence treaties alone. India's extensive defence and technology relationship with Israel, its rapidly expanding economic and strategic partnership with the UAE, and the UAE-Israel relationship following the Abraham Accords have created considerable common ground. I2U2—bringing together India, Israel, the UAE and the United States—added another institutional dimension. Thus, without necessarily becoming opposing military camps, two interesting strategic formations are visible across West Asia: Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan and the looser India–UAE–Israel convergence. Balancing Challenge India faces a similar balancing challenge. The Gulf is not a distant geopolitical theatre for New Delhi. Nearly nine million Indians live and work there. India's energy security, investments, trade and remittance flows are closely connected with the region. The proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor also requires relative stability across this geography. Polarisation in West Asia can therefore rapidly become an Indian economic and strategic problem. There is another question Indian planners cannot ignore. If a future India-Pakistan confrontation escalates, how would any collective-defence commitment involving Pakistan be interpreted by Saudi Arabia and Türkiye? It would be alarmist to assume that either country would automatically enter a conflict against India. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has substantial economic and strategic interests in maintaining good relations with New Delhi. Nevertheless, defence planners are paid to examine possibilities before they become crises. While these equations develop in India's neighbourhood, economic pressure is emerging from Washington. The US Senate has voted 86–11 for legislation intended to increase pressure on Russia by targeting major purchasers of Russian energy. The measure could authorise tariffs reaching 100 per cent against goods from countries continuing large-scale purchases of Russian oil and gas, with India among those potentially exposed. China is powerful enough to shrug off similar challenges from the West." However this does not mean that America has already imposed a 100 per cent tariff on India. Further legislative steps remain necessary, and presidential waiver provisions are important. But the overwhelming Senate vote carries a political message that New Delhi cannot dismiss. Tariffs are no longer merely tools of trade protection; they have become instruments of geopolitical coercion. Washington's argument is understandable: revenues from Russian petroleum help sustain Moscow's economy during the Ukraine war, and reducing those revenues increases pressure on Russia. But in that case what about European countries who too were/are customers of Russian oil? India's question is equally legitimate: who should determine where India purchases the energy required by more than 1.4 billion people? If Russian crude remains commercially advantageous and helps contain domestic energy costs, New Delhi cannot reasonably be expected to make every energy decision according to another country's geopolitical priorities. Strategic partnership cannot become strategic obedience. This is where BRICS enters the larger picture. India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and will host its leaders at an unusually sensitive moment. BRICS is no longer merely the original grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Its expansion has considerably increased its demographic, energy and geopolitical weight. More importantly, discussions around BRICS increasingly touch a sensitive nerve in Washington: alternative payment mechanisms, local-currency trade, development finance and the possibility of gradually reducing dependence upon the dollar-dominated international financial system. The BRICS Summit this time is poised to take some decisive steps which may affect western interests especially US. (The writer is an advocate, legal, geopolitical and public policy analyst. Views personal.)

Selective Conscience

Justice delayed is often described as justice denied. But for the Kashmiri Pandits, it has frequently been forgotten. The decision to charge separatist leader Yasin Malik as the alleged principal conspirator in the abduction, gang rape and murder of Kashmiri Hindu nurse Sarla Bhat comes after thirty-six long years. It is an indictment of the Indian state that allowed one of the most horrific crimes of the Kashmir insurgency to languish in legal limbo.


Sarla Bhat was only twenty-seven. According to investigators, she was abducted, subjected to unspeakable brutality and murdered in 1990 at the height of the Islamist terror campaign that drove hundreds of thousands of Kashmiri Pandits from their ancestral homeland. Her murder was part of a systematic and grim campaign of intimidation of Kashmir’s Hindu community. Besides living with grief, the survivors have had to endured the humiliation of watching those accused of orchestrating such crimes acquire political legitimacy, television platforms and, in some cases, respectful treatment by India’s political establishment in previous governments.


While the belated charge sheet is welcome, this delayed accountability compounds the original crime by signalling that some victims can be safely forgotten. More disturbing has been the selective morality that has surrounded Kashmir for decades. The moral clarity of India’s self-appointed liberal conscience, which has spoken with passion about custodial deaths and alleged abuses committed by the state, has mysteriously evaporated when the victims were Kashmiri Hindus.


Few exemplify this contradiction more starkly than Arundhati Roy, who helped confer moral legitimacy upon separatist figures like Malik. To share platforms with such men while scarcely acknowledging the victims of their terror was no an act of intellectual courage but a profound moral failure. A human-rights discourse that humanises perpetrators while neglecting their victims becomes a shameful exercise in ideological selectivity.


Roy has built an international reputation as an uncompromising defender of the oppressed and an eloquent critic of state violence. Yet, her public engagement with Yasin Malik, even as countless Kashmiri Pandit families waited for justice, reflected a troubling asymmetry.


This selectivity has inflicted lasting damage. It has convinced many Kashmiri Pandits that their pain occupies no meaningful place within India’s intellectual establishment. Their stories have rarely found space in literary festivals, university seminars or international human-rights campaigns. When they demanded recognition, they were often accused of communalising history or weaponizing victimhood by the very same left-liberal establishment which claims to be concerned about Israel’s treatment of Palestinians.


While the charge sheet against Yasin Malik offers a measure of hope, it cannot restore the lost decades or erase the message sent by institutional indifference. Sarla Bhat deserved justice in 1990, not in 2026. The greater scandal is that for thirty-six years, too many of the country’s loudest moral voices scarcely asked why she had to wait.

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