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By:

Akhilesh Sinha

25 June 2025 at 2:53:54 pm

From Ideology to Electability

BJP is blending ideology with pragmatism, elevating leaders from rival parties to power New Delhi: The growing tendency of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to elevate leaders from other parties to the position of Chief Minister represents a shift, one that reflects not only a recalibration of the party's strategy but also the evolving character of Indian politics itself. Once known primarily as a cadre-based party anchored firmly in ideological commitment, the BJP has entered a phase where...

From Ideology to Electability

BJP is blending ideology with pragmatism, elevating leaders from rival parties to power New Delhi: The growing tendency of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to elevate leaders from other parties to the position of Chief Minister represents a shift, one that reflects not only a recalibration of the party's strategy but also the evolving character of Indian politics itself. Once known primarily as a cadre-based party anchored firmly in ideological commitment, the BJP has entered a phase where political pragmatism is accorded equal importance alongside ideology. The clearest evidence of this transformation lies in the rising number of leaders who, after crossing over from other parties, have not only found space within the BJP but have gone on to occupy the highest offices of power. Names such as Basavaraj Bommai in Karnataka, Himanta Biswa Sarma in Assam, and most recently Samrat Choudhary in Bihar have come to embody this trend. Each of these leaders had prior political affiliations outside the BJP, yet after joining the party, their stature and responsibilities have grown significantly. This is not an ad hoc development, but the outcome of a carefully crafted, multi-layered strategy. At the heart of this strategy lies a decisive emphasis on "winning ability." The BJP is no longer determining leadership solely on the basis of ideological loyalty, instead, it is prioritising individuals who possess electoral appeal, grassroots influence, and the capacity to navigate complex social equations. This explains why Himanta Biswa Sarma rose swiftly within the BJP to become Chief Minister and one of the party's most influential figures in the Northeast, who spent nearly two decades in the Congress. Similarly, leaders like Pema Khandu in Arunachal Pradesh, N. Biren Singh in Manipur, and Manik Saha in Tripura underscore the party's willingness to rely on strong local faces to expand its footprint in the Northeast, even if those leaders once belonged to the Congress. In Uttar Pradesh, the elevation of Brajesh Pathak, a former Bahujan Samaj Party leader, to the post of Deputy Chief Minister reflects a similar attempt to balance social equations. Key Driver One key driver of this approach is the relative absence of strong indigenous leadership in several states. In regions where the BJP historically lacked widely accepted local faces, turning to experienced leaders from other parties has proven to be a pragmatic solution. This marks a shift away from ideological rigidity toward an acceptance of political realities. A second critical factor is the need to manage caste and regional equations. Social structures continue to play a decisive role in Indian elections, and political success often hinges on aligning with these dynamics. In Bihar, the elevation of Samrat Choudhary is widely seen as an attempt to consolidate OBC/Kurmi support, while in Karnataka, Basavaraj Bommai's leadership aligns with the influence of the Lingayat community. The third dimension of this strategy is the systematic weakening of the opposition. By inducting influential leaders from rival parties and assigning them significant roles, the BJP not only strengthens its own ranks but also erodes the organizational capacity of its competitors. The induction of leaders such as Jyotiraditya Scindia, Narayan Rane, R. P. N. Singh, and Jitin Prasada, all of whom have been entrusted with key responsibilities in government and party structures, illustrates this approach. Two Levels The BJP's model now appears to function on two distinct levels: a strong and centralized leadership at the top, and influential local faces at the state level. Under the leadership of Narendra Modi and Amit Shah, the central command remains cohesive and firmly in control, while states are led by individuals capable of delivering electoral victories, irrespective of their political past. The rise of Suvendu Adhikari in West Bengal further exemplifies this strategy. Once a close aide of Mamata Banerjee, Adhikari is now one of the BJP's principal faces in the state, forming a cornerstone of the party's expansion efforts. The message is unmistakable clear that the opportunities within the BJP are no longer confined to its traditional cadre. Any leader with mass appeal and capability can aspire to the top. This shift also reflects the party's organisational confidence. The BJP believes its institutional structure is robust enough to quickly integrate leaders from outside and align them with its broader objectives. This has enabled a blend of ideological flexibility and political pragmatism. That said, the strategy is not without its internal contradictions. For long-time party workers, the rapid rise of leaders from outside may send mixed signals, potentially creating tensions within the cadre. Managing this balance will be a critical test for the party in the years ahead. Even so, in a broader sense, the BJP's approach represents a fusion of ideology and pragmatism. Its goals are clear that secure electoral victories, expand rapidly into new regions, and systematically weaken the opposition.

Selective Outrage

India’s left-liberal media has long prided itself on being the torchbearer of secularism, dissent and moral rectitude. In the aftermath of ‘Operation Sindoor,’ the precision military strike launched by the Modi government against Pakistan-based terror camps, it has revealed its not a principled commitment to peace or truth, but a disturbing penchant for ideological prejudice, performative sanctimony and selective outrage.


The operation itself was a textbook display of calibrated force and geopolitical prudence. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, often caricatured as ‘authoritarian’ by the ‘liberal’ English-language commentariat, chose patience over provocation. He consulted opposition leaders, held detailed discussions with defence chiefs and took key international stakeholders, notably the United States and Russia, into confidence before authorising limited military action. The symbolism of ‘Operation Sindoor’ was also carefully crafted: a pointed reminder that the attack’s real victims were Hindu women widowed by Pakistan-sponsored militants in Kashmir. The government’s briefings were also strategic and symbolic as two ranking female officers, one of them Muslim, were made the public face of the mission, underlining a new Indian confidence that blends military muscle with democratic pluralism.


But this was unacceptable for India’s entrenched ‘left-liberal’ press, steeped in academic jargon, Western validation and a knee-jerk hostility to anything remotely ‘Hindutva.’ That a Muslim officer briefed the nation on ‘Operation Sindoor’ was branded ‘tokenism’ by such commentators. Others crudely alleged that the April 22 Pahalgam massacre was the logical culmination of reported atrocities against Muslims since Modi came to power in 2014.


The semantic nitpicking over ‘Operation Sindoor’ was maddening. An editor of a prominent magazine dubbed the operation’s name as ‘patriarchal’ and coded in Hindutva tropes. In a bizarre case of moral inversion, sindoor was likened to symbols of ‘honour killings’ and gender oppression, ignoring both its cultural resonance and the cruel reality that these women had lost their husbands in cold blood. For years, India’s ‘secular’ commentariat nurtured a preordained binary: the Congress may be flawed but was at least ‘secular’ while the BJP was an inveterate ‘fascist.’ Thus, the 2002 Gujarat riots are always focused upon but the Congress-backed pogrom of the Sikhs in 1984 is either downplayed or rationalised. Terrorism in Kashmir is tragic, but state retaliation is ‘jingoism.’ A strong Muslim voice in government is ‘tokenism’ but its absence is ‘exclusion.’ Even journalistic rigour is selectively applied. When Pakistan claimed to have downed Indian jets, some Indian outlets rushed to amplify the story before verification, inadvertently echoing enemy propaganda.


Dissent is vital in any democracy. But when its becomes indistinguishable from disdain, when editorial choices are dictated by ideological conformity, then the press becomes a caricature of itself. Ironically, many of these journalists enjoy robust free speech and loudly lament India’s supposed slide into ‘fascism’ from the safety of their X handles. Yet they turn a blind eye to Putin’s repression, Erdogan’s purges or Xi Jinping’s camps. In their eyes, Modi remains the greatest threat to democracy even as they broadcast their outrage freely, without fear of censorship or reprisal. ‘Operation Sindoor’ was a statement of cultural self-confidence. That confidence has rattled those who have spent their careers gatekeeping Indian discourse. Today, their monopoly is over. The people are watching and they no longer believe that the emperor has clothes.

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