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By:

Rajendra Joshi

3 December 2024 at 9:20:26 am

Sugar industry strains as traders reap profits

Gap between ex-mill prices, retail rates raised questions Kolhapur: The Indian sugar industry is caught in a deepening crisis, with sugar mills struggling to secure remunerative prices for their produce even as traders and middlemen appear to be making substantial profits. While sugar mills are receiving between Rs 4,600 and Rs 4,800 per quintal through recent sale tenders, retail prices have remained as high as Rs 58 per kg. The widening gap between ex-mill prices and retail rates has...

Sugar industry strains as traders reap profits

Gap between ex-mill prices, retail rates raised questions Kolhapur: The Indian sugar industry is caught in a deepening crisis, with sugar mills struggling to secure remunerative prices for their produce even as traders and middlemen appear to be making substantial profits. While sugar mills are receiving between Rs 4,600 and Rs 4,800 per quintal through recent sale tenders, retail prices have remained as high as Rs 58 per kg. The widening gap between ex-mill prices and retail rates has raised serious questions about the role of intermediaries and the effectiveness of the Centre’s efforts to contain sugar prices. The margins available to traders and intermediaries have reportedly crossed 20 per cent, leaving sugar millers perplexed. At a time when both sugarcane growers and mill operators are under financial pressure, the trading chain appears to be benefiting disproportionately. The Centre must examine this growing disparity and take corrective measures to prevent speculative profiteering. Retail sugar prices began rising sharply in August, touching nearly Rs 70 per kg in some markets. The escalation added to inflationary pressures and caused concern among consumers, particularly ahead of the festive season. In response, the Centre introduced a series of measures to improve domestic availability and moderate prices. These included permitting duty-free sugar imports, initially until October 31, a deadline subsequently extended to December 31. The government also directed sugar mills to commence the crushing season from October 15 and tightened monitoring of sugar stocks. In another significant intervention, it modified the ethanol policy, restricting the diversion of sugarcane juice, sugar syrup and B-heavy molasses for ethanol production. Following these measures, sugar mills began witnessing a decline in the prices offered through their sale tenders. Recent transactions have fetched between Rs 4,600 and Rs 4,800 per quintal. Going by the conventional relationship between ex-mill prices and retail rates, sugar should ideally have been available to consumers at less than ₹50 per kg. However, retail prices continue to hover around Rs 58 per kg, pointing to a substantial disconnect between the mill gate and the consumer market. Traditionally, sugar retailing operated on relatively thin margins. Since sugar is an essential commodity, retailers often treated it as a low-margin product to attract customers who would subsequently purchase other household provisions. The margin was sometimes informally equated with the resale value of the empty 50-kg jute bags in which sugar was supplied. This was considered a nominal return for retailers. That traditional pricing mechanism, however, appears to have undergone a significant change. The widening gap between mill-level tender prices and retail rates has created considerable scope for intermediaries to extract higher margins. The critical question is whether the additional amount paid by consumers is reaching the sugar mills or remaining within the trading chain. The issue assumes particular significance in Maharashtra, where the sugarcane pricing dispute has intensified ahead of the new crushing season. Farmers’ organisations have been demanding a minimum price of Rs 5,500 per tonne for sugarcane. Millers, meanwhile, are preparing to agitate for a revision in the Fair and Remunerative Price (FRP) framework and the restoration of a more supportive ethanol policy. The Swabhimani Shetkari Sanghatana, led by Raju Shetti, has taken a firm position that sugar mills should not be allowed to commence operations until farmers receive an acceptable price for their cane. Shetti has also drawn the state government’s attention to the unusually high retail prices of sugar, questioning why consumers continue to pay more even as mills are forced to sell at relatively lower rates. The Centre’s sudden changes to the ethanol policy have further complicated the industry’s financial position. Ethanol production had emerged as an important revenue stream for sugar mills, enabling them to diversify operations, improve cash flows and enhance their capacity to pay farmers. Restrictions on the diversion of sugarcane-based raw materials have weakened this support at a critical juncture. The resulting contradiction is difficult to ignore: farmers are demanding better cane prices, millers are struggling with shrinking realisations and policy uncertainty, while intermediaries appear to be benefiting from the gap between wholesale and retail prices. The government cannot address the sugar crisis merely by regulating mill stocks, imports and ethanol diversion. It must also examine the entire supply chain, identify where the widening margins are accruing and ensure that the benefits of market interventions reach both sugarcane growers and consumers. With nearly Rs 2 lakh crore riding on the sugar economy, allowing intermediaries to thrive while the industry’s primary stakeholders struggle would be a serious policy failure.

Selective Outrage

May 9, 2025
2 min read

India’s left-liberal media has long prided itself on being the torchbearer of secularism, dissent and moral rectitude. In the aftermath of ‘Operation Sindoor,’ the precision military strike launched by the Modi government against Pakistan-based terror camps, it has revealed its not a principled commitment to peace or truth, but a disturbing penchant for ideological prejudice, performative sanctimony and selective outrage.


The operation itself was a textbook display of calibrated force and geopolitical prudence. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, often caricatured as ‘authoritarian’ by the ‘liberal’ English-language commentariat, chose patience over provocation. He consulted opposition leaders, held detailed discussions with defence chiefs and took key international stakeholders, notably the United States and Russia, into confidence before authorising limited military action. The symbolism of ‘Operation Sindoor’ was also carefully crafted: a pointed reminder that the attack’s real victims were Hindu women widowed by Pakistan-sponsored militants in Kashmir. The government’s briefings were also strategic and symbolic as two ranking female officers, one of them Muslim, were made the public face of the mission, underlining a new Indian confidence that blends military muscle with democratic pluralism.


But this was unacceptable for India’s entrenched ‘left-liberal’ press, steeped in academic jargon, Western validation and a knee-jerk hostility to anything remotely ‘Hindutva.’ That a Muslim officer briefed the nation on ‘Operation Sindoor’ was branded ‘tokenism’ by such commentators. Others crudely alleged that the April 22 Pahalgam massacre was the logical culmination of reported atrocities against Muslims since Modi came to power in 2014.


The semantic nitpicking over ‘Operation Sindoor’ was maddening. An editor of a prominent magazine dubbed the operation’s name as ‘patriarchal’ and coded in Hindutva tropes. In a bizarre case of moral inversion, sindoor was likened to symbols of ‘honour killings’ and gender oppression, ignoring both its cultural resonance and the cruel reality that these women had lost their husbands in cold blood. For years, India’s ‘secular’ commentariat nurtured a preordained binary: the Congress may be flawed but was at least ‘secular’ while the BJP was an inveterate ‘fascist.’ Thus, the 2002 Gujarat riots are always focused upon but the Congress-backed pogrom of the Sikhs in 1984 is either downplayed or rationalised. Terrorism in Kashmir is tragic, but state retaliation is ‘jingoism.’ A strong Muslim voice in government is ‘tokenism’ but its absence is ‘exclusion.’ Even journalistic rigour is selectively applied. When Pakistan claimed to have downed Indian jets, some Indian outlets rushed to amplify the story before verification, inadvertently echoing enemy propaganda.


Dissent is vital in any democracy. But when its becomes indistinguishable from disdain, when editorial choices are dictated by ideological conformity, then the press becomes a caricature of itself. Ironically, many of these journalists enjoy robust free speech and loudly lament India’s supposed slide into ‘fascism’ from the safety of their X handles. Yet they turn a blind eye to Putin’s repression, Erdogan’s purges or Xi Jinping’s camps. In their eyes, Modi remains the greatest threat to democracy even as they broadcast their outrage freely, without fear of censorship or reprisal. ‘Operation Sindoor’ was a statement of cultural self-confidence. That confidence has rattled those who have spent their careers gatekeeping Indian discourse. Today, their monopoly is over. The people are watching and they no longer believe that the emperor has clothes.

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