top of page

By:

Commodore S.L. Deshmukh

31 October 2024 at 8:30:19 am

Killing the Hidden Killer

INS Mangrol strengthens India’s underwater defences as Chinese anti-submarine capabilities and Pakistan’s submarine fleet underscore the need for indigenous technology and coastal preparedness. The most dangerous threat to a warship is not always visible on the horizon. Lurking beneath the waves, a hostile submarine can threaten naval assets, disrupt maritime traffic and place critical infrastructure at risk without revealing its presence. For India, whose maritime interests stretch across...

Killing the Hidden Killer

INS Mangrol strengthens India’s underwater defences as Chinese anti-submarine capabilities and Pakistan’s submarine fleet underscore the need for indigenous technology and coastal preparedness. The most dangerous threat to a warship is not always visible on the horizon. Lurking beneath the waves, a hostile submarine can threaten naval assets, disrupt maritime traffic and place critical infrastructure at risk without revealing its presence. For India, whose maritime interests stretch across the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal and the wider Indian Ocean, countering this hidden threat is an operational necessity. The commissioning of INS Mangrol, the Indian Navy’s third Anti-Submarine Warfare Shallow Water Craft (ASW-SWC) built by Cochin Shipyard Limited (CSL), Kochi, represents another important step in strengthening this capability. At a time when China is expanding its naval reach and Pakistan continues to operate Chinese-origin submarines, India’s ability to detect, track and neutralise underwater threats assumes growing strategic significance. Complex Challenges Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) presents particular challenges in shallow coastal waters. Unlike the relatively predictable acoustic environment of the deep sea, littoral waters generate complex sound patterns through seabed reflections, shipping activity and varying water conditions. These factors can complicate the detection and classification of hostile submarines. Yet these are precisely the waters where threats can approach naval bases, strategic ports, commercial shipping lanes and offshore installations. Conventional frigates and destroyers, despite their formidable capabilities, cannot always operate with the same agility in confined, shallow-water environments. This is where the ASW-SWC programme assumes significance. Conceived as a replacement for the ageing Abhay-class corvettes, these vessels are designed to provide specialised anti-submarine protection in India’s coastal waters. Their induction strengthens a crucial layer of maritime defence between the open sea and the country’s vulnerable coastal approaches. INS Mangrol carries forward a distinguished naval tradition. Named after the historic port town of Mangrol in Gujarat’s Junagadh district, it also recalls the legacy of the erstwhile INS Mangrol (M85), an Agray-class minesweeper decommissioned in 2004. Designed for anti-submarine warfare, underwater surveillance and coastal patrol, its significance, however, extends beyond its relatively compact dimensions. The vessel combines specialised sensors, indigenous weapons and manoeuvrability suited to the demanding conditions of shallow waters. Its sensor suite includes the DRDO-developed Abhay hull-mounted sonar and advanced low-frequency active towed-array sonar capabilities tailored to the challenging acoustics of littoral environments. Together, these systems are intended to improve the detection and tracking of underwater contacts. The vessel’s armament includes indigenous anti-submarine rocket launchers and lightweight torpedoes, supported by remote-controlled gun mounts for other operational requirements. Its indigenous Maareech Advanced Torpedo Defence System adds another layer of protection, helping detect, classify and counter incoming torpedo threats through acoustic countermeasures and decoys. These characteristics are particularly valuable when operating close to shore, where time and space for tactical decisions can be severely limited. Its utility is not restricted to hunting submarines. The platform can also undertake low-intensity maritime operations, surveillance of coastal choke points, mine-related missions and search-and-rescue duties. Such versatility makes it a valuable asset in peacetime as well as during periods of heightened tension. Equally important is the programme’s contribution to self-reliance. With more than 80 per cent indigenous content understood to be incorporated in INS Mangrol, the vessel reflects the growing capabilities of Indian shipyards, defence laboratories and domestic manufacturers, including micro, small and medium enterprises. The programme also demonstrates how complex naval platforms can strengthen the wider domestic defence ecosystem. The broader ASW-SWC programme has already gained momentum with the induction of vessels including INS Arnala, INS Androth and INS Mahe. The remaining ships are scheduled for completion by June 2028. Once the programme matures, the Navy will possess a more comprehensive and modernised force for addressing underwater threats close to India’s shores. The China Threat India’s requirement for stronger anti-submarine capabilities must be viewed against the wider transformation of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Beijing has invested heavily in modern surface combatants, submarines, maritime surveillance systems and aviation platforms, with ASW forming an important component of its expanding naval capabilities. The Type 055 Renhai-class guided-missile destroyer illustrates this evolution. Equipped with a 112-cell vertical launch system, advanced multifunction radar and electronic warfare capabilities, the class is designed for complex, multi-domain naval operations. Its ability to operate with shipborne helicopters, including the Z-20F in the PLAN’s anti-submarine role, adds an important aerial dimension to maritime surveillance and submarine hunting. China has also pursued greater operational coordination with Russia. Joint naval exercises, including anti-submarine activities conducted by the two countries in October 2024, have highlighted their interest in improving interoperability and coordinated maritime operations. For India, the implications are clear. The challenge is not simply the number of submarines a potential adversary possesses, but the integration of sensors, aircraft, surface ships, weapons and information networks into a coordinated operational system. Pakistan’s acquisition and operation of Chinese-origin submarine platforms adds another dimension to India’s maritime security calculations. The possibility of hostile submarines operating near strategic ports, naval installations and offshore energy infrastructure demands sustained vigilance. The protection of assets such as the Bombay High oil and gas fields is especially important given their significance to national energy security. INS Mangrol is an important addition to India’s coastal anti-submarine shield, but a single platform cannot neutralise every underwater threat. Effective ASW depends on the integration of ships, maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, surveillance networks, trained crews and reliable intelligence. Equally critical are continuous upgrades, realistic exercises and the ability to operate seamlessly across different maritime environments. Aatmanirbhar Bharat in naval defence must mean not merely assembling ships at home, but developing the technologies, industrial depth and operational expertise needed to maintain a decisive advantage. INS Mangrol represents progress in this demanding contest. Its real value will lie in the larger indigenous maritime-defence ecosystem it helps strengthen. (The writer is a retired naval aviation officer and defence and geopolitical analyst. Views personal.)

Selective Outrage

Correspondent
May 9, 2025
2 min read

India’s left-liberal media has long prided itself on being the torchbearer of secularism, dissent and moral rectitude. In the aftermath of ‘Operation Sindoor,’ the precision military strike launched by the Modi government against Pakistan-based terror camps, it has revealed its not a principled commitment to peace or truth, but a disturbing penchant for ideological prejudice, performative sanctimony and selective outrage.


The operation itself was a textbook display of calibrated force and geopolitical prudence. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, often caricatured as ‘authoritarian’ by the ‘liberal’ English-language commentariat, chose patience over provocation. He consulted opposition leaders, held detailed discussions with defence chiefs and took key international stakeholders, notably the United States and Russia, into confidence before authorising limited military action. The symbolism of ‘Operation Sindoor’ was also carefully crafted: a pointed reminder that the attack’s real victims were Hindu women widowed by Pakistan-sponsored militants in Kashmir. The government’s briefings were also strategic and symbolic as two ranking female officers, one of them Muslim, were made the public face of the mission, underlining a new Indian confidence that blends military muscle with democratic pluralism.


But this was unacceptable for India’s entrenched ‘left-liberal’ press, steeped in academic jargon, Western validation and a knee-jerk hostility to anything remotely ‘Hindutva.’ That a Muslim officer briefed the nation on ‘Operation Sindoor’ was branded ‘tokenism’ by such commentators. Others crudely alleged that the April 22 Pahalgam massacre was the logical culmination of reported atrocities against Muslims since Modi came to power in 2014.


The semantic nitpicking over ‘Operation Sindoor’ was maddening. An editor of a prominent magazine dubbed the operation’s name as ‘patriarchal’ and coded in Hindutva tropes. In a bizarre case of moral inversion, sindoor was likened to symbols of ‘honour killings’ and gender oppression, ignoring both its cultural resonance and the cruel reality that these women had lost their husbands in cold blood. For years, India’s ‘secular’ commentariat nurtured a preordained binary: the Congress may be flawed but was at least ‘secular’ while the BJP was an inveterate ‘fascist.’ Thus, the 2002 Gujarat riots are always focused upon but the Congress-backed pogrom of the Sikhs in 1984 is either downplayed or rationalised. Terrorism in Kashmir is tragic, but state retaliation is ‘jingoism.’ A strong Muslim voice in government is ‘tokenism’ but its absence is ‘exclusion.’ Even journalistic rigour is selectively applied. When Pakistan claimed to have downed Indian jets, some Indian outlets rushed to amplify the story before verification, inadvertently echoing enemy propaganda.


Dissent is vital in any democracy. But when its becomes indistinguishable from disdain, when editorial choices are dictated by ideological conformity, then the press becomes a caricature of itself. Ironically, many of these journalists enjoy robust free speech and loudly lament India’s supposed slide into ‘fascism’ from the safety of their X handles. Yet they turn a blind eye to Putin’s repression, Erdogan’s purges or Xi Jinping’s camps. In their eyes, Modi remains the greatest threat to democracy even as they broadcast their outrage freely, without fear of censorship or reprisal. ‘Operation Sindoor’ was a statement of cultural self-confidence. That confidence has rattled those who have spent their careers gatekeeping Indian discourse. Today, their monopoly is over. The people are watching and they no longer believe that the emperor has clothes.

Comments

bottom of page