Strategic Bargain
- Correspondent
- 6 hours ago
- 2 min read
The signing of India and the European Union’s long-delayed free-trade agreement (FTA) and the formalisation of a security and defence partnership binds nearly two billion people and about a quarter of global GDP into a meaningful economic and strategic bloc. In an age of tariff wars, sanctions regimes and maritime disruption, this itself is no small feat.
While bilateral trade already exceeds $136 bn a year, the FTA promises to push it much further. But the defence partnership in this deal nudges India–EU relations beyond polite declarations towards capability-driven cooperation. This sudden affinity for India has less to do with any affection on part of the EU than about a shared sense of strategic urgency.
Europe’s post-Cold War security architecture has been shattered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. India, for its part, confronts an assertive China along a disputed Himalayan border and across the Indian Ocean. Both worry about weaponised supply chains and America under Donald Trump that looks increasingly unpredictable as a guarantor of global order. Thus, the stalled trade negotiation between the EU and India has re-emerged as a geopolitical necessity.
For decades Europe mattered to India strategically mainly through France. Now the relationship is broadening, driven by hard-headedness on both sides. Europe has advanced military technology but struggles to scale its production. India offers manufacturing capacity, a skilled workforce and a political push for indigenisation. Joint work on artillery, naval platforms, sensors and ammunition serves both Europe’s need to replenish depleted stockpiles and India’s desire to escape dependence on legacy suppliers.
Maritime security is the most visible point of convergence. European trade and energy flows depend heavily on the Indian Ocean, where piracy, coercion and instability from the Red Sea to the western reaches have become harder to ignore. India’s naval reach and its information-fusion hub for the region make it an attractive partner. The cooperation is deliberately non-confrontational, reflecting India’s insistence on strategic autonomy.
Emerging technologies, space security and cyber resilience offer potentially deeper gains. Here, co-development and dual-use innovation allow both sides to sidestep the sensitivities of outright technology transfer. Lessons from Ukraine about drones, cyber-attacks and disinformation have sharpened European interest about technology in warfare and India brings software expertise and operational experience to the table.
But for all this convergence, the partnership remains brittle. Europe sees Russia as an existential threat while India still treats it as a key defence supplier and energy partner. Brussels continues to engage Pakistan through trade preferences that Delhi views with suspicion, and continues to trade heavily with China despite India’s concerns. European lectures on human rights and environmental standards grate against India’s development-first instincts.
The result is a strategically cautious relationship. The FTA will likely strengthen supply-chain resilience and indirectly bolster security. If pursued pragmatically, the defence pact can enhance capabilities without forcing alignment. But absent greater convergence on Russia, China and regional priorities, this will remain a partnership of convenience rather than conviction.



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