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By:

Sagari Gupta

24 March 2026 at 2:16:04 pm

SpaceX’s IPO and India’s Sovereignty

The record-breaking $1.75 trillion IPO underscores a new reality that nations which do not control critical digital infrastructure risk ceding part of their sovereignty. Last week, SpaceX listed on Nasdaq under the ticker SPCX, raising $75 billion at a staggering valuation of $1.75 trillion. That single offering surpassed Saudi Aramco’s 2019 record of $25.6 billion by a factor of three. India’s defence budget for FY 2025-26 was Rs. 6.81 lakh crore, approximately $78.57 billion, according to...

SpaceX’s IPO and India’s Sovereignty

The record-breaking $1.75 trillion IPO underscores a new reality that nations which do not control critical digital infrastructure risk ceding part of their sovereignty. Last week, SpaceX listed on Nasdaq under the ticker SPCX, raising $75 billion at a staggering valuation of $1.75 trillion. That single offering surpassed Saudi Aramco’s 2019 record of $25.6 billion by a factor of three. India’s defence budget for FY 2025-26 was Rs. 6.81 lakh crore, approximately $78.57 billion, according to the Union Budget. SpaceX raised the near-equivalent of that annual allocation in one day. The investors who participated were not buying into a rocket company. They were pricing control over satellite infrastructure, global internet access, launch capability, and an integrated AI platform at a level exceeding the GDP of most countries. Roughly 30 percent of the shares, worth approximately $22.5 billion, went to retail investors, three times the proportion typical of a US listing. India has no private entity in this category. What SpaceX actually controls Starlink, SpaceX’s satellite internet division, operated approximately 7,000 active satellites globally as of early 2026. It counts over nine million subscribers worldwide, and following a 2026 merger, SpaceX also owns xAI, the developer of the Grok AI system. A company that controls satellite connectivity, launch capacity, and a frontier AI model occupies a position no regulator has previously had to classify. It is not a telecom operator, not a defence contractor, and not a technology platform. It is all three at once, under common ownership. In June 2025, SpaceX received authorisation from India’s Department of Telecommunications, followed by a licence from IN-SPACe in July 2025. As of June 2026, Starlink’s commercial operations in India remain pending, with the company in active discussions with the Government of India on security clearances, a process slowed by concerns linked to Starlink terminal use in the Iran conflict. That delay is itself revealing. A foreign company’s service continuity in India depends on negotiations that India does not fully control. Satellite communications, launch systems, and AI-integrated data infrastructure are the functional equivalents of roads and electricity grids in a digital economy. States that built those grids in the twentieth century retained control over access, pricing, and service continuity. States that depend on foreign corporations for digital infrastructure in the twenty-first century do not. The dependence question is already live for India India’s digital public infrastructure, covering Aadhaar, UPI, and the Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission, processes billions of transactions monthly. Aadhaar covers nearly the entire adult population, and UPI carries the bulk of India’s retail digital payments. The system’s design is sound: public architecture, state-controlled data governance, open standards. The next connectivity layer is the problem. TRAI data shows rural internet penetration at 44.2 percent as of March 2024, with only 3.8 percent of rural households connected through high-speed fixed infrastructure. Approximately 630 million Indians remain offline, with primary barriers being awareness, affordability, and limited local-language content, according to the Kantar ICUBE 2024 survey. That gap will not close through terrestrial fibre rollout alone. Satellite broadband, through Starlink, Eutelsat OneWeb, or Amazon’s Project Kuiper, will carry a large share of that load over the next decade. None of these are Indian entities. Their pricing decisions, service continuity choices, and data routing practices sit outside Indian jurisdiction. A farmer in Chhattisgarh receiving crop advisory data through a satellite connection does not know that a pricing decision made in California affects whether that signal arrives tomorrow. She will notice only when it stops. Foreign private capital has built connectivity infrastructure in India before. Reliance Jio brought down mobile data costs after its 2016 launch, extending internet access to hundreds of millions of Indians who had not been able to afford it before. Jio’s rollout also created large-scale domestic employment in network maintenance, retail, and customer service, jobs that remain within India’s economy. Private investment in connectivity is not a threat to sovereignty. Structural Gap The difference with SpaceX is structural. Jio operates under Indian law, pays taxes in India, employs Indian engineers, and answers to Indian regulators when disputes arise. Its towers and fibre sit on Indian soil. Starlink’s constellation orbits at 550 kilometres, outside any single national jurisdiction. Under the Telecommunications Act 2023, existing Starlink operators in India continue under the legacy Unified Licence framework, with their licences remaining valid. But no Indian regulatory instrument contains a binding service continuity obligation for satellite operators. If Starlink suspends Indian operations, no domestic legal mechanism compels continuation or requires a managed transition for the users left without service. The $1.75 trillion valuation amplifies this structural gap. India’s external debt stood at $736.3 billion at end-March 2025, according to the Reserve Bank of India. SpaceX’s market valuation now exceeds India’s total external debt by a wide margin. A corporation at that scale does not face the same regulatory friction as a domestic operator. It does not need to negotiate from a position of dependence. India’s satellite communications framework, updated through the Indian Space Policy 2023 and the Telecommunications Act 2023, governs licensing and spectrum allocation in detail. It does not contain binding service continuity or exit-transition obligations for foreign satellite operators. That gap needs closing through explicit licence conditions before Starlink and its competitors reach commercial scale in India. India’s Semiconductor Mission has made genuine progress. Pilot production started in three plants in 2025, and the government confirmed that four plants commenced commercial production in 2026. Kaynes Semicon’s OSAT unit in Sanand reached commercial production in March 2026. India also inaugurated its first 3-nanometer chip design centres in Noida and Bengaluru in 2025, a step toward design capability even as fabrication capacity remains limited. These are real milestones, not announcements. They do not yet constitute a domestic supply chain for the advanced chips needed for satellite infrastructure, AI systems, or next-generation communications hardware. India’s domestic semiconductor market was approximately $45-50 billion in 2024-25, according to industry estimates cited by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. Closing the gap between consumption and domestic production is a decade-long task requiring sustained capital commitment. India’s competition framework does not treat foreign satellite infrastructure concentration as a market power question. The Competition Commission of India has a clear mandate over domestic pricing and merger activity. It has no instrument to act when a foreign entity’s control over orbital infrastructure creates de facto monopoly conditions for remote connectivity within India. That regulatory gap needs explicit legislative attention before dependence deepens further. Market Signals SpaceX’s $1.75 trillion valuation is not a data point about one company. It is a market signal about what global capital considers most valuable in 2026: not oil fields or shipping lanes, but control over the systems through which economies communicate, compute, and transact. India entered the hydrocarbon era as a net importer and spent decades building the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and domestic refining capacity to reduce that dependence. The programme continues to expand today, a reminder that infrastructure sovereignty is an ongoing commitment. The response was slow and expensive. It was also the right call. The digital infrastructure era has well and truly arrived. India is already a net importer of the connectivity and computing systems that will define the next phase of its economic growth. The SpaceX IPO makes the scale of that dependence visible in a single number. And policymakers do not have decades to respond this time. (The writer is an independent public policy researcher. Views personal.)

The Adult Technocrat

Updated: Apr 6

The danger is not technology itself, but the quiet, unquestioned surrender to its conveniences.

A few months ago, ChatGPT unveiled a new health feature that allows users to upload medical test reports for analysis, carefully stopping just short of formal clinical advice. On paper, it was a modest extension of an already ubiquitous tool. In practice, it signalled something larger: the quiet expansion of machines into domains once considered deeply human. Around the same time, a television news host, in a parting broadcast, captured the zeitgeist with unnerving clarity. People, she observed, were using ChatGPT for everything – from therapy, dating advice, life decisions, even questions of self-worth. The system now handles billions of prompts daily. Her stark warning was that just because one can ask a question does not mean one should; if it is not something one would shout in a crowded room, it ought not to be typed into a chatbot. Such anxieties are not new. More than a century ago, Henry David Thoreau offered a line that continues to haunt the technological age: “Our inventions are but improved means to an unimproved end.


Being a technologist, I cannot entirely agree with Thoreau’s text, of which that sentence is only a tiny fragment. Yet, having browsed through the rugged history of technology, I, for sure, find myself partially aligned.


The fact is most technological innovations have genuine necessities in their respective contexts. An intellect like Thoreau would never be foolish to question the benefits of AI for a data scientist, computers for a mathematician, microscopes for a microbiologist, or the internet for a social scientist. He was rather speaking about the thoughtless democratization of technological fruits, not the rigor behind those innovations. The bigger question is how does technology interact with culture and society as a whole?


Consider a small society in north-central Tanzania: the Ihanzu. For generations, they observed a peculiar ritual. After each sexual encounter, individuals were required to light a new fire. The act was not merely symbolic; it served as a form of social accounting, effectively curbing adultery by making relationships visible through the labour of fetching fire-lighting sticks. Then came European traders bearing matchsticks. What appeared to be a trivial convenience - a quicker way to make fire - quietly dismantled a centuries-old social structure. By eliminating the need to fetch tools, it erased the ritual’s public dimension. A technology introduced without regard for its cultural function undid a system that had regulated behaviour for generations.


My father never wore a wristwatch. We ragged him endlessly, but he never folded. He would calmly reply: If you want to do things on time, you don’t need a watch. I later realized the socio-political side to that refusal.


Benedictine monks of the 11th-12th-century used to strike bells at specific hours to ensure regularity of their seven daily prayers. By the 14th century, this idea of a mechanical clock would migrate to the marketplace. The merchant class would realize its profit potential by making servants work according to the clock. By the Industrial Age, wristwatches were marketed as status symbols. Like the Ihanzu people we would turn a tool ‘designed-to-force’ onto trend by mere surrender. Thus, without ever questioning the necessity of a device introduced primarily to extract labour for masters’ profit, we unknowingly transformed it into a mass-trend. Even the socialists once acknowledged that without wristwatches, capitalism’s expansion would have been far less seamless. That is precisely why wristwatches were once rejected outright by that section of my father’s generation.


In the same vein, the later successes of cars, weapons, social media, AI could be traced to this idea of unquestioned surrender to tech-harvests; and later to how a tech-trend leads to cultural-change, power-gaps and social control. It’s not the tech itself; our or the consumers’ unquestioned allegiance to those harvests is the issue, and the tech-elites know it. The most curious part is history repeated itself every time a new technological product took the market by storm. And yet the sociologists hope “surely this must be the last!” No. By giving people filled matchboxes in a dynamite factory while calling it ‘technological empowerment’ cannot prevent explosions or death.


Few thinkers examined this relationship between technology and culture as rigorously as Neil Postman. His work revolved around a deceptively simple premise: that every technology carries within it a philosophy, shaping not just what people do but how they think. Postman argued that societies rarely ask the right questions before embracing new tools. Among those he proposed were inquiries into the specific problem a technology claims to solve, whose problem it actually addresses, and what new problems it might create. He urged scrutiny of which institutions might be weakened, how language itself might change, and what new forms of social, financial and political power might emerge.


Such questions are seldom posed in the heat of technological enthusiasm. Instead, adoption precedes understanding. Convenience becomes the primary metric, eclipsing considerations of long-term consequence. In the process, something subtler is lost.


Postman added an incisive observation: those who drive technological innovations tend to read, write, and speak exceptionally well. Whereas those who succumb to the fruits, however, gradually drift away from all three of these fundamental skills. In other words, we are of no innocence in creating that void between the tech-elites (the ‘Broligarchs’) and us (the people) - we actively contribute to it.


In a nutshell, ultimately, the responsibility of survival has returned to us. We are being called to act, to leave our complaining convenient cocoon and grow up technologically to be what I call as ‘The Adult Technocrat.’ But the question is can we?


(The writer is a Lead Process Engineer with GE HealthCare in France and a columnist with four books to his credit. Views personal.)

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