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By:

Commodore S.L. Deshmukh

31 October 2024 at 8:30:19 am

The Beam That Blinds the Drone

As cheap drones reshape the battlefield, India’s T-SHUL BEAM points to a future in which electronic warfare may matter as much as firepower The drone has definitively become the weapon of choice for the modern battlefield. Cheap, expendable and increasingly autonomous, unmanned aerial vehicles can now threaten troops, armour, airfields and critical infrastructure without requiring the attacker to risk a pilot. Their proliferation has created a corresponding demand for counter-drone systems...

The Beam That Blinds the Drone

As cheap drones reshape the battlefield, India’s T-SHUL BEAM points to a future in which electronic warfare may matter as much as firepower The drone has definitively become the weapon of choice for the modern battlefield. Cheap, expendable and increasingly autonomous, unmanned aerial vehicles can now threaten troops, armour, airfields and critical infrastructure without requiring the attacker to risk a pilot. Their proliferation has created a corresponding demand for counter-drone systems that can respond quickly and at a cost proportionate to the threat. This is where beam-based anti-drone technology enters the picture. Broadly, such systems fall into two categories. Hard-kill systems use concentrated laser energy to physically damage or destroy a drone. Soft-kill systems, by contrast, use radio-frequency or electromagnetic energy to disrupt the electronic links that allow a drone to communicate, navigate and transmit information. Sophisticated Weaponry Hard-kill laser systems focus an intense beam of light on a vulnerable part of an incoming UAV - its carbon-fibre structure, control surfaces, battery or other critical components. The concentrated energy rapidly heats the target, potentially burning through its structure or disabling optical sensors and bringing the aircraft down. India’s DRDO has demonstrated a 30kW laser system, while Israel’s Rafael has developed the Lite Beam system. Soft-kill systems take a different route. Rather than physically destroying the aircraft, they interfere with the electronic architecture that keeps it airborne. Directional radio-frequency energy can disrupt command-and-control links, video feeds, telemetry and satellite-navigation signals such as GPS or other GNSS services. Depending on the drone and the nature of the disruption, the aircraft may be forced to land, return to its launch point or lose control. It is in this category that the T-SHUL BEAM system developed by Indian defence company IG Defence deserves attention. T-SHUL BEAM is a man-portable, directional counter-drone system designed for tactical deployment. Its multi-band radio-frequency architecture is intended to target several of the links on which unmanned aerial systems depend, including command-and-control, telemetry, video transmission and GNSS navigation. Its directional configuration allows an operator to concentrate electronic countermeasures on a particular aerial target rather than indiscriminately radiating energy across a large area. That matters on a battlefield where the warning time against a small UAV or first-person-view drone may be measured in seconds. The appeal of such a system is therefore not simply that it can counter a drone. It is that it can potentially bring counter-drone capability closer to the soldier and to the tactical edge. Large counter-UAS installations have their place, particularly around fixed and high-value assets. But forward units require systems that can move with them, be deployed rapidly and operate against small, low-cost unmanned platforms without imposing the logistical burden associated with conventional weapons. The T-SHUL BEAM’s significance also lies in its proposed integration with an artificial-intelligence-enabled battle-management architecture. IG Drones, the original equipment manufacturer, has stated that T-SHUL BEAM has been integrated with GRID, its indigenous AI-powered platform. The GRID architecture is intended to bring sensors, intelligence systems, unmanned platforms and command elements into a common operational framework. The attraction of such integration is obvious. Countering drones is increasingly less about a single weapon and more about the speed of the kill chain: detecting a threat, identifying it, deciding what response is appropriate and directing that response before the target disappears. An AI-enabled command architecture can potentially improve situational awareness, facilitate real-time threat detection and coordinate different systems operating simultaneously. This is particularly relevant as drone warfare evolves from isolated attacks towards increasingly complex and potentially swarming operations. A battlefield crowded with drones cannot be managed effectively if every sensor and weapon operates as a separate island. The advantage will increasingly belong to forces capable of turning disparate streams of information into a coherent picture and responding at machine speed. The T-SHUL BEAM’s reported demonstration at Pokhran represents another step in India’s attempt to build a domestic ecosystem spanning drones, counter-drones, artificial intelligence and electronic warfare. Counter-drone warfare is likely to be a recurring requirement rather than a niche capability. Importing every component of such an ecosystem would leave India vulnerable to supply-chain disruptions, technology restrictions and foreign-exchange pressures. Indigenous development, even when undertaken by relatively small private-sector companies, can broaden the country’s technological base and give the armed forces greater freedom to adapt systems to their operational requirements. Economics of the Contest Yet the real measure of any counter-drone system will ultimately be operational rather than promotional. Electronic warfare is inherently a contest between countermeasure and counter-countermeasure. Drone designers can alter frequencies, communications protocols, navigation methods and levels of autonomy. A system that is effective against one generation of drones may require modification against the next. The battlefield, in other words, will remain a technological arms race. The economics of the contest nevertheless favour directed-energy and electronic-warfare solutions. A conventional interceptor expends a missile or projectile against each target. A beam-based system can, subject to its power supply, engagement envelope and other operational constraints, engage targets without expending conventional ammunition. The marginal cost of an interception can consequently be dramatically lower. The beam also travels at effectively the speed of light, removing the flight time associated with kinetic interceptors. In densely populated areas or around sensitive infrastructure, bringing down a drone with a projectile can create its own hazards. Electronic disruption, when properly controlled, offers the possibility of neutralising the threat without sending an interceptor crashing back to earth. These advantages should not obscure the limitations. Soft-kill systems depend on the vulnerabilities of the target’s electronic architecture and may be less effective against increasingly autonomous drones that require fewer external communications. Weather, range, power availability, frequency management and the sophistication of an adversary's electronic countermeasures can all affect performance. No single technology is likely to provide a complete answer. The future of counter-drone warfare will therefore belong not to the beam alone but to layered defence combining. The emergence of systems such as T-SHUL BEAM suggests that India is beginning to build the technological pieces of that architecture at home. (The writer is a retired naval aviation officer and a defence and geopolitical analyst. Views personal.)

The BJP’s Gen Z Moment

Writer: Abhijit Joshi
Abhijit Joshi
Jul 31
4 min read

The CJP movement in Maharashtra exposes the limits of an older political communication model and signals a changing relationship between young voters and power.

Every generation arrives convinced that it understands the country better than the one before it. Indian cinema has repeatedly captured this quiet conflict between inherited wisdom and youthful impatience. From Jo Jeeta Wohi Sikandar to 3 Idiots and Udaan, the message has remained remarkably consistent: older generations trust experience; younger ones demand freedom, recognition and a chance to define their own future.


Today’s Generation Z may encounter these films through streaming platforms rather than theatres, but the tension they portray has acquired a new political relevance. The ongoing CJP movement in Maharashtra is not merely another episode of street politics. Beneath its immediate demands lies a broader conversation about aspirations, frustration and a growing communication gap between those who govern and those who expect to be heard.


Communication Gap

Conversations with young voters in recent weeks reveal a recurring sentiment: many believe the political establishment has failed to understand their anxieties. For some, the BJP’s communication machinery no longer speaks the language of a generation shaped by smartphones, social media and instant feedback. They argue that the party’s spokespersons, digital campaigns and organisational ecosystem continue to reflect the political environment of 2014 and 2019, when a powerful central narrative and disciplined messaging delivered electoral dividends. Post-2024 India, they suggest, requires something different.


Whether this assessment is entirely fair is debatable. But politically, perceptions matter as much as facts. The NEET paper leak controversy became the emotional catalyst for many young protesters.


Even voters without political affiliations acknowledged that such episodes weaken confidence in institutions.


Yet conversations with older generations reveal a more complicated picture. Many middle-aged and senior citizens expressed sympathy with students’ concerns and criticised any excessive use of force during protests. At the same time, they were uncomfortable with abusive language, offensive slogans and personal attacks directed at Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Their argument was not against protest itself, but against the erosion of civility in public debate.


This difference reflects a generational divide as much as a political one. Younger voters increasingly view confrontation as a natural extension of digital activism, where outrage spreads quickly and institutions are challenged openly. Older voters often place greater emphasis on restraint and traditional norms of political engagement.


For the BJP, the challenge is therefore larger than handling one protest. It is about recognising the cumulative effect of multiple public concerns. Inflation, unemployment, corruption, farmers’ issues, infrastructure gaps and rising living costs remain part of everyday conversations. Alongside these are anxieties about social harmony and caste tensions. The CJP protests appear to draw energy from this wider atmosphere of dissatisfaction rather than from a single grievance.


Political movements rarely emerge overnight. They begin as scattered signals of discomfort before becoming larger expressions of public mood. Parties that recognise these signals early retain the advantage; those that ignore them often find themselves responding after the narrative has already shifted.


Many political observers believe the BJP underestimated the early momentum of the CJP movement. By the time responses became visible, the issue had already expanded across social media platforms and entered broader public conversation. In the digital age, once a narrative takes shape online, correcting it becomes considerably harder.


The BJP’s communication challenge is not simply about producing more messages. Politics today operates through Instagram Reels, YouTube Shorts, podcasts, influencers and creator networks. Political authority is no longer communicated only through television debates or press conferences. It is negotiated every day in a decentralised digital ecosystem.


The party that once built one of India’s most effective political communication systems now faces a different environment. Young voters consume information differently. They expect interaction rather than instruction, conversation rather than slogans. They are more willing to question authority and less attached to political loyalties inherited from previous generations.


This challenge extends to media relations as well. Visibility remains important, but visibility alone does not create trust. In a fragmented information landscape, political parties must engage across multiple platforms and audiences rather than rely only on established channels.


New Opening

The CJP movement also presents opportunities for Maharashtra’s opposition. The Shiv Sena (UBT) and Maharashtra Navnirman Sena have attempted to position themselves closer to youth concerns through social media outreach and urban issues. Leaders such as Aaditya Thackeray and Amit Thackeray have gained visibility among younger audiences, where short videos, memes and digital content increasingly shape political impressions.


For the Shiv Sena (UBT), the protests offer a chance to reinforce its image as a party attentive to urban youth and middle-class concerns. For the MNS, traditionally associated with Marathi identity and city-centric issues, the moment provides an opportunity to broaden its appeal towards employment, education and aspirations. Whether online attention can translate into lasting political support remains uncertain, but both parties are likely to study these changing voter instincts carefully.


The BJP must also examine its relationship with its own organisational base. Many party workers continue to draw confidence from the victories of 2014 and 2019. But the 2024 election demonstrated that Indian politics has entered a more competitive phase. Voters are more demanding, more informed and less willing to overlook governance gaps. Past victories cannot become substitutes for present engagement.


The RSS, too, has entered public discussion, with some observers asking whether it should play a more visible role in reconnecting political messaging with grassroots concerns. Whether such expectations are practical is another matter. But the debate itself reflects a changing political environment in which attention is no longer focused only on elected leaders.


Ultimately, the CJP movement should not be viewed merely as an opposition opportunity or a challenge to the ruling party. It is a reminder that public opinion is constantly evolving. Political organisations that listen, adapt and engage are more likely to retain public confidence than those that depend only on past achievements.

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