The Empty Cradle: India’s Quiet Demographic Reversal

Once fretting over a population explosion, India now faces a fear of the slow implosion of its demographic engine.

Something quite scary is happening to the demographics of the country. In recent times, for the first time in the long history of demographic growth of the country, the Total Fertility Rate at present in the rural and small-town areas, has come down to 2.1. Total Fertility Rate is a demographic indicator representing the average number of children a woman would have in her lifetime if she experienced the current age-specific fertility rates. It is the indicator of the average number of children born to a woman over her reproductive years. It is a key demographic tool for understanding population growth and patterns, with a TFR of 2.1 (Two children per one woman of a reproductive age) is considered the replacement level needed to maintain a stable population.

For a country that once worried about its ‘population explosion,’ this quiet implosion of fertility marks a striking reversal. India, long the textbook case of demographic overhang, is edging into territory that many ageing societies in East Asia now rue about.

According to the National Family Health Survey 5, “The total fertility rate in rural areas has declined from 3.7 children per woman in 1992-93 to 2.1 children in 2019-21. The corresponding decline among women in urban areas was from 2.7 children in 1992-93 to 1.6 children in 2019-21”. The overall fertility rate is two children per woman, down from 2.2 in 2015-16. The fertility rate is currently below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. The figures conceal a quiet revolution: the Indian village, once the bastion of large families, is now converging demographically with Seoul, Tokyo and Milan.

The decline in the TFR is an indicator, also known as replacement rate. which decides the growth rate in the population. It is more alarming to learn that in urban cities in the country, the TFR has declined to about 1.6. Rural India is facing the same problem. In India, the TFR has steadily decreased over time in rural areas to nearly 1.6. Demographers call this the fertility trap — once a society’s fertility falls below replacement, it rarely climbs back up, no matter how generous the incentives or patriotic slogans.

Declining TFR

The causes for this steady and increasing decline in the TFR are not far to seek: rise in the literacy rate among girls and women, rise in the number of girls going to school, easy access to methods of birth control and also, the gradual rise in the daily expenses of the family. There is another significant contributing factor – since the State plays no role in supporting the rise in domestic expenses in any manner, especially with regard to the growth and development of children, the middle-class and low middle-class sections of the population are learning to restrict the number of children with the aim of controlling the family budget. Add to this the personal preference of young women to have less children as they need to work to support the family expenses to some extent is rising every day. In urban areas, many modern couples are opting for marriage minus kids which also adds to the decline in the TFR due to both partners busy in outside jobs to support their standard of living within inflation, lack of time to spend with the children and the economic factor of the expenditure children demand for which, there is zero state support.

But a steady fall in the TFR is a lesser problem than what this falling TFR will bring along in the near future. What we seem to forget is that the reduction in the birth rate changes the very character of the demographic map of any country. This means that there will be a reduction in the number of infants born and subsequently, a fall in the percentage of young people of the productive age and a corresponding rise in the segment of senior citizens who are financially unproductive citizens and in India at least, do not have a proper support system in old age.

This is not a new phenomenon across the world. Many developed nations have already shown that the percentage of senior citizens is increasing over every decade. Japan’s “silver tsunami” and China’s sudden demographic slowdown offer cautionary tales: when the nursery empties, the pension queue lengthens. India, a country that still prides itself on its “youth dividend,” may soon discover that such dividends, too, have expiry dates.

Negative pressures

The two negative pressures that are brought about are – that the section of people that falls in the productive age which leads to a rise in the GNP is on the decline while on the other hand, the percentage of dependent senior citizens increase the pressure on the government of the country and in a developing nation like India, the pressure on both the government and also on the young people rises in the absence of a humane infrastructure to support these senior citizens. This will also lead to a downward pressure on the general productivity of the nation. This also increases the demand for huge capital and productive resources to fund this rise in the senior population of the country, especially in a country like India with a low per capita income.

India risks ageing before it grows rich, a fate that has already begun to haunt parts of East Asia. Without robust pension systems, healthcare reforms and labour policies that keep older citizens economically active, the demographic dividend could curdle into a demographic burden. Another side effect of a decline in the birth rate in India also indicates in detailed figures is visible in the more progressive states in the Southern and Western parts of the country where the per capita income is higher than in other states, the decline in the birth rate is higher than the other parts and is also declining at a faster rate. In the North and North Eastern states, the speed at which this decline is seen is lesser and slower. This divergence may well reshape India’s political economy: southern states, already contributing more to tax revenues, could find themselves under greater fiscal pressure to support the younger, faster-growing north. A demographic divide could soon mirror the country’s linguistic and economic ones.

Another observation shows that families with a low capita income have more kids than better-off families. To remedy this situation, economists and sociologists believe that they should focus on pushing up education and health in order to better their performance and reduce the birth rate among low-income families. If this does not happen, India will steadily continue its downward climb in productivity levels and its upward rise in poverty, productivity and a rise in the population of non-productive, dependent and weak senior citizens.

(The author is a noted film scholar who writes extensively on gender issues. She is a double-winner for the National Award for Best Writing on Cinema. Views personal.)