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By:

Minal Sancheti

2 May 2026 at 12:26:53 pm

Lost in Transport

Mumbai’s grand transport infrastructure is undermined by potholes, Poor discipline and a last-mile gaps that keeps it crawling Mumbai: It is morning time, and Pawan Khandelwal is all set to leave for work. A creative lead at an ad agency in Malad, Mumbai, Khandelwal should take 12 to 15 minutes to reach the office, but that rarely happens because of the traffic, poor road quality and lack of civic sense among co-drivers on the road. He mostly ends up reaching the office in 30 to 40 minutes....

Lost in Transport

Mumbai’s grand transport infrastructure is undermined by potholes, Poor discipline and a last-mile gaps that keeps it crawling Mumbai: It is morning time, and Pawan Khandelwal is all set to leave for work. A creative lead at an ad agency in Malad, Mumbai, Khandelwal should take 12 to 15 minutes to reach the office, but that rarely happens because of the traffic, poor road quality and lack of civic sense among co-drivers on the road. He mostly ends up reaching the office in 30 to 40 minutes. Khandelwal firmly believes that road construction is not a major issue for traffic. “The road under construction is not a big issue because they usually don’t take very long to repair the roads. But even after their work is done, it is not done perfectly. At times when they are digging up the road for other purposes, they often leave a bump or a pothole,” he said. He gives an example, “One can see it on the western express highway. There are so many bumps. We call it a highway, but we can’t even drive at 15 km/h because it is not fixed properly.” He also blames people for not following traffic rules, which adds to the problem. Traffic Woes Although there are coastal roads and metros available, the traffic still seems to be a problem for many residents. A media professional and a daily commuter, Charlene Flanagan has been travelling in Mumbai for many years now. There is not much difference in her experience of the traffic congestion. From her experience, she believes the coastal roads and metros have not completely accomplished the mission of curbing traffic congestion. She says, “As a resident of Mumbai and as a person with a valid driver’s licence, I would say the traf f ic hasn’t really changed. It is still as congested, and whether the coastal roads have helped depends on the time of the day you leave and whether you are going against the traffic or along with the traffic.” The pedestrians also face problems. Saloni Mehta, a theatre artiste, says, “I prefer walking to my destinations. For example, I live in Versova, and if I want to see a play in the Prithvi Theatre, I will take a half-hour walk. However, this one time, I could not reach the venue, not just because of the traffic but also because there were no pavements left to walk on. The roads are dug up, and every road is just half a road.” Mumbai’s average speed covered is 5.2 km per 15 minutes. During the peak traffic hours in the morning, when most people travel to their workplace, the average speed is 18.5 km/h. It is important to understand the issue and address it with a solution. Sudhir Badami, an author of the book ‘Matter of Equitability - Making Commuting in Mumbai Enviable’, explains why people still prefer to use cars over metros, “The metro line 3 has definitely taken away some car users. But it has not taken away sufficient numbers of car users to make a difference in the state of road congestion. The reason behind this is essentially the last-mile connectivity in areas where the Aqua Line or Line 7 operates, especially in suburban areas. In the city area, it is supported by good BEST services on the one hand, and taxis being available near the metro stations on the other hand. But most car users still opt for using their cars, as public transport currently does provide assured exclusivity, comfort and good frequency, not forgetting last mile connectivity. The Coastal Road sees very few cars compared to the number of cars on Mumbai’s Roads. Badami, as a transportation analyst, says, “Mumbai has approximately 16 Lakhs motor cars, out of which only about 55,000 seem to be using coastal roads. It is such a minuscule proportion for whom so much has been spent. This is largely because in the city, people don’t go from one end of the city to the other end. They normally start from in between and go somewhere in between. If there is not much time saving for the shorter stretches, then people are not likely to take it, and there will be continued congestion on city roads.” “In general, the necessity of the last-mile connectivity is an important part, but the greater part will be how to get car users onto the public transport,” says Badami. Public transport must provide near exclusivity, comfort and safety to a car-using commuter for migration to take place. This is where the importance of last-mile connectivity is felt. Air Pollution The slow-moving traffic also adds to the air pollution in the city several times more than when they are moving at optimum speeds, he says. Joint Commissioner of Police (Traffic), Mumbai, Anil Kumbhare, denies that there is much traffic congestion in Mumbai as compared to five years back. He credits the coastal roads for curbing the traffic. He says, “Earlier, there used to be bumper-to bumper traffic near Haji Ali. That has come down drastically. As coastal roads shape, the traffic will go down.” He also adds that there is traffic congestion in the morning hours as people are travelling for work. But there is no traffic jam. Although coastal roads have helped, there are still pockets of the city that face traffic congestion every day. This can be solved with careful planning and execution.

The End of Nuclear Blackmail and India’s Doctrine of Resolve

By refusing to be cowed by nuclear blackmail, India has drawn a red line after Operation Sindoor that challenges the West’s double standards.

Last month, during his first public address following the retaliatory Operation Sindoor (which was launched by India after the April 22 Pahalgam terrorist strike), Prime Minister Narendra Modi made two statements of consequence on India’s approach to Pakistan. First, he reiterated that “terrorism and talks cannot go together” which has been a long-standing position. But it was the second assertion that has marked a paradigm shift. Modi firmly said that India would “no longer relent to nuclear war blackmail.” The gauntlet has been firmly thrown.


The hardening of India’s response is informed not merely by the regularity of Pakistan-sponsored terror, but by the coordinated international reaction that followed India’s retaliatory strike. Even before the first sortie of Operation Sindoor had taken off, Pakistani leaders were already issuing shrill warnings of nuclear escalation that were eagerly amplified by Western governments and their media outlets in what appeared to be a synchronised chorus. This, despite India’s prior communication to both Islamabad and key Western capitals that the operation would be narrowly focused on terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.


New Delhi’s political establishment was understandably dismayed. President Donald Trump has repeatedly claimed that he had helped to “stop” such a war. The irony is rich: India, which would have borne the brunt of any hypothetical nuclear exchange, had raised no such alarms. Nor did Russia or several other non-Western powers. Why then was the West so quick to sound the nuclear sirens?


The West’s nuclear alarmism is not new. During the Kargil conflict in 1999, similar warnings were issued and that, too, only after Indian forces began turning the tide. Contrast that with other flashpoints involving nuclear powers. Whether it is the proxy war between NATO and Russia in Ukraine or tensions between the US and China in the South China Sea, nuclear escalation is rarely part of the mainstream Western narrative. Indeed, only the West has actually dropped nuclear bombs – the U.S. against Japan in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 - and in more recent decades deployed depleted uranium munitions in conflicts like Iraq and Syria.


Today, Russia has openly threatened the use of nuclear weapons should NATO escalate the war in Ukraine. Yet Western leaders have dismissed such warnings as bluster while continuing to arm Ukraine. Why the double standard?


To understand the West’s selective nuclear sensitivity, one must examine its strategic interests in South Asia.


The West’s primary interest in India is economic: tapping into its vast market. Geopolitically, India is useful as a counterweight to China and a potential partner in loosening ties with Russia. But this partnership is conditional. India’s ambitions for regional leadership and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council are often met with quiet resistance. New Delhi is welcomed into forums like the Quad but kept just outside the gates of elite global influence. Meanwhile, subtle interference in form of often stoking tensions along its borders keeps India preoccupied at home and less assertive abroad.


By contrast, the West’s relationship with Pakistan has been mercurial, oscillating between that of a ‘key ally’ and a troublesome but tolerated partner. Pakistan’s strategic location, abutting Iran, China, Afghanistan and India, makes it invaluable for Western power projection. Its ruling elites, especially the military, have long been compliant instruments of Western designs in the region. The West does not object to Pakistan being poor so long as its generals and political elites remain well-fed. Arms supplies from China, Turkey and the West keep the Pakistani military well-stocked, even as its economy teeters.


Pakistan’s armed forces are capable, but the country’s economic fragility means it cannot sustain a multi-front war. This is where its nuclear arsenal plays a vital role. Unlike India’s nuclear programme which was conceived with China in mind, Pakistan’s is aimed squarely at India. This suits both Chinese and Western interests: it keeps India’s strategic ambitions in check while maintaining Pakistan’s utility as a lever.


India’s nuclear ambitions have long been viewed with suspicion by the West. Despite never breaching any international treaties or IAEA protocols, India faced sanctions, sabotage, and even physical attacks on its scientists. Only in the past two decades has the tide turned somewhat, with civil nuclear agreements and defence cooperation frameworks emerging, albeit cautiously.


Pakistan, on the other hand, encountered no such roadblocks. Its nuclear programme was bankrolled by petrodollars from autocracies in the Middle East, technically assisted by China, and diplomatically ignored by the West. Intelligence agencies like the CIA, despite being deeply embedded in Pakistan, looked the other way. Indeed, parts of the Western intelligence and industrial complex covertly assisted the effort, with evidence linking countries like the Netherlands, Switzerland and Japan in facilitating uranium enrichment and centrifuge technology.


When Pakistan’s infamous nuclear proliferation network led by A.Q. Khan was caught peddling atomic secrets to North Korea, Libya and Iran, the West’s reaction was muted. The IAEA was never allowed to investigate. Western agencies later acknowledged, mostly for domestic consumption, that they had been aware of the activities but refrained from action “due to strategic concerns.”


The practical utility of nuclear weapons today lies less in their use and more in the threat they pose. Pakistan, aided by sympathetic voices in the West, has mastered this psychological game, using nuclear posturing to deter Indian retaliation and influence international opinion. Each time India responds to a terrorist provocation, Western governments swiftly raise concerns about ‘escalation,’ equating the aggressor and the victim.


This suits Pakistan perfectly. The threat of nuclear war acts as a shield, allowing it to wage a proxy war through jihadist outfits without inviting full-scale retaliation. For the West, this equilibrium keeps Pakistan pliable and militarily available for use in other theatres without the risk of it being destabilised by a conventional war with India. Everyone wins -m except India.


The double standard is glaring. India, a democracy and a responsible nuclear power, is routinely bracketed with a state sponsor of terrorism. The moment it responds to provocation, global headlines scream of apocalypse. And so far, the West’s concern has rarely been for Indian lives lost to terrorism but for the hypothetical risks posed by India’s response.


This time, India appears determined to challenge that narrative. Its move to send parliamentary delegations to explain its position to foreign governments and global institutions was a well-thought out one. The aim is to dismantle the false equivalence between a sovereign democracy defending itself and a rogue state exporting terror.


Whether this campaign ultimately succeeds in shifting perceptions remains to be seen. But one thing is clear: India’s new doctrine of refusing to be cowed by nuclear blackmail is a strategic reset, and perhaps the clearest assertion yet that India intends to chart its own path in the world. After all, deterrence cannot be one-sided. If Pakistan continues to benefit from Western indulgence and nuclear bluffing, then India is justified in asserting its right to respond firmly and proportionately.


(The author is a veteran journalist based in Navi Mumbai. Views personal.)

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