The Governor’s Dilemma
- Arushi Kulshrestha and Sowmya China
- 3 hours ago
- 4 min read
Caught between constitutional duty and political suspicion, the new gubernatorial appointments underscore how the Governor’s office remains one of the most contested pillars of India’s federal system.

The recent appointment and reshuffling of Governors and Lieutenant Governors for six states and two Union Territories by the President of India, Droupadi Murmu, including the politically significant state of West Bengal on the eve of crucial Assembly elections, has once again brought the office of the Governor into sharp public focus. Within India’s federal framework, the Governor functions as the constitutional head of the state and occupies an important position in the governance structure, exercising executive, legislative and certain discretionary powers that influence the functioning of the state government.
Introducing Flexibility
Article 153 of the Constitution of India provides that each state shall have a Governor. However, the Seventh Constitutional Amendment Act, 1956 introduced flexibility by permitting the appointment of the same individual as Governor for two or more states. Unlike the President of India, the Governor is neither directly nor indirectly elected. The office follows a model inspired by the Canadian system of governance, under which the Governor is appointed by the President through a warrant under his hand and seal, while the oath of office is administered by the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court. By long-standing convention, the appointee is generally an outsider to the state concerned, and the President is expected to consult the Chief Minister prior to such appointment.
As the de jure constitutional head of the state, the Governor is ordinarily expected to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except in situations where the Constitution expressly permits the exercise of discretion. It is this sphere of discretionary authority that lies at the heart of the ongoing debate surrounding the Governor’s office. These powers allow the Governor to act according to personal judgment without ministerial advice and, in certain respects, are considered broader than those of the President. They include functions such as reserving bills for the consideration of the President or recommending the imposition of President’s Rule, making their exercise a frequent subject of constitutional and political scrutiny.
Controversial Instances
Over the years, several instances have highlighted the controversies surrounding the exercise of such discretion. In 2016, the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh advanced a session of the state Assembly, triggering a political crisis that was later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. In the same year, the recommendation of President’s Rule in Uttarakhand by the Governor was set aside by the High Court. In Karnataka in 2018, the Governor invited the single largest party to form the government despite a post-poll coalition claiming majority support. In 2020, the Governor of Kerala faced criticism for delaying assent to a bill passed by the state legislature.
More recently, the issue resurfaced in Tamil Nadu, where Governor R. N. Ravi was criticized for delaying assent to several bills passed by the state Assembly, an action widely described as a “pocket veto.” Observations by the Supreme Court regarding the delay in granting assent to these bills have once again revived debates on the constitutional limits of gubernatorial discretion. Similarly, the West Bengal government has frequently accused Governor C. V. Ananda Bose of unwarranted interference in the functioning of the elected administration, reflecting recurring tensions between Raj Bhavans and state governments, particularly in opposition-ruled states.
Against this backdrop, the recent reshuffling and appointment of Governors by the Union government assumes particular significance, especially in politically sensitive and poll-bound states such as West Bengal. The Governor’s discretionary powers both constitutional and situational may become crucial in times of political instability, including situations such as the appointment of a Chief Minister in a hung Assembly, fragile coalition arrangements, or constitutional deadlocks before or after elections. In such circumstances, the Governor may also be called upon to dismiss a Council of Ministers that fails to demonstrate majority support or recommend the dissolution of the state legislative assembly. Consequently, the office of the Governor often becomes central to resolving political and constitutional uncertainties.
Situational Discretion
At the same time, opposition-ruled states have frequently argued that the exercise of such situational discretion may reflect the influence of the Union government rather than an independent constitutional judgment. This perception has continued to fuel tensions within India’s federal framework, particularly in states governed by parties opposed to the ruling party at the Centre.
The constitutional vision of the Governor’s office, however, demands a high degree of neutrality, restraint and institutional integrity. The Governor was envisaged as an impartial constitutional authority and a vital link between the Union and the states, rather than as a political instrument. Preserving the dignity and neutrality of this office is therefore essential for maintaining the spirit of cooperative federalism that lies at the heart of India’s constitutional design.
In this context, the recommendations of expert bodies such as the Sarkaria Commission (1988), the Venkatachaliah Commission (2002) and the Punchhi Commission (2010) assume renewed relevance. Their proposals, aimed at insulating the office of the Governor from partisan politics and strengthening its constitutional role, merit serious consideration if India’s federal democracy is to function effectively in both letter and spirit.
(The writers are advocates practicing before the Supreme Court of India. Views personal.)





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