top of page

By:

Hridbina Chatterjee

29 August 2024 at 3:43:30 pm

Rivers of Discord and Power

As the Indus Waters Treaty collapses under the weight of arbitral boycotts and upstream infrastructure competition, South Asia’s river basins are fast becoming the region’s defining geopolitical flashpoint. For over six decades, the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 stood as a singular, almost miraculous anomaly in the turbulent geopolitical landscape of South Asia. Brokered by the World Bank after nine years of painstaking diplomacy, the treaty successfully withstood three major wars, sharp...

Rivers of Discord and Power

As the Indus Waters Treaty collapses under the weight of arbitral boycotts and upstream infrastructure competition, South Asia’s river basins are fast becoming the region’s defining geopolitical flashpoint. For over six decades, the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 stood as a singular, almost miraculous anomaly in the turbulent geopolitical landscape of South Asia. Brokered by the World Bank after nine years of painstaking diplomacy, the treaty successfully withstood three major wars, sharp diplomatic ruptures, and endless ideological friction between nuclear-armed rivals India and Pakistan. It was celebrated globally as a masterclass in functionalist international law - a framework capable of isolating critical natural resources from the volatile realities of territorial statecraft. Yet today, that long-standing enclave of technical pragmatism is rapidly dissolving into an intense, irreversible legal and strategic standoff. Water is no longer managed through the quiet, technocratic mechanisms of the Permanent Indus Commission but has moved directly to the absolute center of regional strategic doctrine. The determinations issued in late August 2026 by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, alongside New Delhi’s firm and categorical rejection of the tribunal’s jurisdiction, have brought this institutional decay to a head, laying bare a profound structural fracture that threatens to permanently unravel the legal fabric of transboundary water governance in the subcontinent. Unprecedented Crisis The immediate catalyst for this unprecedented crisis is a fundamental disagreement over how technical disputes under the treaty ought to be legally resolved. The origin of the current impasse lies in Pakistan’s persistent objections to two major Indian run-of-the-river hydroelectric projects situated on the western river system in Jammu and Kashmir: the 330-megawatt Kishanganga plant on the Kishanganga/Neelum River and the 850-megawatt Ratle plant on the Chenab River. Islamabad argued that the engineering designs of these projects, particularly regarding pondage levels, spillway gate configurations, and intake heights, violated the strict design limits imposed by the 1960 text. In response to these objections, India formally requested the World Bank in 2016 to appoint a Neutral Expert, maintaining that the disagreements were strictly engineering and technical questions falling within the domain of a specialized adjudicator. Pakistan, conversely, sought the immediate constitution of an ad hoc Court of Arbitration, framing the controversy as an overarching legal dispute involving the broader interpretation of the treaty’s annexures. Rather than enforcing the treaty’s explicit, stepped dispute-resolution hierarchy which dictates that technical questions move first to a Neutral Expert before ascending to an arbitral court, the World Bank made a fateful procedural decision in late 2022. After a multi-year pause intended to encourage a bilateral settlement, the Bank simultaneously activated both legal tracks, appointing a Neutral Expert while also establishing the Court of Arbitration. This dual-track activation created a parallel dispute-resolution mechanism that risk delivering directly contradictory legal findings on identical engineering designs. Viewing this as an impermissible breach of the treaty's structured mechanism, New Delhi refused to appear, plead, or nominate members to the Hague court. Instead, India served formal notices to Pakistan demanding comprehensive modifications to the 64-year-old pact to account for vast demographic changes, clean energy demands, and the persistent threat of cross-border terrorism, before declaring in April 2025 that the treaty was being placed in statutory abeyance. Legal Showdown The legal showdown reached a critical inflection point on August 31, 2026, when the Permanent Court of Arbitration issued two sweeping rulings in an ex parte decision. The court unanimously determined that India’s decision to place the treaty in abeyance lacked legal justification under both the instrument itself and general international law, declaring that the 1960 pact remains fully operative and binding. Furthermore, the tribunal issued interim measures barring India from pouring concrete above specified elevations on the dam wall and power intake structure at the Ratle project until ninety days after the Neutral Expert delivers a final determination, expected in mid-2027. Within hours, India’s Ministry of External Affairs rejected the Hague determinations in their entirety, reiterating that the court was unlawfully constituted, that its pronouncements were null and void, and that New Delhi would not recognize any order that seeks to circumscribe its sovereign rights to build clean energy infrastructure within its own territory. This firm rejection marks a decisive, permanent pivot in India’s hydro-diplomatic strategy away from mid-century multilateral legalism toward an unyielding, sovereign-centric bilateral realism. By treating the Hague proceedings as non-existent and proceeding with its infrastructure works on the western rivers, New Delhi has signalled that it will no longer allow international legal venues to be weaponized by lower riparians to delay or block vital energy and economic development. From India’s perspective, Pakistan’s repeated recourse to external arbitral bodies represents an obstructive strategy designed to keep Indian infrastructure tied up in decades of procedural litigation. New Delhi’s posture reflects a growing domestic political consensus that an upper riparian nation cannot grant a downstream neighbour an effective veto over its sovereign civil engineering, particularly when the shared cooperative mechanisms like data exchanges and joint field inspections have broken down entirely. The Security Dilemma For Islamabad, India’s stance is viewed not merely as a legal challenge, but as an existential threat to its national survival and economic security. As a hyper-arid, downstream riparian state, Pakistan is overwhelmingly dependent on the Indus River system to supply over 80 percent of its irrigated agriculture, feed its municipal networks, and sustain its national food security. The Pakistani strategic establishment perceives India’s upstream dam construction, combined with its refusal to abide by Hague arbitral orders, as a deliberate effort to acquire physical operational control over the flow of the western rivers. From Islamabad’s viewpoint, even run-of-the-river projects without massive storage reservoirs grant an upstream state the theoretical ability to manipulate flow timing—withholding water during critical early sowing seasons or discharging excess water during heavy monsoons. Consequently, Pakistan has doubled down on internationalizing the dispute, leveraging global multilateral forums and international legal frameworks to frame its campaign as a defence of binding international law against unilateral power politics. This intense tug-of-war highlights how international arbitration institutions, originally created to diffuse geopolitical flashpoints, can inadvertently become primary arenas of strategic conflict. When a downstream state utilizes multilateral courts to bind an upstream neighbour, and the upstream state responds by completely rejecting the jurisdiction of those courts, the institutional machinery ceases to function as a neutral arbiter. Instead of fostering compromise, the legal battle hardens political positions, deepens strategic mistrust, and leaves the treaty in a comatose state. The core assumption of the 1960 agreement - that water engineering could be neatly separated from sovereign territorial hostility - has entirely collapsed under the weight of cumulative geopolitical grievances. Compounding this structural legal crisis is the severe, accelerating impact of climate change across the Hindu Kush Himalayan region. Often referred to as the planet’s “Third Pole,” these vast glacial fields feed the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers, serving as the primary hydrological engine for hundreds of millions of people. However, rapidly rising global temperatures are altering the baseline hydrology of the region at a pace that far exceeds historic models. Glaciers are receding rapidly, monsoon patterns have become dangerously volatile, and extreme weather events, ranging from catastrophic flash floods to extended, multi-year drought cycles, are now regular occurrences. These environmental shifts mean that the fundamental hydrological calculations that underpinned the 1960 treaty no longer reflect ecological reality. The treaty was built around historical, predictable flow averages that no longer exist in an era defined by rapid climate instability. As natural water availability becomes increasingly erratic, infrastructure development on the western rivers has acquired an immense strategic urgency for both nations. Under the terms of the original allocation, the three western rivers - the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab - were allocated primarily to Pakistan, but India retained explicit rights to utilize their waters for domestic consumption, agricultural irrigation, and, crucially, run-of-the-river hydroelectric power generation. Today, India considers the rapid buildout of major hydro-projects on these steep, high-gradient rivers vital to powering its rapidly expanding northern industrial grid, achieving its aggressive net-zero carbon targets, and driving economic development in Jammu and Kashmir. For Pakistan, however, every new concrete barrier, diversion tunnel, or gated spillway constructed upstream is interpreted through a lens of deep security paranoia, seen as potential infrastructure that could be weaponized during periods of military or political crisis. This dynamic has created a classic security dilemma within South Asia’s hydropolitics. Upstream engineering projects driven by legitimate civil requirements and green energy mandates are viewed downstream as existential security risks. Conversely, downstream legal challenges and international appeals intended to safeguard water security are viewed upstream as deliberate political sabotage designed to keep a neighbour energy-deficient. As climate stress contracts the overall envelope of reliable freshwater, the margin for operational error or diplomatic concession shrinks dramatically. What was once a manageable resource-sharing arrangement under conditions of relative ecological stability has transformed into a zero-sum contest over an increasingly scarce and volatile natural resource. China and Escalation Woes Furthermore, transboundary water dynamics in South Asia can no longer be analysed strictly through a bilateral India-Pakistan framework. The strategic equation is profoundly shaped by a formidable third actor: China. As the ultimate upper riparian power in Asia, controlling the glacial origins of the Indus, the Brahmaputra, and the Mekong on the Tibetan Plateau, Beijing occupies a position of supreme hydrological leverage over the entire continent. China’s extensive dam-building programs, mega-engineering diversion schemes, and infrastructure investments along its southern frontiers introduce a complex layer of vulnerability into India’s own strategic planning. New Delhi occupies an inherently complex position as a middle riparian state - sitting downstream from Chinese control on the Brahmaputra and Indus, while remaining upstream from Pakistan on the Indus basin. This middle-riparian posture directly informs India's unyielding stance on international legal jurisdiction in the Indus basin. Indian strategic planners are acutely aware that accepting intrusive international oversight, binding third-party arbitration, or restrictive legal precedents regarding its Western River engineering could severely constrain its own freedom of action vis-à-vis China’s massive hydro-engineering projects upstream. If New Delhi accepts that downstream states possess an effective legal check on upstream run-of-the-river designs, it would severely weaken its own legal and diplomatic arguments against Chinese dam construction on the Yarlung Zangbo (Brahmaputra). Consequently, India’s insistence on absolute territorial sovereignty and exclusive, unmediated bilateralism in the Indus basin is inextricably tied to its broader strategic competition with Beijing. The close Sino-Pakistani strategic alignment, exemplified by the expansion of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor infrastructure through disputed territory, further merges transboundary water management into an integrated, theater-wide geopolitical contest. The collapse of functional cross-border hydro-diplomacy carries profound domestic consequences across the subcontinent. In Pakistan, acute water scarcity exacerbated by rapid population growth, inefficient flood-irrigation practices, unchecked groundwater extraction, and climate shocks, is already straining internal cohesion. It has intensified bitter, inter-provincial disputes between upper-riparian Punjab and downstream Sindh over agricultural water allocations. When domestic political leaders attribute these severe shortages primarily to upstream Indian river development, hydropolitics becomes deeply entwined with national security rhetoric, making compromise virtually impossible. In India, surging industrial power demand and severe climate-induced heatwaves generate intense domestic pressure on the central government to fully utilize its complete legal allocation of the western rivers, leaving zero political space for diplomatic concessions to Islamabad. The World Bank’s failure to prevent parallel, conflicting dispute-resolution tracks has laid bare the limitations of mid-twentieth-century legal frameworks when confronted with twenty-first-century geopolitical realism. When an international tribunal issues binding legal determinations that a powerful regional state explicitly rejects as null and void, the authority and enforcement power of international law itself is eroded. The weaponization of arbitral frameworks risks producing a permanent legal paralysis. If the institutional machinery of the Indus Waters Treaty ceases to function permanently, it will remove the very last remaining operational bridge connecting New Delhi and Islamabad. The complete absence of formal, real-time data sharing, flood forecasting notifications, and direct technical consultations between the respective water commissioners drastically increases the probability of catastrophic miscalculation. During extreme climate events. the lack of trusted, transparent technical communication could lead one or both nations to mistake natural hydrological anomalies for deliberate upstream manipulation or downstream provocation. In a region characterized by tight military timelines and volatile political rhetoric, a misunderstanding over river flow variations could easily serve as the spark for rapid military escalation. Transboundary hydro-diplomacy in South Asia has crossed a decisive threshold, evolving from an administrative exercise in joint resource management into the region’s primary strategic flashpoint. Moving beyond this dangerous deadlock will require both nations to abandon outmoded, zero-sum models of resource division in favour of realistic frameworks focused on climate adaptation, joint ecological monitoring, and transparent data integration. Without a dramatic pivot toward a modern, ecologically grounded hydro-realism, the great rivers that nourished the birth of South Asian civilization risk becoming the primary conduits for its future conflicts.

The Huns Who Came in from the Cinematic Cold

Peter o' Toole in 'The Night of the Generals' (1967), which remains vastly underrated despite its trenchant probing of the Nazi psyche.
Peter o' Toole in 'The Night of the Generals' (1967), which remains vastly underrated despite its trenchant probing of the Nazi psyche.

This week marks yet another anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe. The dating of the twentieth century’s most cataclysmic war, always a matter of controversy, has definitively begun to shift in both popular and academic histories to underscore its global dimensions. In the past two decades, the war’s historiography has steadily pushed its beginning backwards while widening its geography.


Jonathan Fennell’s recent Collapse: A Global History of the Second World War, 1931–1941, the first volume of a projected trilogy, takes the story back to 1931, when the international order had already begun to come apart.


Earlier, Richard Overy had made much the same case in his magnificent Blood and Ruins: The Great Imperial War, 1931–1945 as did the formidable Robert Lyman in his riveting and highly-acclaimed A War of Empires: Japan, India, Burma & Britain: 1941–45 (both came out in 2021). The dating had already been pushed back in more popular narrative histories like Antony Beevor’s The Second World War (2012), that made it abundantly clear the conflict’s dimensions were never adequately captured by the old six-year European frame.


The Second World War is now being understood not as a European quarrel into which the rest of the world was dragged, but as a truly global convulsion, rooted in the crises of empire, nationalism, economics and ideology across several continents.


Cinema has been rather slow to make the adjustment. By cinema, I am specifically speaking of the mainstream Anglophone war film - principally Hollywood and British commercial cinema, whose enormous international reach made it the dominant popular storyteller of the Second World War.


For several years after 1945, the popular war film remained overwhelmingly an Anglo-American affair. Its natural heroes were British and American soldiers and commandos; its preferred landscapes were the deserts of North Africa, the beaches of Normandy, the occupied villages of Western Europe or Anglo-American pluck in Asiatic jungles. The mythology of such films was constructed on the courage, sacrifice and derring-do of British and American soldiers.


From such films as Battleground, Destination Tokyo, Bataan, Objective, Burma! and Wake Island to The Dambusters, Ice Cold in Alex, The Cockleshell Heroes, Ill Met by Moonlight and The Guns of Navarone – all belonging to different genres and having very different virtues, but broadly sharing the same imaginative geography: The war was something where intrepid British and Americans combated Axis tyranny.


Killing Fields

But the savagery and the killing fields of the Second World War was undoubtedly the Eastern Front, which was the gigantic furnace of the conflict, swallowing German and Soviet armies (with more than 35 of the total 60 million casualties from the war) on a scale that dwarfed the fighting in the West.


Yet for much of the history of popular cinema, that immense theatre remained curiously remote. The German soldier was generally a caricature (though not in all films) rather than a character: a figure in grey uniform to be shot, captured or outwitted by the heroes.


The war had certainly been dealt with in the former Axis countries - Germany, both East and West as well as Japan and Italy – in their respective languages. These countries had confronted the catastrophe on screen almost from the war’s end: Wolfgang Staudte’s The Murderers Are Among Us (1946) and Bernhard Wicki’s The Last Act (1955) were already grappling, in very different ways, with the German experience of the war and its aftermath. Japan produced an extraordinary body of postwar war cinema, from Kon Ichikawa’s The Burmese Harp (1956), a melancholy meditation on defeat and moral recovery, to his much more brutal Fires on the Plain (1959) as did Italy in form of Roberto Rossellini’s celebrated trilogy - Rome, Open City (1945), Paisan (1946) and Germany Year Zero (1948) - which confronted Fascism, occupation, resistance and the moral desolation left in the war’s wake.

Decision Before Dawn (1951) was one of the earliest and most thoughtful among mainstream English-language films to tackle the German point of view.
Decision Before Dawn (1951) was one of the earliest and most thoughtful among mainstream English-language films to tackle the German point of view.

There were exceptions in mainstream cinematic, English-speaking commercial war films, though, in representations of the enemy. 1951’s Decision Before Dawn (1951) was an excellent and unusually thoughtful film that featured Oskar Werner in a deeply affecting performance as a German POW recruited by the Americans for espionage and sent back into Germany. The film’s images of a war-ravaged country possess a documentary bleakness. In a different vein, so did The One That Got Away (1957), in which Hardy Krüger played Franz von Werra, the Luftwaffe officer whose repeated attempts to escape Allied captivity gave the familiar British prisoner-of-war picture a German protagonist.


Changing Perspectives

By the 1960s and 1970s, there was a perceptible shift as some notable, big-budget English-speaking war films, featuring major British, European and American stars, were centred on German characters and, increasingly, told from the German point of view.


Producer Darryl F. Zanuck’s epic The Longest Day (1962), based on Cornelius Ryan’s now-classic nonfiction book, was an important landmark, not least because its enormous international cast allowed German officers and soldiers to exist as major characters rather than merely targets.


A most curious undertaking came with The Night of the Generals in 1967 – a woefully underrated film which trenchantly probed the German military mind and the abyss of the Nazi psyche.

Directed by Anatole Litvak and produced by Sam Spiegel, The Night of the Generals was ostensibly a ‘murder mystery,’ adapted from Hans Hellmut Kirst’s savage 1962 novel, which a was black satire on the supposedly celebrated Teutonic virtues of efficiency, discipline and obedience, and on the peculiar insanity that results when an elaborate military machine continues to function perfectly while serving an insane purpose.


The film, a ‘Fritz-the-Ripper’ story and a subsequent manhunt that plays out in the capitals of occupied and postwar Europe, opens in Warsaw in 1942 with the murder of a prostitute. German military intelligence officer Major Grau, played by Egyptian heartthrob Omar Sharif, discovers that the evidence points not towards some anonymous psychopath but towards a German general. Three generals are possible suspects, among them is Peter O’Toole’s ruthless General Wilhelm Tanz, a terrifying young ‘star’ fanatically devoted to Hitler, whose immaculate military bearing conceals an unhinged mind. The other suspects are marvellously played by the acid, though humane Donald Pleasance and the chameleon-like Charles Gray.


Two years later, a similar murder occurs in Paris, which sees the three suspects reunited with the detective, who is doggedly pursuing the trail. A third murder takes place in Dresden after the war, when the Nazi hierarchy has long collapsed but the criminal has not disappeared.


The film is remarkable for its audacity – assembling a stalwart cast of international stars (o’ Toole, Sharif and Tom Courtenay, all David Lean alumna), putting them in German uniforms and presenting them with a problem almost comic in its insolubility. Searching for a murderer among the German High Command is rather like looking for a needle in a garbage dump: identifying the exceptional crime in a military world steeped in criminality, in a machine hurtling itself towards insanity.


O’Toole, reunited with Sharif five years after their signal triumph in Lean’s Lawrence of Arabia, chews the scenery with frightening abandon, demonstrating that no one comes remotely close to him in portraying psychotic characters on screen. The scene in which Gen. Tanz encounters Van Gogh’s self-portrait in the Louvre, is one of the film’s great eruptions of madness.


Omar Sharif, gives a performance even better than his turns in Lawrence or Doctor Zhivago. His Major Grau is the perfect foil to o’ Toole’s maniac - a cool, melancholy and sardonic detective pursuing a rational explanation in a world in which rationality has become an increasingly dubious commodity.

Around them are Donald Pleasence, Philippe Noiret and Tom Courtenay, all excellent, giving the film the texture of a literate European political thriller rather than an ordinary war picture whose likes we shall sadly never see today.


The great Maurice Jarre, fresh from his successes with Lean’s epics, provides yet another spectacular score – a marionette-like march and a waltz that perfectly captures the macabre dance of the German military machine.


The film, unsurprisingly, was not a commercial success. I have a particular weakness for The Night of the Generals. When the Second World War bug bit me in adolescence in Pune, I spent the best part of my graduation years haunting the second-hand book exhibitions that used to descend upon the city, looking for Kirst’s novel and a copy of the film. I finally found a copy – an old, battered Fontana edition, in 2004. By then, my search had begun to echo the novel’s manhunt.


If The Night of the Generals looked at the German military establishment through the prism of murder, director Sam Peckinpah’s Cross of Iron (1977) was perhaps the first mainstream film to capture the inferno of the German-Soviet war. It was one of the rare mainstream war pictures to put the German infantryman at the centre of the Eastern Front in a muddy, freezing, increasingly senseless struggle for survival.

American James Coburn is perfectly cast as Sergeant Steiner, a hard-bitten veteran whose sole objective is to survive the slaughter. He has lost whatever appetite he may once have possessed for rhetoric and military glory. Maximilian Schell is superb as Captain Stransky, the cowardly Prussian aristocrat obsessed with winning the Iron Cross. 

James Coburn in Sam Peckinpah's brutal and gritty anti-war 'Cross of Iron' (1977).
James Coburn in Sam Peckinpah's brutal and gritty anti-war 'Cross of Iron' (1977).

James Mason and David Warner add further distinction to a formidable cast. Peckinpah’s combat sequences are filmed with his trademark The Wild Bunch style – exploding on screen in the familiar barrage of slow motion, freeze frames with bodies hurled through space. As with Peckinpah, violence becomes an obscene ballet. The bleak film perfectly captures the turmoil and futility of men fighting on afterbelief has long disappeared and the war has become a machine for consuming men who no longer know why they are fighting. Orson Welles, who admired the film, reportedly considered it one of the finest anti-war pictures of its time.


In contrast, The Eagle Has Landed, a thoroughly enjoyable 1976 adventure film, takes the German viewpoint into altogether more fanciful territory. Based on Jack Higgins’ 1975 bestseller, the plot (strikingly similar to the British wartime classic Went the Day Well?) imagines a German commando operation to kidnap Winston Churchill.

Action specialist John Sturges (The Great Escape, The Magnificent Seven) turns the improbable premise into a polished late-war caper, while Tom Mankiewicz’s screenplay improves considerably on the novel’s pulp machinery, supplying the proceedings with a generous quantity of wit and irony with lines like “It makes the Charge of the Light Brigade look like a sensible military exercise.”


The stalwart cast has British legend Michael Caine playing the dashing Colonel Kurt Steiner while Canadian Donald Sutherland, with his customary insouciance, is Liam Devlin, the raffish IRA operative recruited for the mission; American heavyweight Robert Duvall is Colonel Radl, the German officer who cooks up the mission while British knight Sir Anthony Quayle essays a harried Admiral Wilhelm Canaris.


Donald Pleasence, returning to German uniform, steals the film as Heinrich Himmler, whose sinister charm more than conveys the chilling essence of the real historical monster. The Eagle Has Landed  is perhaps one of the last examples of that old-fashioned late-war adventure film where craft mattered as much as spectacle.


Bolstered by Lalo Schifrin’s exciting score, the film’s most interesting feature is that it allows the German soldier to be the hero without pretending that the regime he serves is heroic. Steiner and his men are portrayed as professionals trapped inside a criminal state.


Taken together, these three films offer a curious little history of Anglophone cinema’s changing relationship with the German soldier.


Despite the cliché, history does not belong exclusively to the victors, although the victors inevitably have a considerable say in how it is remembered. Mainstream cinema, for much of the post-war period, inherited that imbalance. The German soldier was the enemy because the story required one. This is not to downplay the monstrous crimes committed by the Nazi regime, the SS and the Wehrmacht. But once the celluloid German was permitted to become a character by possessing the fears, delusions, vanities, loyalties, absurdities and even professional virtues, the war on screen becomes more complicated, and perhaps, more truthful psychologically. Sometimes, the most revealing way of looking at a war is to stand on the other side of the hill.

Comments


bottom of page