The Rising Tide: China’s Tightening Grip on Solomon Islands

China’s quiet rise in Oceania is reshaping Pacific geopolitics, and the Solomon Islands now sit at the centre of this strategic contest.

While the South China Sea dominates debate over China’s maritime expansion, China’s quieter but significant rise in Oceania is generating growing geopolitical and security concerns. The Solomon Islands exemplify this shift, emerging as a key arena of competition between China and traditional Western allies. Beijing’s push for deeper security and economic ties signals a strategic move into a region long shaped by Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.

The Solomon Islands is an archipelago nation in Oceania, northeast of Australia. It consists of six main islands and over a thousand smaller ones, covering about 29,000 sq km and home to roughly 700,000 people. Honiara, the capital and largest city, sits on the island of Guadalcanal.

Modern Solomon Islands history began in 1893, when Captain Herbert Gibson declared a British protectorate. The islands later became a major World War II battleground, seeing fierce clashes between the US, Britain, and Japan.

In 1975, the territory was renamed “The Solomon Islands”, gaining self-governance the following year. It became fully independent in 1978 as the Solomon Islands”. The country remains a constitutional monarchy within the Commonwealth, with the British monarch as head of state, represented by a governor-general.

China’s growing influence

After gaining independence in 1978, the Solomon Islands established ties with Taiwan in 1983 and maintained them for 36 years. Taiwan provided extensive aid in infrastructure, education, and healthcare. But as China’s influence expanded, the Solomons eventually shifted under pressure from Beijing’s One-China policy, which requires countries to recognise only the PRC and reject Taiwan’s claim to statehood.

In 2019, the Solomon Islands cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan and recognised China, aligning with a broader regional shift in the Pacific.

Soon after, the Solomons signed an MoU with China, joining the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Launched in 2013, the BRI is a vast global infrastructure and economic project aimed at boosting trade and connectivity across Asia, Africa, and Europe.

The Solomon Islands’ economy depends largely on agriculture, fishing, and forestry, with little industrialisation. Its BRI partnership with China prioritises infrastructure, including upgrades to Honiara’s port, major road improvements, and new sports facilities such as the $119 million national stadium. Cooperation also extends to Chinese language training, scholarships, and government capacity-building programmes.

Since switching diplomatic ties, Solomon Islands officials have been visiting China almost monthly on “study tours”. Chinese provincial governments are also building links with Solomon Islands’ provinces, while universities on both sides are signing agreements to set up joint R&D centres.

The concerns

While the BRI has spurred major infrastructure growth, it has also raised concerns about long-term financial sustainability. A key worry is “debt-trap diplomacy”, where repayment pressures could threaten the Solomons’ control over key assets, as seen in countries like Sri Lanka. The islands also export most of their timber and natural resources to China, deepening economic dependence on the Chinese market.

Concerns over China’s influence extend beyond trade and infrastructure. In 2022, the Solomons and China signed a security cooperation pact—initially kept secret—which alarmed Western allies over the possibility of a future Chinese military presence.

These concerns soon proved justified. In January 2022, a PLA Air Force aircraft carrying riot gear and security personnel in camouflage landed in Honiara. This deployment, known as the China Public Security Bureau–Solomon Islands Policing Advisory Group (CPAG), has since become a permanent presence. China’s police maintain a 12-member presence on six-month rotations, operating across all provinces. There have also been reports of Beijing influencing local media, and recent international coverage has highlighted China’s role in the Solomons’ domestic politics, including during a no-confidence motion.

The alternatives

For the Solomon Islands, ties with China offer both opportunities and challenges. While the former Sogavare government leaned strongly toward Beijing, the current administration under Jeremiah Manele is trying to balance relations with both the US and China as the two powers compete for influence.

The country is also trying to broaden partnerships with Australia, New Zealand, and others. Manele has repeatedly signalled a preference for partners like New Zealand on major projects such as the Bina Harbour development. But New Zealand cannot fund the project alone, and its attempts to secure additional donors have so far failed — leaving China eager to step in. This is just one example of how smaller nations, unable to attract Western support, often end up turning to China and risking deeper dependence or debt.

In the crucial Pacific Ocean region, the Solomon Islands exemplify smaller nations caught between the geopolitical rivalry of the US and China.

(The writer is a foreign affairs expert. Views personal.)