The UN Has Company
As the United Nations struggles with geopolitical paralysis, specialised coalitions are becoming faster instruments of global statecraft.

The annual high-level general debate of the United Nations General Assembly’s eighty-first session opened against a backdrop of profound global disillusionment. But beneath the grand rhetoric inside the General Assembly Hall, the foundational premise of post-World War II diplomacy wherein a singular, universal institution could preserve peace and manage global affairs felt increasingly detached from reality.
The United Nations Security Council remains trapped in systemic operational paralysis, where vetoes serve as instruments of geopolitical confrontation rather than safeguards of collective security. As a direct consequence, the centre of gravity in international relations has decisively migrated away from traditional universalist forums towards flexible, specialised minilateral coalitions. From the halls of the UN to the summit floors of the Global South, the international community is witnessing a fundamental reordering of power dynamics, where minilateralism is no longer a temporary alternative, but an increasingly important vehicle for statecraft in an era of multipolarity.
The immediate catalyst for this shift was showcased just weeks before diplomats met in Manhattan, with the leaders of the BRICS group adopting the New Delhi Declaration. The declaration was not only an appeal for institutional reforms but also an indication of a changing gear in the creation of alternative governance structures that could sideline traditional institutions dominated by the West.
For as long as institutions such as the Security Council remain unsuccessful in stopping regional conflicts and enforcing international law, platforms such as BRICS+, the I2U2 Group and the Quad have been providing solutions in areas where classic governing mechanisms have struggled. These minilateral platforms emphasise flexibility over universality, bringing together middle states and emerging powers based on functional needs rather than ideology.
The change from universal multilateralism to networked minilateralism is among the most important developments in international governance since the adoption of the UN Charter. The question for the world today is whether these targeted coalitions can fulfil the wider mission of stabilising the international system or whether they will reduce world diplomacy to fragmented systems of trade, security and influence.
Institutional Shift
The core driver of this institutional shift is the structural inertia of the existing multilateral framework. For years, emerging powers have been asking for greater representation in the UN Security Council, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, reflecting their present demographic and economic weight. The refusal of status quo powers to yield meaningful decision-making authority has translated frustration into institution-building.
Minilateralism is the answer to this stagnation. By limiting the number of countries participating in an initiative, groups such as the Quad can pursue cooperation on maritime security in the Indo-Pacific without waiting for the consensus of almost two hundred nations. The same is true of the I2U2, which brings together the USA, India, Israel and the UAE. It allows these countries to pursue cooperation on food security, renewable power and transportation systems across the Middle East and South Asia.
In a situation where global treaties can take years to negotiate and then remain unratified, such flexible cooperation can deliver results much faster than traditional international organisations. The attraction is therefore obvious: fewer members, narrower objectives and a greater capacity to act.
Yet the rapid growth of minilateral coalitions poses serious questions about the stability of the global economic architecture. Nowhere are these tensions more evident than in international trade and finance.
Parallel Economies
The BRICS Declaration in New Delhi has highlighted efforts to expand trade settlements in local currencies, improve payment messaging systems and increase financing through the New Development Bank. With the aim of protecting their economies from unilateral Western sanctions and what they regard as weaponised trade practices, as well as from over-dependence on the US dollar, these countries are seeking to develop an alternative monetary-security architecture.
However, the emergence of localised payment systems and regional trade-preference zones could also fragment the global marketplace into conditional regions. A divided international monetary system could increase transaction costs, restrict the movement of capital and create parallel regulatory systems that make international trade considerably more complicated.
Each minilateral group developing its own financial infrastructure could ultimately weaken the integrated international economy that has helped lift millions of people out of poverty over the past half-century. The very flexibility that makes minilateralism attractive in diplomacy could therefore become a source of rigidity in the economic sphere.
This is the central paradox of the new order. The more efficiently smaller groups solve problems among themselves, the greater the temptation to build institutions that operate independently of universal ones.
A Hybrid Order
The rise of minilateralism has sparked serious discussion about how universal global purposes will be achieved in the future. Climate change, pandemic preparedness, cross-border pollution and the ethical challenges posed by advanced artificial intelligence are systemic by nature. They cannot be confined to a particular region or managed effectively by a handful of countries alone.
Minilateral groups can serve as platforms for testing new solutions. Common technology standards developed through the Quad or financing for green technologies provided by regional development banks can demonstrate what smaller coalitions are capable of achieving. But such arrangements lack the legal boundaries and broad recognition required to enforce truly global cooperation.
A system reliant entirely on voluntary coalitions also risks leaving smaller, non-aligned and economically vulnerable nations without a meaningful seat at the table, effectively disenfranchising much of the Global South from decisions that directly affect their development trajectories.
Despite these risks, expecting a return to the post-1945 era of centralised, universal diplomacy is unrealistic.
UN institutions must adapt by serving as ultimate conveners and standard-setters, integrating the practical outputs of smaller coalitions into universal norms. If minilateral coalitions remain open, transparent and focused on functional cooperation rather than political division, they can complement the UN system by acting as agile problem-solvers in an age of institutional paralysis.
(The author is a policy analyst with special focus on the Northeast and the Indo-pacific. Views personal.)






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