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By:

Dr. P. K. Singh and Dr. Kishore Paknikar

22 November 2024 at 10:39:13 am

From Cleaner Rivers to Healthier Rivers

A river can look clean and still be unhealthy. Water may meet prescribed standards while native fish disappear, seasonal flows change, floodplains shrink and groundwater connections weaken. New pollutants may go undetected. A river is more than water flowing between two banks; cleaning it is necessary, but does not by itself restore its health. As India looks towards Viksit Bharat@2047, the focus must shift from water quality to river health. Programmes such as Namami Gange are already moving...

From Cleaner Rivers to Healthier Rivers

A river can look clean and still be unhealthy. Water may meet prescribed standards while native fish disappear, seasonal flows change, floodplains shrink and groundwater connections weaken. New pollutants may go undetected. A river is more than water flowing between two banks; cleaning it is necessary, but does not by itself restore its health. As India looks towards Viksit Bharat@2047, the focus must shift from water quality to river health. Programmes such as Namami Gange are already moving beyond pollution control towards biodiversity conservation, ecological flows and biological monitoring. The next measure of restoration should be whether a river is functioning as a living ecosystem. Beyond Clean Water The Central Pollution Control Board’s 2025 assessment, based on monitoring during 2022 and 2023, identified 296 polluted stretches across 271 rivers, compared with 351 polluted stretches identified in 2018. These figures describe pollution, and not river health. Suppose a river meets prescribed standards while its natural flow declines, native fish disappear or its floodplain is built over. Would we call it healthy? No physician would declare a person healthy after measuring blood glucose alone. Rivers, too, need a broader assessment that includes flow, aquatic life, sediments, groundwater and floodplains. European and Australian programs recognize this approach. Scientists at IIT (BHU) have developed and tested a River Health Index for the Ganga at Varanasi, bringing together measures of river condition across locations and seasons. Subsequent research has examined pharmaceutical pollutants and biological responses involving algae, small aquatic animals and fish. Aquatic organisms experience river conditions continuously. A water sample tells us what was present when it was collected; changes in aquatic life can reveal what has been happening over time. Emerging threats include medicine residues, personal care chemicals, microplastics and antimicrobial resistance. Studies of Indian rivers have detected antibiotic-resistant bacteria and genes associated with antibiotic resistance in water and sediments. Sewage, hospital waste, agricultural runoff and industrial discharges can introduce these threats into rivers, linking the health of people, animals and the environment. This is where the One Health approach becomes relevant. High flows, low flows and seasonal floods move sediments, create habitats, connect floodplains and support aquatic life. In many rivers, groundwater helps maintain flow during dry periods. In monsoon-dominated India, when and how water flows matter as much as its quantity. We often try to restore rivers by working on the rivers themselves. Yet many problems begin far from their banks. Deforestation and farming change runoff and erosion. Urban growth reduces the amount of rainwater entering the ground. Excessive groundwater pumping can reduce river flows. Dams alter water and sediment movement, while sand mining and construction damage riverbeds and floodplains. A river cannot ultimately be healthier than the basin that sustains it. Restoration must include tributaries, wetlands, groundwater, vegetated riverbanks and natural drainage routes, not merely treatment plants and riverfronts. The Sahibi illustrates this challenge. Rising in Rajasthan and passing through Haryana before entering Delhi, it has undergone major changes in its flow and surrounding landscape. Its links with Najafgarh Jheel and the Najafgarh Drain show how urban growth, sewage, altered flows and drainage works become intertwined. Treating water in its channel alone cannot restore the wider river system. India’s rivers also differ greatly. A Himalayan river fed by snow, glaciers and monsoon rain cannot be assessed exactly like a seasonal river in Rajasthan or a dam-regulated peninsular river. We need common principles, but different measures and restoration goals for different rivers. Climate change makes this task harder. Unpredictable rainfall, longer dry periods and extreme floods can alter flows, water quality and habitats. Restoration plans must account for these changes, while monitoring should tell us whether improvements last. Viksit Bharat@2047 offers an opportunity to establish a national River Health@2047 framework. It should examine water and sediment quality; natural flow patterns; aquatic life; the condition of riverbeds and floodplains; and the relationship between rivers and the people who depend on them. River Health Index These aspects tell us what to measure. But measurement alone cannot restore a river. Rivers need sufficient water through their natural seasonal cycles, supported by groundwater where appropriate. Pollution must be reduced and wastewater treated. Floodplains, wetlands and natural drainage routes must be protected. Aquatic habitats, biodiversity and connections within river systems must be restored. Farming, groundwater use, urban growth and industry must be managed without steadily damaging rivers. Governments, communities, universities, civil society and businesses must work together, with clear responsibilities for monitoring, protecting and restoring them.
A River Health Index can bring measurements together and identify where a river is under stress, why and what might help. Success must be measured by checking whether natural flows have returned and if aquatic life has recovered. Scientific findings must guide decisions about water use, land use and floodplain protection. Otherwise, even sophisticated measurements will achieve little. Importantly, restoration cannot remain the responsibility of scientists and government agencies alone. Technology cannot replace the knowledge of people who live beside rivers. Their observations of changing flows, disappearing fish and shrinking wetlands can help scientists judge whether restoration is working. This is the spirit behind Bharat Discourses on Rivers@2047: Connecting Science with the Society which begins on October 3 at IIT (BHU). The event raises vital questions. What should be different about Indian rivers by 2047? How will we know their health has improved? What is holding us back, and what must we do differently? Most importantly, what one or two actions should begin by 2027 to achieve our goals? Healthy rivers sustain biodiversity and livelihoods, recharge groundwater, carry sediments and accommodate floods. They are not an environmental luxury to consider after development; they are essential to development itself. We must leave the next generation not merely cleaner stretches of water, but living, resilient rivers. The question for 2047 is not simply, “Is our river cleaner?” It is, “Is our river healthier, and is its health continuing to improve?” (Dr. Singh is a Professor of Civil Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology (BHU), Varanasi; Dr. Paknikar is the ANRF Prime Minister Professor, COEP Technological University, Pune. Views personal.)

The UN Has Company

14 hours ago
4 min read

As the United Nations struggles with geopolitical paralysis, specialised coalitions are becoming faster instruments of global statecraft.

The annual high-level general debate of the United Nations General Assembly’s eighty-first session opened against a backdrop of profound global disillusionment. But beneath the grand rhetoric inside the General Assembly Hall, the foundational premise of post-World War II diplomacy wherein a singular, universal institution could preserve peace and manage global affairs felt increasingly detached from reality.


The United Nations Security Council remains trapped in systemic operational paralysis, where vetoes serve as instruments of geopolitical confrontation rather than safeguards of collective security. As a direct consequence, the centre of gravity in international relations has decisively migrated away from traditional universalist forums towards flexible, specialised minilateral coalitions. From the halls of the UN to the summit floors of the Global South, the international community is witnessing a fundamental reordering of power dynamics, where minilateralism is no longer a temporary alternative, but an increasingly important vehicle for statecraft in an era of multipolarity.


The immediate catalyst for this shift was showcased just weeks before diplomats met in Manhattan, with the leaders of the BRICS group adopting the New Delhi Declaration. The declaration was not only an appeal for institutional reforms but also an indication of a changing gear in the creation of alternative governance structures that could sideline traditional institutions dominated by the West.


For as long as institutions such as the Security Council remain unsuccessful in stopping regional conflicts and enforcing international law, platforms such as BRICS+, the I2U2 Group and the Quad have been providing solutions in areas where classic governing mechanisms have struggled. These minilateral platforms emphasise flexibility over universality, bringing together middle states and emerging powers based on functional needs rather than ideology.


The change from universal multilateralism to networked minilateralism is among the most important developments in international governance since the adoption of the UN Charter. The question for the world today is whether these targeted coalitions can fulfil the wider mission of stabilising the international system or whether they will reduce world diplomacy to fragmented systems of trade, security and influence.


Institutional Shift

The core driver of this institutional shift is the structural inertia of the existing multilateral framework. For years, emerging powers have been asking for greater representation in the UN Security Council, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, reflecting their present demographic and economic weight. The refusal of status quo powers to yield meaningful decision-making authority has translated frustration into institution-building.


Minilateralism is the answer to this stagnation. By limiting the number of countries participating in an initiative, groups such as the Quad can pursue cooperation on maritime security in the Indo-Pacific without waiting for the consensus of almost two hundred nations. The same is true of the I2U2, which brings together the USA, India, Israel and the UAE. It allows these countries to pursue cooperation on food security, renewable power and transportation systems across the Middle East and South Asia.


In a situation where global treaties can take years to negotiate and then remain unratified, such flexible cooperation can deliver results much faster than traditional international organisations. The attraction is therefore obvious: fewer members, narrower objectives and a greater capacity to act.


Yet the rapid growth of minilateral coalitions poses serious questions about the stability of the global economic architecture. Nowhere are these tensions more evident than in international trade and finance.


Parallel Economies

The BRICS Declaration in New Delhi has highlighted efforts to expand trade settlements in local currencies, improve payment messaging systems and increase financing through the New Development Bank. With the aim of protecting their economies from unilateral Western sanctions and what they regard as weaponised trade practices, as well as from over-dependence on the US dollar, these countries are seeking to develop an alternative monetary-security architecture.


However, the emergence of localised payment systems and regional trade-preference zones could also fragment the global marketplace into conditional regions. A divided international monetary system could increase transaction costs, restrict the movement of capital and create parallel regulatory systems that make international trade considerably more complicated.


Each minilateral group developing its own financial infrastructure could ultimately weaken the integrated international economy that has helped lift millions of people out of poverty over the past half-century. The very flexibility that makes minilateralism attractive in diplomacy could therefore become a source of rigidity in the economic sphere.


This is the central paradox of the new order. The more efficiently smaller groups solve problems among themselves, the greater the temptation to build institutions that operate independently of universal ones.


A Hybrid Order

The rise of minilateralism has sparked serious discussion about how universal global purposes will be achieved in the future. Climate change, pandemic preparedness, cross-border pollution and the ethical challenges posed by advanced artificial intelligence are systemic by nature. They cannot be confined to a particular region or managed effectively by a handful of countries alone.


Minilateral groups can serve as platforms for testing new solutions. Common technology standards developed through the Quad or financing for green technologies provided by regional development banks can demonstrate what smaller coalitions are capable of achieving. But such arrangements lack the legal boundaries and broad recognition required to enforce truly global cooperation.


A system reliant entirely on voluntary coalitions also risks leaving smaller, non-aligned and economically vulnerable nations without a meaningful seat at the table, effectively disenfranchising much of the Global South from decisions that directly affect their development trajectories.


Despite these risks, expecting a return to the post-1945 era of centralised, universal diplomacy is unrealistic.


UN institutions must adapt by serving as ultimate conveners and standard-setters, integrating the practical outputs of smaller coalitions into universal norms. If minilateral coalitions remain open, transparent and focused on functional cooperation rather than political division, they can complement the UN system by acting as agile problem-solvers in an age of institutional paralysis.

 

(The author is a policy analyst with special focus on the Northeast and the Indo-pacific. Views personal.)

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