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By:

Rupak Bardhan Roy

17 March 2026 at 2:34:57 pm

Will Gen Z Bury Political Ideology?

From Kenya to Nepal, a digitally native generation is challenging the ideological foundations on which modern politics has long rested. Between 2024 and 2026, across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, a series of rapid, leaderless political uprisings erupted, fundamentally driven by citizens under the age of thirty. Commonly dubbed as the ‘Global Gen Z uprisings,’ these movements systematically unseated ruling regimes, dismantled political dynasties, and forced constitutional re-evaluations....

Will Gen Z Bury Political Ideology?

From Kenya to Nepal, a digitally native generation is challenging the ideological foundations on which modern politics has long rested. Between 2024 and 2026, across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, a series of rapid, leaderless political uprisings erupted, fundamentally driven by citizens under the age of thirty. Commonly dubbed as the ‘Global Gen Z uprisings,’ these movements systematically unseated ruling regimes, dismantled political dynasties, and forced constitutional re-evaluations. While traditional political science has historically viewed revolutions through the lens of competing ideologies - capitalism versus socialism or secularism versus religious nationalism - the generational wave of the mid-2020s introduced an entirely different model. Driven by a hyper-connected generation demanding technocratic competence, structural fairness and the protection of their digital spaces, these movements are fundamentally post-ideological. Youth Mobilization This global cycle of youth mobilization began in June 2024 in East Africa. Entirely organized on TikTok and X (formerly Twitter), young Kenyans launched the ‘Reject Finance Bill’ movement to debunk aggressive state tax hikes on everyday household necessities. Operating without traditional political figureheads, protesters utilized artificial intelligence translation tools, digital crowdfunding campaigns, and geo-located mapping to outmanoeuvre security apparatuses. The movement culminated in the breach and partial burning of the parliament building in Nairobi. President William Ruto had to completely withdraw the tax legislation and dismiss his cabinet. Weeks later, in July 2024, the operational blueprint was finalized in the student–people’s revolution in Bangladesh. University students mobilized in masses to oppose a prevalent employment quota system. In an economy choked by acute underemployment, the policy was seen as institutionalized nepotism to reward ruling party loyalists. Following a severe state crackdown, by August 2024, mass civilian marches overran Dhaka, forcing Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to resign and flee the country, ending her fifteen-year tenure and replacing it with an interim council. Though there have been certain discourses over the movement being hijacked by the overtly fundamentalist Jamat, an open election last year has proved substantially otherwise. Similar occurrences of civil protests organized by Gen Z also erupted and flourished to success during August-September 2025 in Indonesia over Government allocation of funds for the political elites amid state’s financial constraints. The global contagion also crossed back into Africa (Madagascar) in October 2025, driven by systemic inflation and infrastructure failures. The president fled the country, and the incoming temporary administration instituted radical transparency measures. The peak of this physical confrontational phase occurred in Nepal in September 2025, during the ‘Jan Andolan III’ movement. Triggered directly by the sudden ban on twenty-six major digital platforms including TikTok and YouTube, the youth viewed this policy as a deliberate destruction of their digital livelihoods. Following a violent confrontation at Maitighar Mandala in Kathmandu, nationwide riots forced the resignation of Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli and eventually to the choice of judicial figurehead to lead an interim government. By early this year, the movement shifted from external street disruption to internal systemic transformation, finally embodied by Nepal’s historic general elections on March 5. Though in its nascent and purely digital counter-narrative state, this phenomenon has hit our country in the form of the Cockroach Janata Party (CJP). Following the controversial remarks by the Chief Justice of India, young digital strategists launched the CJP under the hashtag ‘#MainBhiCockroach.’ The movement gained nineteen million followers in five days, proving that the undercurrents of generational frustration could bypass physical conflict entirely and manifest as overwhelming digital narrative warfare. To understand why these diverse geographic events occurred in serial concordance, one must look beyond standard copybook political explanations. Though unemployment is the structural backbone for these movements, the uprisings feature an amalgam of economic stagnation, mobility constraints and the abrupt termination of technocratic access. Historically, developing states with high youth accumulation have substantially managed domestic stability through labour migration. In Nepal, for example, nearly 14 percent of the domestic labour force works abroad, sending home remittances that account for nearly one-third of the national GDP. When global economic slowdowns, rising visa costs, and tighter immigration quotas in the Gulf States, Malaysia, and Europe closed these traditional economic exit routes, the domestic pressure intensified. This economic constraint collided directly with the ‘relative deprivation gap’ accelerated by social media. Prior to the smartphone era, the wealth gap between the ruling political class and the working-class public was mostly obscured. Platforms like TikTok, Instagram, and YouTube fundamentally democratized the visibility of corruption. When governments attempted to resolve the resulting social friction by imposing digital blockades, they fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the modern internet. For Gen Z, the internet was their primary economic infrastructure. Shutting it down directly dismantled their freelance networks and digital micro-enterprises. With their domestic jobs non-existent, foreign visas unobtainable, and digital spaces blocked, millions of young people were left with no alternative but to occupy the streets. What emerges as the connecting characteristic of these global movements is the absolute absence of a unifying political ideology. Bypassing prevalent debates these movements operate as hyper-focused crusades for basic institutional functionality, accountability, and meritocracy. Tactical Agility This post-ideological stance gives the modern youth movement radical tactical agility. Because they are not bound to a rigid party manifesto, they can mobilize instantly around specific, tangible grievances. Traditional state apparatuses have been designed to combat structured opposition parties through ideological propaganda and counter-narratives to neutralize decentralized networks thriving on internet culture. The emergence of the Cockroach Janata Party perfectly illustrates this dynamic. By ironically adopting a satirical manifesto that combined serious demands with absurdist declarations of being a “lazy” party, the movement insulated itself from traditional state security crackdowns. The state’s attempt to suppress the CJP by restricting its social media accounts exposed that traditional structures do not know how to politically defeat a viral meme. However, if a regime change takes place like Nepal, this lack of structural ideology creates a profound systemic void. Because these movements are unified entirely by what they 'oppose rather than what they want to 'build', the post-revolution transition period is naturally fragile. It is within this vacuum of transition that Nepal’s current political experiment has become a vital case study for global politics. The centrist, youth-backed Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) achieved an unprecedented landslide victory, the largest single-party majority since Nepal's restoration of democracy. If the Balen Shah administration achieves their proposed economic goals with acceptable deviation, it will provide a definitive proof-of-concept for modern governance: that technocratic competence can serve as a stable, standalone alternative to traditional political ideology. By treating national management as a problem of engineering and resource optimization, Nepal is actively testing whether a state can be effectively run on data, transparency and administrative efficiency. The global wave of Gen Z revolutions has fundamentally altered the rules of political engagement. Yet, the ultimate legacy of this generational shift will not be decided by the speed with which it clears the political slate, but by its capacity to govern. If the technocratic experiment currently underway in Nepal succeeds, it could serve as a blueprint for youth movements globally. Whether this marks the end of ideology or merely its latest reinvention remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that a generation raised on algorithms, transparency and instant connectivity is no longer content to inherit the political assumptions of the twentieth century. If Gen Z succeeds in transforming protest into governance, the defining political divide of the future may no longer be between Left and Right, but between competence and incompetence. (The writer is a Lead Process Engineer with GE HealthCare in France and an author. Views personal.)

Unrest within Mahayuti

Updated: Jan 21, 2025

Mahayuti

Mumbai: The state administration on Sunday stalled the appointments of guardian ministers in Raigad and Nashik districts. Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis had cleared the appointments before he left for Davos in Switzerland to attend the World Economic Forum on Saturday. They are believed to have been stalled on behest of Deputy Chief Minister Eknath Shinde, who heads the state in absence of the Chief Minister.


NCP’s Aditi Tatkare and BJP’s Girish Mahajan were entrusted with responsibilities of guardian minister for the Raigad and Nashik districts respectively, where Shiv Sena’s Bharat Gogawale and Dada Bhuse had staked claims. Gogawale is a first-time minister while, Bhuse had been the guardian minister of the district during previous government under Eknath Shinde.


Shiv Sena, NCP and BJP all the three constituents of Mahayuti have strong roots in both the districts. However, the Shiv Sena and the NCP had been particularly on loggerheads there. The Shiv Sena, which had been demanding the guardian minister’s post in Nashik district has managed to win only two assembly seats in the district where the NCP has Six and the BJP has Five MLAs. On the contrary, in Raigad the NCP has won only one seat while the Shiv Sena and the BJP both have Three MLAs each in the district.


Sunil Tatkare, MP from Raigad Lok Sabha constituency and the stat unit president of the NCP and father of Aditi Tatkare, had been the guardian minister of Raigad between 2004 and 2014. Gogawale had always been his political opponent before Tatkare joined the Mahayuti government under Ajit Pawar’s leadership in 2023. Gogawale claimed that all the Six Shiv Sena-BJP MLAs in the district had opined in his favour to be the guardian minister of the district and after the decision to appoint Aditi Tatkare was announced, his supporters resorted to violent protests. They burnt tyres in bid to stall traffic on highway in the district. Reacting to the developments, Tatkare said that the issue should be pondered over after CM Fadnavis returns from Davos on Saturday and settled amicably.


In Nashik Girish Mahajan had been the guardian minister of the district between 2014 and 2019 when Fadnavis was the Chief Minister.


The post of guardian minister doesn’t have any constitutional mandate and is considered to be a political appointment. Guardian ministers head the district planning and development councils (DPDC) that control the funds for development works being carried out in the particular district. This control wields much of political power to the minister in that district whereby spreading the party in the district becomes much easier. This is the reason why the grass root politicians seem to be very sensitive to such appointments.


While Gogawale and Bhuse are unhappy about not being appointed as guardian ministers, some others like NCP’s Hasan Mushrif and BJP’s Pankaja Munde are unhappy about not being appointed as guardian district in their home districts of Kolhapur and Beed respectively. DCM Shinde is learnt to have gone to his ancestral village Dare in Satara district after the decision and BJP’s firefighters Chandrashekhar Bawankule and Girish Mahajan are expected to meet him there to try finding a way out of the issue.

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