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By:

Yogesh Kumar Goyal

19 April 2026 at 12:32:19 pm

The Exit Poll Mirage

While exit polls sketch a dramatic map of India’s electoral mood, the line between projection and verdict remains perilously thin. With the ballots across five politically pivotal arenas of West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Assam, Kerala and Puducherry falling silent until the results are announced on May 4, poll surveyors have filled the vacuum with exit poll numbers that excite, alarm and often mislead. These projections have already begun shaping narratives well before D-Day on May 4. If India’s...

The Exit Poll Mirage

While exit polls sketch a dramatic map of India’s electoral mood, the line between projection and verdict remains perilously thin. With the ballots across five politically pivotal arenas of West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Assam, Kerala and Puducherry falling silent until the results are announced on May 4, poll surveyors have filled the vacuum with exit poll numbers that excite, alarm and often mislead. These projections have already begun shaping narratives well before D-Day on May 4. If India’s electoral history offers any lesson, it is that exit polls illuminate trends, not truths. Bengal’s Brinkmanship Nowhere is the drama more intense than in West Bengal, arguably the most keenly watched contest among all five arenas. The contest for its 294 seats has long transcended the state’s borders, becoming a proxy for national ambition. Most exit polls now point to a striking possibility of a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) majority, in some cases a commanding one. Such an outcome would mark a political earthquake. For decades, Bengal has resisted the BJP’s advances, its politics shaped instead by regional forces - first the Left Front, then Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress (TMC). Yet the arithmetic of the polls suggests that the BJP’s campaign built on organisational muscle and the promise of ‘parivartan’ (change) may have finally breached that wall. The TMC, meanwhile, appears to be grappling with anti-incumbency and persistent allegations of corruption. Still, one outlier poll suggests it could yet retain power, a reminder that Bengal’s electorate has a habit of confounding linear predictions. Here, more than anywhere else, the gap between projection and reality may prove widest. Steady Script If Bengal is volatile, the Assam outcome looks fairly settled. Across agencies, there is near unanimity that the BJP-led alliance is poised not just to retain power, but to do so comfortably. With the majority mark at 64 in the 126-member assembly, most estimates place the ruling coalition well above that threshold, in some cases approaching triple digits. The opposition Congress alliance, by contrast, appears stranded far behind. Under Himanta Biswa Sarma, the BJP has fused development rhetoric with a keen sense of identity politics, crafting a coalition that has proved resilient. A third consecutive term would underline the party’s deepening institutional hold over the state. Kerala, by contrast, may be returning to its old rhythm. For decades, the state has alternated power between the Left Democratic Front (LDF) and the Congress-led United Democratic Front (UDF) with metronomic regularity. The LDF broke that pattern in the last election, securing an unprecedented second term. Exit polls now suggest that experiment may be short-lived. Most projections place the UDF comfortably above the 71-seat majority mark in the 140-member assembly, with the LDF trailing significantly. If borne out, this would reaffirm Kerala’s instinctive resistance to prolonged incumbency. Governance records matter here, but so does a deeply ingrained political culture that treats alternation as a form of accountability. Familiar Duel? Tamil Nadu, long dominated by its Dravidian titans, shows little appetite for disruption as per most exit polls, which place M.K. Stalin’s DMK-led alliance above the halfway mark of 118 in the 234-seat assembly. Yet, some sections have suggested a possible upset could be staged by actor Vijay’s TVK, the wildcard in the Tamil Nadu battle. Most polls, however, are clear that the opposition AIADMK alliance, though competitive, seems unlikely to unseat the incumbent DMK. In Puducherry, the smallest of the five contests, the implications may nonetheless be outsized. Exit polls give the BJP-led alliance a clear majority in the 30-seat assembly, relegating the Congress-led bloc to a distant second. Numerically modest, the result would carry symbolic weight. A victory here would further entrench the BJP’s presence in the south, a region where it has historically struggled to gain ground. For all their allure, exit polls are imperfect instruments. They rest on limited samples, extrapolated across vast and diverse electorates. In a country where millions vote, the opinions of a few thousand can only approximate reality and often fail to capture its nuances. There is also the problem of the ‘silent voter’ - individuals who either conceal their preferences or shift them late. Recent elections have offered ample reminders. In states such as Haryana and Jharkhand, and even in Maharashtra where margins were misjudged, exit polls have erred, and sometimes dramatically sp. Moreover, the modern exit poll is as much a media event as a methodological exercise. Packaged with graphics, debates and breathless commentary, it fills the void between voting and counting with a sense of immediacy that may be more theatrical than analytical. That said, to dismiss them entirely would be too easy. Exit polls do serve a purpose in sketching broad contours, highlighting regional variations and offering clues about voter sentiment. For political parties, they are early signals and act as tentative guides for observers. Taken together, this cycle’s exit polls suggest a broad, if tentative, pattern of the BJP consolidating in the east and north-east, and opposition alliances regaining ground in parts of the south, and continuity prevailing in key states. But patterns are not outcomes and only counted votes confer legitimacy. It is only on May 4 when the sealed electronic voting machines will deliver that clarity. They will determine whether Bengal witnesses a political rupture or a resilient incumbent, whether Assam’s stability holds, whether Kerala’s pendulum swings back, and whether Tamil Nadu stays its course. (The writer is a senior journalist and political analyst. Views personel.)

A Civilisation of Shared Gods

Across Southeast Asia, Hinduism and Buddhism did not clash for supremacy but intertwined across empires and scriptures to forge a uniquely unified civilisational ethos.

Troluwan: Ruins of Majapahit Kingdom.
Troluwan: Ruins of Majapahit Kingdom.

History knows for sure as to when the Buddhist thought entered Southeast Asia, which was when the great Mauryan Emperor Ashoka sent messengers Sona and Uttara into then known ‘Suvarnabhumi’ consisting of Burma and Thailand, to preach Buddha’s message there. Ashoka’s effort did certainly bear fruit especially in neighbouring Burma, where the reputed Buddhist kingdom of Shri-kshetra was formed as early as in the 2nd century CE.


The Buddhist thought as such, however, does not seem to have spread evenly or at a steady pace throughout the entire region. The evidence lies in the fact that it had to wait for three more centuries before getting introduced in the Indonesian archipelago. There is no such record available of the entry of the Hindu thought in the Southeast Asian region. But that can be speculated to have preceded that of the Buddhist by the sheer logic of its uninterrupted existence before Buddhism was born in mother country India.


Shared Sovereignty

The speculation of an earlier Hindu entry in Southeast Asia is proved by the existence of a vast and prosperous Hindu empire of Funan, based in much farther Cambodia in the same, that is, 2nd century.


Theologically speaking, both Mahayana and Theravada branches of Buddhist thought spread in the region, and got rooted in different territories depending on their compatibility with the respective local soil. In the case of Hinduism, its major branches of Shaivism and Vaishnavism flourished in different eras, in the order of the latter following the former, but not necessarily replacing it. Interestingly, a less known fact is about the Vedic stream of the Hindu pantheon, which, along with its yajna system, did exist in fewer pockets like that of Kalimantan Island of Indonesia, in the 4th century CE.


Although there may have been a healthy competition between them with regard to attracting followers, both these streams of thought – Hindu and Buddhist – appear to have existed in almost all of the Southeast Asian territories simultaneously and peacefully throughout, except until their existence was challenged by the Islamic and Christian proselytization around mid-second millennium in the maritime sub-region.


Their peaceful co-existence before that phase has been vouched for by most of the world historians. Although a minority among the Western historians doubted it, and from their strictly binary lenses imagined territorial competition between the two, their speculations could never be proved on the test of evidence.


Sacred Kinship

This peaceful co-existence of theirs is underlined by the royal recognition of their equal status, highlighted in case of mighty polities. The example in the mainland was the Cambodia-based Khmer empire – 11th-12th centuries’ Angkor, including its preceding as well succeeding polities of its heritage, whereas in the maritime domain it was the Indonesia-based 13th-15th centuries’ Majapahit empire.


Elsewhere, the mental unification reflected in intertwining of things apparently coming from two different sources, as it happened in case of the 6th-11th centuries’ Dvaravati kingdoms, spread from southern Burma, northern and central Thailand and parts of Laos, which were Buddhist; but the name Dvaravati was fashioned on Dvarakavati or Dvaraka of Mahabharata’s Krishna, an incarnation of Hindu deity of Vishnu. Similarly, Kyanzittha, an avowedly Buddhist king of the 11th-13th centuries’ Pagan empire of Burma, had considered himself an incarnation of Vishnu.


This background may have supported the current tradition of the Thai royal court, where the reigning Buddhist king is titled as Rama, another incarnation of Vishnu.


While this religio-spiritual unification had the sanction of the ruling class, the societal integration of the thought was at scriptural as well as at the rituals level.  The 10th century Buddhist text of Indonesia called Sang Hyang Kamahayanikan refers to Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva, the trinity of the Hindu pantheon, as the emanations of Vairochana, the meditating Buddha. One of the famous heritage literatures of Indonesia is 14th century Suta-soma, which is another Buddhist text, which treats Shiva and Buddha as equals or even identical with each other. While both the above texts originated in the Java island of the archipelago, the Bali islanders took the spiritual proximity between Shiva and Buddha to the level of establishing familial relationship between them – according to a 19th century historian’s discovery, Buddha was treated as an younger brother of Shiva by the Balinese, a situation that was found to have been made more intimate in the 20th century where Buddha had become Shiva’s son.


This legacy of spiritual unification is found to have been followed by the natives of the profoundly Hindu Bali even today, where the publicly performed religious rituals involve participation by Hindu as well as Buddhist priests. Cynics may smell a division and paint a picture that suggests one-upmanship between the Hindu and Buddhist ideas, where comparatively higher or lower status may have been assigned to either of them in this process. That, however, is not likely to stand, taking into account the sheer sincerity of purpose and effort that shines through this historical process of unification taking place in that region across centuries. Having presented this picture, it may not be out of place to point out that this effort at Hindu-Buddhist unification was attempted even in India, speculated to have taken place in 11th-12th centuries, which treated Buddha as the ninth out of ten incarnations of Vishnu. This Indian move can rather be viewed as a trigger for a similar process in Southeast Asia that started taking a serious shape in later centuries.


(The writer is a research scholar in international relations. Views personal.) 


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