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By:

Rajiv Shah

22 September 2025 at 8:32:23 pm

New Alliances, New Pressures, New Fault Lines

To its west, old relationships in the Gulf are acquiring new strategic and military dimensions. Across the Atlantic, Washington is increasingly using tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy. At the same time, India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and prepares to host its summit when the grouping is being watched in the West as a potential challenge to the American-dominated global financial order. Individually, these developments may appear unrelated. Put together, they reveal a larger...

New Alliances, New Pressures, New Fault Lines

To its west, old relationships in the Gulf are acquiring new strategic and military dimensions. Across the Atlantic, Washington is increasingly using tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy. At the same time, India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and prepares to host its summit when the grouping is being watched in the West as a potential challenge to the American-dominated global financial order. Individually, these developments may appear unrelated. Put together, they reveal a larger geopolitical churn in which alliances, energy, trade, currencies and economic coercion are becoming interconnected. India finds itself almost at its centre. The emerging Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan security equation deserves particular attention. Saudi Arabia brings enormous financial and energy influence; Türkiye possesses considerable military strength, NATO experience and an expanding defence industry; Pakistan brings a large military establishment and nuclear capability with the open support of Washington. Any arrangement containing a collective-defence commitment naturally acquires significance beyond ordinary diplomatic cooperation. Alongside it, another strategic convergence has gradually developed among India, Israel and the UAE. It would be incorrect to describe this as a formal military alliance. Yet geopolitics does not operate through defence treaties alone. India's extensive defence and technology relationship with Israel, its rapidly expanding economic and strategic partnership with the UAE, and the UAE-Israel relationship following the Abraham Accords have created considerable common ground. I2U2—bringing together India, Israel, the UAE and the United States—added another institutional dimension. Thus, without necessarily becoming opposing military camps, two interesting strategic formations are visible across West Asia: Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan and the looser India–UAE–Israel convergence. Balancing Challenge India faces a similar balancing challenge. The Gulf is not a distant geopolitical theatre for New Delhi. Nearly nine million Indians live and work there. India's energy security, investments, trade and remittance flows are closely connected with the region. The proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor also requires relative stability across this geography. Polarisation in West Asia can therefore rapidly become an Indian economic and strategic problem. There is another question Indian planners cannot ignore. If a future India-Pakistan confrontation escalates, how would any collective-defence commitment involving Pakistan be interpreted by Saudi Arabia and Türkiye? It would be alarmist to assume that either country would automatically enter a conflict against India. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has substantial economic and strategic interests in maintaining good relations with New Delhi. Nevertheless, defence planners are paid to examine possibilities before they become crises. While these equations develop in India's neighbourhood, economic pressure is emerging from Washington. The US Senate has voted 86–11 for legislation intended to increase pressure on Russia by targeting major purchasers of Russian energy. The measure could authorise tariffs reaching 100 per cent against goods from countries continuing large-scale purchases of Russian oil and gas, with India among those potentially exposed. China is powerful enough to shrug off similar challenges from the West." However this does not mean that America has already imposed a 100 per cent tariff on India. Further legislative steps remain necessary, and presidential waiver provisions are important. But the overwhelming Senate vote carries a political message that New Delhi cannot dismiss. Tariffs are no longer merely tools of trade protection; they have become instruments of geopolitical coercion. Washington's argument is understandable: revenues from Russian petroleum help sustain Moscow's economy during the Ukraine war, and reducing those revenues increases pressure on Russia. But in that case what about European countries who too were/are customers of Russian oil? India's question is equally legitimate: who should determine where India purchases the energy required by more than 1.4 billion people? If Russian crude remains commercially advantageous and helps contain domestic energy costs, New Delhi cannot reasonably be expected to make every energy decision according to another country's geopolitical priorities. Strategic partnership cannot become strategic obedience. This is where BRICS enters the larger picture. India holds the BRICS presidency in 2026 and will host its leaders at an unusually sensitive moment. BRICS is no longer merely the original grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Its expansion has considerably increased its demographic, energy and geopolitical weight. More importantly, discussions around BRICS increasingly touch a sensitive nerve in Washington: alternative payment mechanisms, local-currency trade, development finance and the possibility of gradually reducing dependence upon the dollar-dominated international financial system. The BRICS Summit this time is poised to take some decisive steps which may affect western interests especially US. (The writer is an advocate, legal, geopolitical and public policy analyst. Views personal.)

A Leader Adrift

Updated: Mar 17, 2025


Balochistan
Shehbaz Sharif

The recent train hijacking in Balochistan is yet another grim testament to Pakistan’s accelerating descent into chaos. Armed militants from the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) intercepted and seized control of the Peshawar-bound Jaffar Express near Mach, holding passengers hostage in a brazen display of defiance against the Pakistani state. This incident underscores not only the deteriorating security situation in Balochistan but also the sheer inability of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and his government to exert control over a country increasingly resembling a failed state.


Since his return to power in February 2024, Shehbaz has faced an unrelenting barrage of crises - an economy in tatters, skyrocketing inflation, deepening ethnic and sectarian unrest, and a military establishment struggling to impose its will. His leadership, always seen as an extension of the real power centre - the military - has been rendered virtually impotent in the face of growing insurgency and political instability.


Shehbaz Sharif was never expected to be a leader in his own right. His political career has been defined by his role as a crisis manager rather than a visionary statesman. Unlike his elder brother Nawaz Sharif, who commanded a degree of personal authority, Shehbaz has long been seen as the military’s preferred administrator - a technocratic leader capable of executing orders rather than setting the national agenda. However, the challenges before him today are far greater than anything he faced during his tenure as Punjab’s chief minister.


In Punjab, Shehbaz was known for his hands-on approach, personally overseeing infrastructure projects and administrative matters. But governing Pakistan, particularly in its current fragile state, is a different beast altogether. The federal government’s control over large parts of the country is slipping, with Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa increasingly resembling insurgency zones. Meanwhile, even within Punjab, which has historically been the power base of the Sharifs, discontent is growing as economic conditions worsen and political instability festers.


Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest but most neglected province, has long been a hotbed of insurgency. The Baloch separatist movement, catalysed by economic marginalization and heavy-handed military crackdowns, has evolved into a full-fledged rebellion. The recent train hijacking is a stark reminder that the insurgency is no longer confined to remote areas but is now brazenly challenging the state’s authority in broad daylight.


The BLA, which claimed responsibility for the attack, has intensified its operations in recent months, targeting security personnel, government installations, and key infrastructure. Their ability to hijack a train and take hostages without immediate retaliation exposes Islamabad’s weakening grip over the region. Shehbaz’s government issued the usual condemnations, but beyond rhetoric, there is little evidence that he has a coherent strategy to deal with the crisis.


Beyond security concerns, the economic situation in Pakistan continues to spiral out of control. The rupee is in freefall, inflation has skyrocketed and essential commodities are slipping beyond the reach of ordinary citizens. Shehbaz’s government has had to rely on repeated IMF bailouts to prevent economic collapse, but these come with stringent conditions that further erode his popularity.


Foreign investors remain wary of Pakistan’s instability, and local businesses are struggling under the weight of economic mismanagement. For a leader who built his reputation on efficiency, Shehbaz’s inability to stabilize the economy is proving to be one of his biggest failures.


His political challenges are exacerbated by the lingering influence of Imran Khan, whose PTI remains a potent force. Instead of consolidating power, Shehbaz is forced to navigate an uneasy coalition, dependent on allies like the PPP, while also placating an increasingly assertive military.


Traditionally, Pakistan’s military has been the ultimate arbiter of power, but even it appears overstretched. While General Asim Munir maintains a firm grip, the sheer number of internal security threats - from Baloch separatists to Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants - has exposed the limits of the army’s reach.


Shehbaz’s reliance on the military for political survival means he cannot afford to challenge its authority. His tenure is fast proving to be one of firefighting without any real strategy, a premiership defined not by governance but by a desperate attempt to delay the inevitable collapse. If his government continues to drift, Pakistan may soon reach a point where no leader, military or civilian, can prevent it from slipping into the abyss.

 

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