The Leaking Arsenal

As Pakistan and China dive deeper into undersea warfare, India’s ambitions remain stranded by delay, indecision, and the dead weight of bureaucracy.

India’s undersea fleet is showing its age. Of the 17 conventional submarines currently in service, most are over three decades old - creaking veterans that are fast approaching retirement. The Navy’s three nuclear-powered boats offer some relief, and the six new Scorpene-class submarines, built with French help at Mazagon Dock in Mumbai, have bolstered capability. Yet beneath the surface lies a troubling truth that India’s submarine arm, once a source of quiet pride, is losing its technological edge at a time when its rivals are speeding ahead.

At the heart of this lag is a literal failure of propulsion. Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) systems, which allow submarines to stay submerged far longer without surfacing to recharge batteries, have become the new gold standard in undersea warfare. India’s efforts to field an indigenous AIP system have been beset by delays, cost overruns, and technological snags. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has struggled for nearly a decade to operationalise its version, pushing back plans to retrofit the Scorpenes with AIP modules. The complex procedure, known as ‘jumboisation’(cutting open a submarine’s hull, inserting the AIP unit, and welding it back) has been further stalled by the absence of a proven system. What was supposed to be a leap in stealth and endurance has turned into a long dive into bureaucratic inertia.

The next-generation Project-75 (India), or P-75(I), meant to produce six advanced submarines with AIP, has fared little better. The estimated $8.2 billion project has been mired in disputes over cost, technology transfer, and procurement procedures. Germany’s Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems, which partnered with Mazagon Dock, is now the leading contender after France’s Naval Group pulled out, being unwilling to share its prized technologies without ironclad guarantees. The Germans’ Type-214 design, proven in European waters, offers hydrogen fuel-cell AIP and a formidable weapons suite. But with each passing year of dithering and delay, costs climb, suppliers grow wary, and India’s undersea gap widens.

Ominous edge

Meanwhile, Pakistan is racing ahead. The Pakistan Navy, once a minor coastal force, is undergoing a quiet but dramatic transformation. Eight Chinese-built Hangor-class submarines derived from the S26 export model are due for induction, giving Pakistan an AIP-equipped fleet of 11. Each carry six torpedo tubes capable of launching heavyweight Yu-6 torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles like the YJ-18, with ranges that could threaten Indian naval assets and coastal installations. More ominously, Beijing is helping outfit Karachi Shipyard with facilities to maintain and repair these boats, ensuring Pakistan can sustain long deployments deep into the Arabian Sea.

For New Delhi, this is more than a numbers game. AIP-equipped submarines can remain submerged for two to three weeks without surfacing, drastically reducing detectability. In any potential conflict, Pakistan’s enhanced stealth fleet could pose a significant challenge to Indian sea lines of communication and deterrence posture. Even more strategically, China’s deepening involvement in Pakistan’s naval modernisation—through design, training, and sustainment—cements Beijing’s presence in the Arabian Sea and extends its reach into the Indian Ocean. India’s maritime backyard is becoming increasingly crowded.

The Indian government’s response has been predictably cautious. It is now reconsidering a follow-on deal with France for three additional Scorpenes, worth around Rs. 36,000 crore, in favour of the German offer under P-75(I). The decision, expected soon, could define the Navy’s undersea capabilities for the next three decades. The plan calls for six submarines built domestically with full design transfer and hydrogen fuel-cell AIP, echoing the performance of Germany’s Type-212 and Type-214 classes. Each vessel would carry heavyweight torpedoes, anti-ship missiles (possibly the American Harpoon) and naval mines, making it a potent platform for deterrence and offence alike. Yet even under optimistic timelines, the first boat will surface no sooner than seven years after contract signature.

Deeper malaise

India’s predicament reflects a broader malaise in its defence procurement system: a tangle of competing ministries, slow-moving tenders, and risk-averse decision-making. Complex projects, particularly those involving foreign technology transfer, are routinely delayed by procedural red tape and shifting political winds. Defence modernisation, long touted as a pillar of ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ (self-reliant India), too often finds itself hostage to indecision and outdated rules. The submarine saga is only the latest example of how ambition and execution continue to drift apart.

Strategically, the consequences are serious. The Indian Navy’s doctrine rests on keeping adversaries out of its maritime periphery and deterrence through a triad of nuclear-capable forces. Yet without modern, stealthy submarines, these goals risk being undermined. A small but potent Pakistani fleet, backstopped by Chinese logistical support, could tie down Indian assets in the Arabian Sea, forcing New Delhi to divert resources from the wider Indian Ocean. Beijing, already entrenched in Gwadar and Djibouti, would gain an additional lever of influence, using Pakistan’s fleet as an extension of its own.

To be sure, India’s shipyards and scientists have made progress. Mazagon Dock has matured into a capable builder of complex submarines. The DRDO’s AIP prototype, though late, has reportedly completed land-based trials, and plans exist to retrofit it on later Scorpenes. The Navy, too, continues to train aggressively, maintaining a high operational tempo with existing assets. Yet the pace of modernisation remains glacial compared with the speed of regional developments.

The lesson from beneath the waves is that indecision is as corrosive as seawater. In an era when maritime dominance increasingly depends on stealth and endurance, India’s inability to field a credible AIP fleet risks eroding its deterrent posture. The oceans around the subcontinent are becoming the new frontlines of great-power rivalry. Pakistan, with Chinese aid, has understood this. India, with its talent and resources, should have been leading the race. Instead, it finds itself watching from the pier and waiting for the tide of bureaucracy to turn.

(The writer is a retired Naval Aviation Officer and a defence and geopolitical analyst. Views personal.)