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By:

Kiran D. Tare

21 August 2024 at 11:23:13 am

Breaking the Peloton

Harshita Jakhar’s appearance at the Tour de France Femmes is signals India’s arrival in sporting arenas long dominated by Europe. India’s sporting successes have traditionally been concentrated in disciplines where geography or colonial legacy created favourable conditions. While cricket grew into a national religion, hockey delivered decades of global dominance. Wrestling, badminton, shooting and now, increasingly, chess have flourished through sustained investment and nurturing of talent. ...

Breaking the Peloton

Harshita Jakhar’s appearance at the Tour de France Femmes is signals India’s arrival in sporting arenas long dominated by Europe. India’s sporting successes have traditionally been concentrated in disciplines where geography or colonial legacy created favourable conditions. While cricket grew into a national religion, hockey delivered decades of global dominance. Wrestling, badminton, shooting and now, increasingly, chess have flourished through sustained investment and nurturing of talent. Yet some disciplines have remained stubbornly foreign. The Tour de France, for instance, with its punishing mountain stages, century-old European traditions and deeply entrenched professional circuits, belonged firmly to this category. This seemingly impregnable bastion has now been breached by 19-year-old Harshita Jakhar, whose recently became the first Indian woman to feature at the Tour de France Femmes, cycling alongside emerging riders from Afghanistan, Algeria, Chile, Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda under the Union Cycliste Internationale’s World Cycling Talent Programme. While Harshita’s ride through the ceremonial opening of Stage Two of the 2026 Tour de France Femmes may have lasted barely 4.5 kilometres, it was a moment of great import and symbolism. The Tour de France is to cycling what Wimbledon is to tennis. It has been built over generations of mythology and European dominance. For Indian cyclists, merely entering that ecosystem has long seemed a distant aspiration. Harshita’s entry was a signal that despite the barriers still remaining formidable, they are no longer insurmountable. Her participation in this elite event mirrors a broader transformation in Indian sport. With a rise in incomes and an improvement in sporting infrastructure, upwardly mobile Indian families are willing to back unconventional careers. As a result, many young Indians are now venturing into disciplines once regarded as almost exclusively European preserves. Alpine skiing, equestrian events, sailing, rowing and endurance cycling are no longer exotic curiosities reserved for white men and women. The pattern extends well beyond cycling. In 2009, Reena Kaushal Dharmshaktu became the first Indian woman to ski from the Antarctic coast to the South Pole in 2009, while Kaamya Karthikeyan reached the Pole last year as the youngest Indian to do so. Their achievements have expanded the boundaries of what Indians could plausibly aspire to achieve. Harshita’s ride belongs to this tradition. Her own journey has been remarkably grounded. Raised in Rajasthan, she trained at the Sports Authority of India’s National Centre of Excellence in Patiala under the watchful eye of her father, Rakesh Jakhar, himself a former cyclist who competed at the 2010 Commonwealth Games in New Delhi. She snared three gold medals at the 2025 Khelo India Youth Games, which announced her as one of India’s brightest cycling prospects. Earlier, she had collected a silver and two bronze medals at the 2024 Asian Junior Cycling Championships, demonstrating that her promise extended well beyond domestic competition. Cycling presents challenges unlike most Olympic sports with a lot riding on the quality of sporting ecosystems. Unlike India, Europe possesses thousands of kilometres of dedicated cycling routes, professional clubs, sophisticated racing calendars and generations of accumulated expertise. Young riders grow up immersed in a culture where road racing is woven into everyday life. India is only beginning to construct comparable foundations. That makes programmes such as the UCI World Cycling Talent Programme especially valuable. For talents like Harshita, exposure to elite competition cannot be replicated in training camps alone. Riding alongside the world’s best, absorbing tactical nuances, learning race management and simply becoming comfortable within cycling’s highest circles all contribute towards the fulfilment of promise. India’s sporting story increasingly depends on precisely these forms of international integration. Two decades ago, an Indian woman participating in an event associated with the Tour de France would have seemed implausible. But Harshita’s presence has now shattered those barriers. By representing India at one of cycling’s grandest stages, Harshita has expanded the country’s sporting horizon. Young Indian cyclists watching her in Switzerland may now imagine themselves competing in races that previously existed only on television. Her appearance, however symbolic, is part of a tradition where young Indians have begun appearing in sports like Formula racing, rowing, fencing, squash and equestrian events - disciplines that once seemed distant from the country’s sporting DNA. For generations, the peloton belonged almost entirely to Europe. Now, it is making room for the rest of the world. Harshita Jakhar’s ride in Switzerland has shown that India now belongs to the conversation.

An Atomic Shift to Private Capital

India is cautiously courting private capital in its tightly held nuclear sector, seeking scale and innovation without surrendering strategic control.

India’s nuclear sector, long defined by state control and strategic caution, is now edging toward a calibrated opening to private participation. This shift is not a sudden ideological pivot but a pragmatic response to rising energy demand, climate commitments, and fiscal constraints. As India aims to expand its nuclear power capacity significantly over the next two decades, the question is not whether private players will enter, but how deeply they will shape the future of the industry.


For decades, entities like Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited have monopolized nuclear power generation, while BHAVINI has focused on fast breeder reactors. The legal framework, anchored in the Atomic Energy Act of 1962, restricts ownership and operation of nuclear plants to the state. However, recent policy discussions suggest a model where private firms may participate as suppliers, constructors, financiers, or even minority stakeholders in joint ventures, without directly owning reactors.


Privatisation Spree

The drivers behind this ‘privatisation spree’ are clear. India’s electricity demand is projected to double by 2040, while its commitments under global climate frameworks push it toward low-carbon baseload power. Nuclear energy, with its reliability and minimal emissions, fits this role. Yet, the capital-intensive nature of nuclear projects—often running into billions of dollars per reactor—has strained public finances. Opening the door to private capital can accelerate project timelines, improve efficiency, and distribute financial risk.


The emerging corporate interest in this space is no longer speculative; it is taking institutional shape. The Adani Group has formally moved into the nuclear domain by setting up a dedicated subsidiary and is reportedly exploring opportunities around established nuclear hubs such as Rawatbhata Atomic Power Station, signalling that early private participation may cluster around existing state-led sites rather than Greenfield projects. Parallelly, Reliance Industries has shown interest in next-generation technologies such as small modular reactors (SMRs), an area where private participation could accelerate innovation and deployment. However, while there has been broader discussion about Indian firms securing overseas critical mineral assets, concrete public evidence of Reliance directly acquiring uranium mining blocks abroad remains limited.


What is more plausible, and increasingly discussed in policy circles, is the opening up of uranium mining, import, and processing to private players, allowing firms like Reliance to secure long-term fuel supply through partnerships rather than outright ownership of foreign reserves. Other major Indian conglomerates are also positioning themselves for opportunity. Groups like Larsen & Toubro and Tata Group already possess the engineering expertise, manufacturing capacity, and financial strength needed to play critical roles in reactor construction and component supply chains. L&T, in particular, has a long track record in fabricating heavy nuclear equipment, suggesting that privatisation may initially deepen supply chain participation rather than transfer ownership of core assets.


Geopolitical Constraints

However, the pace and scope of privatization will be shaped by regulatory and geopolitical constraints, particularly India’s relationship with the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Although India secured a landmark waiver in 2008, enabling civilian nuclear trade despite being outside the non-proliferation treaty framework, it is still not a full member. This limits its influence over global nuclear commerce rules and complicates technology transfers. Private sector participation will depend heavily on continued access to global nuclear fuel, components, and advanced reactor designs governed by NSG norms.


The role of major global powers remains pivotal. Russia has been India’s most consistent nuclear partner, exemplified by projects like Kudankulam, built with assistance from Rosatom. Moscow’s willingness to provide financing, technology, and long-term fuel supply has made it indispensable. In a more privatized Indian ecosystem, Russian firms may increasingly collaborate with Indian private companies for joint manufacturing and project execution.


The United States entered the picture decisively after the 2008 civil nuclear agreement, opening pathways for companies like Westinghouse Electric Company and GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy. Yet progress has been slow, largely due to India’s nuclear liability regime, which places supplier-side risks that are uncommon globally. Unless these concerns are addressed through insurance pools or legal refinement, large-scale American private participation may remain cautious.


The United Kingdom, while less dominant today, has historically contributed to India’s early nuclear research and institutional development. Its future role is likely to lie in specialized areas—regulatory frameworks, advanced materials, and niche technologies—rather than large reactor deployments.


Looking ahead, privatization—if executed with institutional discipline—could transform India’s nuclear industry in several ways. It can catalyze a robust domestic manufacturing base, reduce import dependence, and foster technological innovation, especially in emerging areas like small modular reactors. It may also introduce greater efficiency in project execution, addressing chronic delays and cost overruns.


Yet, nuclear energy is not an ordinary sector. It carries strategic, environmental, and safety implications that demand uncompromising oversight. Excessive or poorly regulated privatization risks eroding public trust and compromising safety norms. The state must therefore remain the ultimate custodian, even as it invites private participation.


The future of India’s nuclear sector will likely be a hybrid model: state-owned core assets supported by a dynamic ecosystem of private suppliers, investors, and technology partners. This is less a story of privatization in the classical sense and more one of strategic partnership. If managed with foresight, it could not only accelerate India’s clean energy transition but also reposition the country as a significant player in the evolving global nuclear order.


(The writer is a former scientific officer with the Department of Atomic Energy. Views personal.)

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