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By:

Commodore S.L. Deshmukh

31 October 2024 at 8:30:19 am

The Beam That Blinds the Drone

As cheap drones reshape the battlefield, India’s T-SHUL BEAM points to a future in which electronic warfare may matter as much as firepower The drone has definitively become the weapon of choice for the modern battlefield. Cheap, expendable and increasingly autonomous, unmanned aerial vehicles can now threaten troops, armour, airfields and critical infrastructure without requiring the attacker to risk a pilot. Their proliferation has created a corresponding demand for counter-drone systems...

The Beam That Blinds the Drone

As cheap drones reshape the battlefield, India’s T-SHUL BEAM points to a future in which electronic warfare may matter as much as firepower The drone has definitively become the weapon of choice for the modern battlefield. Cheap, expendable and increasingly autonomous, unmanned aerial vehicles can now threaten troops, armour, airfields and critical infrastructure without requiring the attacker to risk a pilot. Their proliferation has created a corresponding demand for counter-drone systems that can respond quickly and at a cost proportionate to the threat. This is where beam-based anti-drone technology enters the picture. Broadly, such systems fall into two categories. Hard-kill systems use concentrated laser energy to physically damage or destroy a drone. Soft-kill systems, by contrast, use radio-frequency or electromagnetic energy to disrupt the electronic links that allow a drone to communicate, navigate and transmit information. Sophisticated Weaponry Hard-kill laser systems focus an intense beam of light on a vulnerable part of an incoming UAV - its carbon-fibre structure, control surfaces, battery or other critical components. The concentrated energy rapidly heats the target, potentially burning through its structure or disabling optical sensors and bringing the aircraft down. India’s DRDO has demonstrated a 30kW laser system, while Israel’s Rafael has developed the Lite Beam system. Soft-kill systems take a different route. Rather than physically destroying the aircraft, they interfere with the electronic architecture that keeps it airborne. Directional radio-frequency energy can disrupt command-and-control links, video feeds, telemetry and satellite-navigation signals such as GPS or other GNSS services. Depending on the drone and the nature of the disruption, the aircraft may be forced to land, return to its launch point or lose control. It is in this category that the T-SHUL BEAM system developed by Indian defence company IG Defence deserves attention. T-SHUL BEAM is a man-portable, directional counter-drone system designed for tactical deployment. Its multi-band radio-frequency architecture is intended to target several of the links on which unmanned aerial systems depend, including command-and-control, telemetry, video transmission and GNSS navigation. Its directional configuration allows an operator to concentrate electronic countermeasures on a particular aerial target rather than indiscriminately radiating energy across a large area. That matters on a battlefield where the warning time against a small UAV or first-person-view drone may be measured in seconds. The appeal of such a system is therefore not simply that it can counter a drone. It is that it can potentially bring counter-drone capability closer to the soldier and to the tactical edge. Large counter-UAS installations have their place, particularly around fixed and high-value assets. But forward units require systems that can move with them, be deployed rapidly and operate against small, low-cost unmanned platforms without imposing the logistical burden associated with conventional weapons. The T-SHUL BEAM’s significance also lies in its proposed integration with an artificial-intelligence-enabled battle-management architecture. IG Drones, the original equipment manufacturer, has stated that T-SHUL BEAM has been integrated with GRID, its indigenous AI-powered platform. The GRID architecture is intended to bring sensors, intelligence systems, unmanned platforms and command elements into a common operational framework. The attraction of such integration is obvious. Countering drones is increasingly less about a single weapon and more about the speed of the kill chain: detecting a threat, identifying it, deciding what response is appropriate and directing that response before the target disappears. An AI-enabled command architecture can potentially improve situational awareness, facilitate real-time threat detection and coordinate different systems operating simultaneously. This is particularly relevant as drone warfare evolves from isolated attacks towards increasingly complex and potentially swarming operations. A battlefield crowded with drones cannot be managed effectively if every sensor and weapon operates as a separate island. The advantage will increasingly belong to forces capable of turning disparate streams of information into a coherent picture and responding at machine speed. The T-SHUL BEAM’s reported demonstration at Pokhran represents another step in India’s attempt to build a domestic ecosystem spanning drones, counter-drones, artificial intelligence and electronic warfare. Counter-drone warfare is likely to be a recurring requirement rather than a niche capability. Importing every component of such an ecosystem would leave India vulnerable to supply-chain disruptions, technology restrictions and foreign-exchange pressures. Indigenous development, even when undertaken by relatively small private-sector companies, can broaden the country’s technological base and give the armed forces greater freedom to adapt systems to their operational requirements. Economics of the Contest Yet the real measure of any counter-drone system will ultimately be operational rather than promotional. Electronic warfare is inherently a contest between countermeasure and counter-countermeasure. Drone designers can alter frequencies, communications protocols, navigation methods and levels of autonomy. A system that is effective against one generation of drones may require modification against the next. The battlefield, in other words, will remain a technological arms race. The economics of the contest nevertheless favour directed-energy and electronic-warfare solutions. A conventional interceptor expends a missile or projectile against each target. A beam-based system can, subject to its power supply, engagement envelope and other operational constraints, engage targets without expending conventional ammunition. The marginal cost of an interception can consequently be dramatically lower. The beam also travels at effectively the speed of light, removing the flight time associated with kinetic interceptors. In densely populated areas or around sensitive infrastructure, bringing down a drone with a projectile can create its own hazards. Electronic disruption, when properly controlled, offers the possibility of neutralising the threat without sending an interceptor crashing back to earth. These advantages should not obscure the limitations. Soft-kill systems depend on the vulnerabilities of the target’s electronic architecture and may be less effective against increasingly autonomous drones that require fewer external communications. Weather, range, power availability, frequency management and the sophistication of an adversary's electronic countermeasures can all affect performance. No single technology is likely to provide a complete answer. The future of counter-drone warfare will therefore belong not to the beam alone but to layered defence combining. The emergence of systems such as T-SHUL BEAM suggests that India is beginning to build the technological pieces of that architecture at home. (The writer is a retired naval aviation officer and a defence and geopolitical analyst. Views personal.)

Bullet Politics

May 15
2 min read

India’s latest anxieties over the renewed conflict in West Asia, and the accompanying fear of another fuel shock, has produced a flurry of political symbolism. Following Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s call for austerity, the Maharashtra government unveiled a Standard Operating Procedure urging ministers and officials to cut fuel consumption, avoid foreign tours, hold virtual meetings and embrace electric vehicles. Then came the pièce de résistance: Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis riding a Bullet motorcycle from Varsha to Mantralaya, accompanied by Minister Ashish Shelar.


While the gesture was designed to project restraint and solidarity with ordinary citizens who are bracing for higher petrol and diesel prices, it risks looking faintly theatrical. Fadnavis is among India’s more competent administrators. He has little need for choreographed displays of modesty. Maharashtra does not require its Chief Minister to cosplay as a fuel-conscious commuter. It requires him to govern well.


Indeed, one suspects that many residents of Mumbai and Pune would happily tolerate a Chief Ministerial convoy if in return they received roads that did not resemble obstacle courses after every monsoon. A smoother commute saves more fuel than a symbolic motorcycle ride ever will. Vehicles trapped for hours in snarled traffic, inching across cratered roads and unfinished flyovers, consume fuel with remarkable efficiency. Urban India’s great fuel wastage, prominent in crowded cities like Mumbai and Pune, is not ministerial convoys but infrastructural dysfunction.


There is something faintly misplaced about governments lecturing citizens on conservation while presiding over traffic systems that guarantee maximum inefficiency. Pune’s commuters routinely spend hours crawling through chaotic junctions. Mumbai’s motorists endure endless bottlenecks caused by perpetual construction, poor road maintenance and planning that appears to have been conceived during a power outage. If Maharashtra genuinely wishes to reduce fuel consumption, its government should begin not with optics but with repairing the asphalt.


That said, the State government’s push for electric vehicles and charging infrastructure is sensible enough. Encouraging virtual meetings instead of bureaucratic pilgrimage is also long overdue. The cancellation of foreign tours, though largely symbolic in fiscal terms, at least conveys some awareness that governments ought to share public anxieties during periods of economic uncertainty.


But symbolism has limits when it begins to undermine practicality. A Chief Minister is not an ordinary commuter. He is a high-security protectee governing India’s richest and politically most consequential state. Security protocols exist for reasons that transcend public relations. The Chief Minister weaving through Mumbai traffic on a motorcycle may delight social media managers, but it is less likely to delight security professionals.


Governance in modern India increasingly risks becoming a branch of performance art. Ministers wield brooms for cameras, travel in metro trains for a day or cycle to work.


Fadnavis should resist that temptation. His reputation rests not on populist theatrics but on managerial competence. Maharashtra faces problems substantial enough to occupy a full-time government. None will be solved from the saddle of a Royal Enfield. 


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