Can BRICS+ Build a New Order?

While BRICS+ may not be a match for the West at the moment, its ambitions and resources make it a force to watch.

One person notably uneasy about the recently concluded BRICS+ summit was Donald Trump, who viewed the grouping as a threat to American dominance. While Trump often reacts unpredictably, BRICS may not pose an immediate challenge to the United States. Over the long term, however, it holds significant potential to rival not just America, but the broader economic clout of the G7.

Surprisingly, the BRIC concept did not originate in diplomacy but in a financial analyst’s imagination. In 2001 Jim O’Neill, an economist at Goldman Sachs, coined the acronym in a paper titled Building Better Global Economic BRICs, identifying Brazil, Russia, India and China as rising economic powers set to drive global growth in the 21st century. His analysis projected that the group could dominate the global economy by 2050.

BRIC’s evolution from acronym to alliance began in 2006, when the foreign ministers of the four countries met informally on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. This marked the beginning of structured cooperation. The first formal summit followed in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in June 2009, amid the fallout from the global financial crisis. In 2010, South Africa joined the group, adding a new continent and transforming BRIC into BRICS.

Post-war institutions such as the UN, World Bank and IMF were intended to foster development, but quickly fell under the sway of the Western bloc, particularly America.

BRICS aims to reform these institutions, amplify the voice of emerging economies, and promote a multipolar world through deeper trade, investment and financial cooperation. Its goal is a more balanced and inclusive global order, less dominated by a handful of rich nations.

The 2009 summit in Yekaterinburg laid the groundwork, with calls for reforming global financial architecture and advocating for a more diversified reserve currency. South Africa’s formal induction in 2011 at the Sanya Summit broadened the bloc’s geographic and economic reach. A watershed came in 2014 at Fortaleza, where BRICS launched its first institutional pillars: the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), a $100bn pool aimed at providing financial stability to members. The CRA remains unused, but symbolises the group’s intent to provide alternatives to Western-dominated systems.

The 2023 Johannesburg summit marked a turning point, with six countries—Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE—invited to join. Though Argentina later withdrew and Saudi Arabia remains undecided, the expansion was driven by aspirations to amplify the bloc’s voice for the Global South. Indonesia joined as the tenth member in January 2025. At the 2024 Kazan summit, BRICS introduced a new ‘partner country’ category, granting this status to Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. This enlarged framework enhances representation for the Global South and opens doors to greater trade, investment and supply-chain resilience.

BRICS+ now represents about 40 percent of global GDP (in purchasing-power terms), 45 percent of the world’s population, and 24 percent of global trade. It also controls roughly 72 percent of rare earth minerals, 44 percent of global oil output, and 36 percent of natural gas production, making it indispensable to energy markets and global supply chains. Despite growing dialogue and cooperation, intra-BRICS trade remains below potential. New frameworks, such as the BRICS 2030 Economic Partnership Strategy, aim to accelerate integration and reduce trade barriers.

The NDB, perhaps the bloc’s most successful institutional initiative, was launched in 2015 in Shanghai. It has approved more than 120 projects worth $32.8bn, mostly in infrastructure and sustainable development. With $100bn in authorised capital and equal voting rights among founding members, the bank blends financial muscle with shared leadership. It has expanded beyond BRICS, admitting Bangladesh, the UAE, Egypt, Uruguay and Algeria. The bank is placing increased emphasis on local-currency financing and regional operations. Related initiatives like BRICS Pay seek to reduce dependency on the U.S. dollar. Early-stage discussions on a common BRICS currency have already rattled Washington, drawing sharp words from Trump about the greenback’s diminishing influence.

Yet despite institutional progress, BRICS is hobbled by structural tensions. The India–China border dispute remains the most acute. Russia’s war in Ukraine has exposed diplomatic rifts, particularly over sanctions. Vast differences in economic development, China’s outsized economic weight and the bloc’s informal structure hamper effective decision-making. The inclusion of rivals such as Iran and Saudi Arabia may add further friction. Perceptions of Chinese or Russian dominance, coupled with their autocratic governance styles, risk undermining BRICS’ appeal to emerging democracies.

India’s engagement reflects its long-standing policy of strategic autonomy. It maintains strong relations with China and Russia, while deepening ties with the West. India supports reforming—not replacing—global institutions, consistent with its quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. BRICS offers alternative channels for trade and development finance, particularly through the NDB. Yet India has remained cautious about expanding membership, backing entrants that align with its strategic calculus. Its participation in both BRICS and Western-led initiatives like the Quad reflects a policy of multi-alignment. But as geopolitical tensions rise, this balancing act is becoming harder to sustain.

BRICS+ is not yet a counterweight to the West. But it is no longer a talking shop either. With growing control over strategic resources, rising economic heft and an expanding global reach, it is emerging as a consequential player in global affairs. Whether it evolves into a constructive force for reform or a disruptive challenge to the liberal order will depend on the choices of its members, particularly India, in the years ahead.

(The author is a Chartered Accountant with a leading company in Mumbai. Views personal.)