Cracks Within
- Correspondent
- 2 days ago
- 2 min read
Political parties can survive scandals and electoral setbacks. What they often struggle to survive is the loss of purpose that follows a crushing defeat. The decision by 20 rebel Trinamool Congress MPs to merge with the Nationalist Citizens Party of India and extend support to the NDA is best understood through that lens. Much commentary has focused on the arithmetic of Parliament and the legal intricacies of anti-defection laws. Yet the deeper story is about what happens to a political movement when it ceases to be the principal vehicle of power.
Only weeks ago, the Trinamool Congress suffered the most devastating setback in its history. After fifteen years in office, it was swept from power by the BJP, which now governs West Bengal under Chief Minister Suvendu Adhikari. Instead of triggering any introspection, it has triggered a complete disintegration.
That should not come as a surprise. The Trinamool had largely held together by Mamata Banerjee’s cult of personality and electoral success. Once that success disappeared, latent tensions within the party began surfacing with remarkable speed.
The scale of the rebellion within TMC makes clear that many senior leaders had concluded that the Trinamool, in its current form, offered little prospect of revival.
Rather than immediately joining the BJP, the rebels have chosen a more circuitous route apparently designed to navigate the legal constraints imposed by anti-defection laws. Whether that strategy withstands judicial scrutiny remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that the rebels are seeking not merely survival but leverage. Their support strengthens the NDA’s position in Parliament at a moment when important legislative battles loom ahead.
For the BJP, the development presents both opportunities and risks. Additional parliamentary numbers are always welcome. Yet the party must also guard against becoming a refuge for every politician seeking shelter after electoral defeat. Bengal voters endorsed change partly because they were weary of the political culture associated with the previous regime. They may not look kindly upon its wholesale importation into the new order.
For the Trinamool, the crisis is existential. Legal challenges may slow the rebels’ advance, but courtrooms cannot substitute for political renewal. The party’s leadership confronts the uncomfortable possibility that the rebellion is not the cause of its troubles but a consequence of them.
History suggests that opposition parties can recover from even the most severe setbacks. But recovery requires adaptation, new leadership and a compelling vision.
The question is no longer whether it can return to power. It is whether it can remain a credible political force long enough to attempt a comeback. Their loss of power has exposed how much of the organisation’s cohesion depended on access to office rather than adherence to a common political project.


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